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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 1979 
No. 
79-8 5 6 
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
PRESIDENT JAMES EARL CARTER and 
SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE, 
Resoondents. 
MOTION BY PETITIONERS FOR EXPEDITIOUS 
CONSIDERATION OF THEIR PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIOR.~RI AND OTHER RELIEF 
Supreme Court l' .S. 
F I T. ;-. . • > 
DEC S 1919 
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK 
Petitioners, through their undersigned counsel, 
respectfully pray that this Court grant expeditious consid-
eration t ·o their Petition for Writ of Certiorari To The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
filed herewith. 
On November 30, 1979, the Court of Appeals, en bane, 
reversed the October 17, 1979 judgment of the District Court, 
and held, in a per curiarn opinion, that the Executive :i;,ossesses 
the constitutional power to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty 
with the Republic of China (6 U.S.T. 433) without any form of 
approval by the Legislative Branch. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 
' 79-2246 (D.C.Cir. Nov. 30, 1979) (Wright, C.J., and Tamm, J., I 
concurring in the result) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). According to the notice of termination 
-2-
given by the Executive on December 23, 1978, the Mutual 
Defense Treaty will be terminated on January 1, 1980. 
If this Court does not dispose of this case by 
December 31, 1979, the matter will be moot and the consti-
tutional powers of the Congress will be irrevocably usurped 
by the Executive. Consequently, Petitioners request that 
under Rule 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the time 
for Respondents Opposition to the Petition be shortened and 
that any such opposition be filed by 5:00 p.m., December 6, 
1979, so that this Court may have the opportunity to consider 
the Petition as early as December 7, 1979. 
If the Petition is granted, it is suggested that since 
time is of the essence, the Court dispens~ with the requirement 
of an Appendix under Rule 36 and instead proceed to hear the 
case on the original record which is being certified and trans-
mitted pursuant to Rule 21 from the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioners also suggest an expedited briefing schedule, 
with cross-briefs filed and exchanged on December 13, 1979, a~d , 
optional reply briefs filed by December 17, with oral argument 
on December 19, or at such time as the Court's schedule permits. 
Petitioners are also prepared to waive the filing of briefs and 
to have this case heard on the parties' briefs and papers filed 
in the Court of Appeals because of the unusual time constraints 
in this case. Petitioners will accomodate this 
Court's schedule to hear this case as much as possible. 
Finally, Petitioners request that because of the time 
considerations, that the Court temporarily suspend Rule 39(1} 
regarding the printing format of the Appendix to the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari and to accept the 20 copies of the temporary 
Appendix with the 40 copies of the printed Petition. Petitioners 
will file 40 replacement copies of the Appendix in a form that 
complies with Rule 39 as soon as they are printed . 
. ... .... ,···~···~ , .- . ..,,_. _ .,.._ - ,-~~ .. 
' I 
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~-~-,\~v,-,- ,, -l6 . TERRY: E~1ERS0N ~ ', ~ 
427 Russell Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
(202)224-2235 
Respectfully submitted, 
~\'\',~ ., J\ .FJ\.~ .1,.-v UV"J ( v ~ 0 Q ti\L 
-DANIELL J. POPEO 
Washington Legal Foundation 
1612 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
OF COUNSEL: ~:~t;-::~ 
EUGENE V. ROSTOW PAUL;~ ·{.ANENAR 
Sterling Professor of Law 910 Seventeenth Street, N.W. 
Yale University Law School Tenth Floor ' 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Washington, D.C. 20006 
I (202) ~223-3148 
CHARLES E. RICE Nv\"r'µ.~ (! ~'\)\~ 
Professor of Law NORTHCUTT LY 
University of Notte Dame ROBERT F. PIETROWSKI, JR. 
Law School RALPH J. GILLIS 
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 Law Offices of Northcutt Ely 
J. DANIEL ~L~HONEY 
Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives 
51 West 51st Street 
New York, New York 10019 
December 3, 1979 
Watergate 600 Building 
Washington~ D.C. 20037 
(202) 342-0800 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL.~ 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 














Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion to alter 
or amend the Court's judgment in this case of June 6, 1979, 
the memoranda in support thereof and in opposition thereto, 
the arguments of counsel in open Court, the entire record 
herein, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum 
of this same date, it is by the Court this 
October, 1979, 
17~ day of 
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend 
the judgment of June 6, 1979 be, and hereby is, granted; and 
it is further 
ORDERED that the Order and accompanying Memorandum 
of June 6, 1979, be, and hereby is, altered and amended by this 
Order and accompanying Memorandum of this same date; and it is 
further 
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss or, in 
the alternative, for summary judgment be, and hereby is, denied; 
and it is further 
ORDERED that plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary 
judgment be, and hereby is, granted; and it is further 
ORDERED that it be, and hereby is, declared as the 
Judgment of this Court that defendant President Carter's notice 
107A 
--
of termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
United States and the Republic of China must receive the 
approval of two-thirds of the United States Senate or a 
majority of both houses of Congress for that notice to be 
effective under our Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense 
Treaty of 1954; and it is further 
ORDERED that defendant Secretary of State Cyrus R. 
Vance and his subordinate officers be, and hereby are, enjoined 
from taking any action to implement the President's notice of 
termination unless and until that notice is approved as herein 
declared. 




UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL. ·, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 














Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion under Rule 59(e) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the 
Court's judgment in this case of June 6, 1979. This suit was 
brought by eight members of the United States Senate, a former 
senator, and sixteen members of the House of Representatives 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the notice given 
by defendant President Carter to the Republic of China ("ROC" or 
"Taiwan") to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Republic of China. Plaintiffs 
seek to have this Court declare that the termination of the 
1954 Treaty cannot be legally accomplished, nor can notice 
be given of intended termination, without the advice and 
consent of the United States Senate or the approval of both 
houses of Congress. Plaintiffs contend that President 
Carter's unilateral notice of termination violated their 
legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the termina-
tion and also impaired the effectiveness of prior votes 
approving the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty . .... 
By Memorandum-Order dated June 6, 1979, the Court 
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice on the 
ground that plaintiffs lacked standing. Under the circumstances 
109A 
then presented, the Court believed that plaintiffs had not 
suffered the requisite injury in fact to support standing. The 
Court now concludes, for the reasons set forth in Part II A of 
this Memorandum, that all plaintiffs with the exception of 
1/ 
former Senator Curtis- have suffered and are suffering a 
present judicially cognizable injury in their capacity as 
individual legislators. Accordingly, the Court hereby alters 
and amends its judgment of June 6, 1979 to hold that these plain-
tiffs have standing to seek a judicial declaration with respect 
to the constitutionality of the President's unilateral termina-
tion of the 1954 Treaty. The Court further concludes, for the 
reasons set forth in Part II B, that this case does not present 
a nonjusticiable political question, and thus the issue of treaty 
termination should be decided on the merits. 
For the reasons set forth in Part III of this Memorandum, 
the Court holds that the termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
China cannot be constitutionally accomplished without the advice 
and consent of the United States Senate or the approval of 
both houses of Congress. 
I. 
A full discussion of the events leading up to the 
110A 
present diplomatic situation is contained in the Court's Memorandum-
Order of June 6, 1979, and is incorporated herein by reference. The 
17 The Court continues to reject the particular standing claims of 
plaintiffs Thurmond and Curtis that are grounded on the allega-
tion that the President's action has impaired the effective-
ne~s of their prior votes approving the 1954 Treaty. An 
in~erest in ensuring enforcement or the proper administration 
of laws for which a legislator has voted is insufficient to 
confer standing. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 213-
14 (D.C. Cir. 1977~Harrin~ton v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 
459 (4th Cir. 1975). All p aintiffs other than former 
Senator Curtis also claim an injury to their legislative right 
to be consulted and to vote on treaty termination, and it is 
this injury that the Court now finds sufficient to support 
standing. 
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essential dispute concerns the constitutional validity of 
President Carter's unilateral notice of termination of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty, given on December 23, 1978 through the United 
States Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. According 
to the notice, the termination will be effective January l, 1980 
pursuant to the termination clause contained in Article X of the 
2/ 
treaty. The President has not submitted, for the purpose of 
obtaining legislative concurrence, the notice of termination to 
3/ 
either the Senate or the Congress as a whole.- Instead the 
President maintains, and has continued to maintain, that he 
possesses the unilateral authority under the Constitution to 
terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. 
II. 
Before reaching the merits of that constitutional ques-
tion, however, it remains necessary to resolve the threshold issues 
of standing and political question, which are subsumed within the ~ 
concept of justiciability. These inquiries become particularly 
sensitive in the context of a suit by Senators and Congressmen 
seeking to challenge executive action, because of the accompanying 
political overtones and separation of powers concerns. Although 
in this context, standing to sue and the political question doc-
trine are interrelated to a large degree, the Court, as it did 





Article X of the treaty contains a termination clause which 
states that the treaty "shall remain in force indefinitely," 
but continues: "Either party may terminate it one year after 
notice has been given to the other party." 
Had.this been done under Senate Rules VII and XXVIII the 
President's message would have been given priority. Defer-
ential attention in the Senate where both the Majority leader 
and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Coll'llllittee 
support the President's position would be expected. 
See Reuss~- Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
aenied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 





In moving this Court for an order to alter or amend 
its judgment of June 6, plaintiffs contend that the require-
ments for injury in fact expressed in the Court's earlier 
opinion have been satisfied and that they now have standing 
to assert their derivative constitutional rights. 
It has been noted that no special standards govern 
congressional standing questions. As articulated by the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a legislator 
must satisfy the same basic requirements for standing as any 
other litigant: (1) that he has suffered injury in fact; (2) 
that the interests being asserted are within the zone of interests 
to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question; (3) that the injury is caused by the challenged action; 
and (4) that the injury is capable of being redressed by a 
favorable decision. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204, 205 
n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1977). At issue here is the existence of injury 
in fact, a constitutionally mandated requirement inherent in 
the Article III "case or .controversy" limitation on federal 
judicial power. See Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
The Court of Appeals, beginning with its important 
5/ 
decision in Kennedy v. Sampson,- has developed a comprehensive 
body of law setting forth an analytical framework for 
approaching cases involving congressional standing. The theory 
of standing established in Kennedy is one of derivative injury, 
5~! F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Kennedy, the Court held 
that the plaintiff Senator had standing to seek a declara-
tory judgment that a bill for which he had voted had become 
law despite a presidential pocket veto. The Senator's vote 
in favor of the bill and his constitutional right to partici-
pate in a vote to override the veto had been nullified by 




based upon the right of each individual legislator to partici-
6/ 
pate in the exercise of the powers of the institution.- This 
concept of derivative institutional injury requires a plaintiff 
Congressman to show, first, an injury in fact to the institution 
of Congress, and, second, that as an individual legislator he 
has been injured in fact because of the harm done to the insti-
tution. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). The institutional injury alleged by plaintiffs here is 
that President Carter's unilateral notice of termination of the 
1954 Treaty has violated the constitutional right of Congress 
7/ 
to be consulted and to vote on that termination.- Under the 
circumstances present at the time of the Court's June 6 decision, 
the Court could not discern the existence of a definite and con-
crete institutional injury, and thus held that the individual 
legislators could not claim a derivative injury to their par-
ticipatory rights. In large part this was due to what the Court 
perceived as a substantial likelihood of resolution of the 
treaty termination issue through the legislative process and 
the Court's reluctance to . interfere with a potential political 
solution. 
The question of the availability of alternative 
political remedies to redress executive action is indeed 
another dimension underlying the congressional standing 
Id. at 435-36. 
113A 
~/ 
II In Kennedy v. Sampson, the nullification of a specific con-
stitutionally prescribed vote was sufficient to constitute 
injury in fact. Id. at 436. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 
190 4 211 (D.C. Cir:-1977). Th~mpairment of other rights of 
Cort"gress conferred by the Constitution may also serve as a 
basis for standing under the participatory rights analysis of 
Kennedy. See Note, Contressional Access to the Federal Courts, 
90 Harv. L-:--llev. 1632, 641 (1977). The right to participate 




cases and the insistence on a clear showing of injury in fact.-
It is in this context that the prudential and functional con-
cerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962), the leading statement on the political question 
doctrine, interrelates with the analysis of congressional 
standing. Both reflect the deference to be accorded a coordi-
nate branch of government under our system of separation of 
9/ 
powers.- Hence, courts are justifiably concerned when a suit 
by individual legislators seeks to vindicate derivative rights 
susceptible to being adequately redressed in the political arena. 
The potential availability of a remedy through the 
legislative process, however, is not conclusive on the 
question of injury in fact and thus certainly not fatal to a 
legislator's standing claim. Metcalf v. National Petroleum 
Council, 553 F.2d 176, 189 n.129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Reuss v. 
Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 997 (1978); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 n.17 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). Rather, in deference to the fundamental constitutional 
principle of separation of powers and in order to avoid 
abuse of the judicial process, the Court must require a clear 
showing of injury in fact. In each case where a denial of 
standing has been based in part on the existence of alternative 
political remedies, there was no impediment to the legislative 
process whatsoever and the powers of the plaintiff Congressmen 
8/ 
114A 
See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
aenied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 
190, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Petroleum 
Council, 553 F.2d 176, 189 & n.129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington 
v.·Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Public 
Citizen v. Sam1son, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1018 D.C. Cir. 1975). 
See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 
190, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Note, Con~ressional Access to the 




remained rather clearly undiminished.~ In those instances, 
there was a genuine risk that granting standing could have 
10/ Thus in Public Citizen v. Samhson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 
1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1 18 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a group 
of 17 Congresiiiien challenged a General Services Administra-
tion regulation authorizing agencies to grant exclusive 
rights to patents developed under federal research con-
tracts. The Court found no injury in fact and denied 
standing because promulgation of the regulation could not 
deprive Congress of its "uncontested right and power" to 
dispose of government property by proposing legislation 
regulating the contractual authority of GSA. The powers 
of the plaintiff Congressmen in that case were not diminished 
in any respect. 
Comparable factual situations were posed in Metcalf v. 
National Petrolewn Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 
and Harrin~ton v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In 
Metcalf, t e plaintiff Senator alleged that the NPC and 
Its subgroups were unlawfully functioning as advisory com-
mittees in violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
and the Federal Energy Administration Act. Standing was 
denied partly on the basis that plaintiff's power to act 
in his role as legislator and Subcommittee chairman to 
acquire accurate, unbiased information was completely 
intact. 553 F.2d at 189. In HarrinEton, a Congressman 
sued for a declaration that certainIA activities were 
in excess of the agency's statutory authority, and an 
injunction prohibiting the CIA from using the funding and 
reporting provisions of the CIA Act of 1949 in connection 
with those illegal activities. The Court again denied 
standing, noting that the legislative process regarding 
the power to prescribe CIA activities remained unimpeded, 
and that plaintiff to a large extent was attempting to 
get more information concerning CIA funding than the 
Congress wished him." to have. 553 F.2d at 199 n.41, 201 
n.50, 214-15. 
Finally, in Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), the Court of Appeals 
again appeared to base its denial of standing in part on 
the existence of an alternative political remedy. In that 
case a Congressman sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
alleging that 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) provided for an unconstitu-
tional composition of the Federal Open Market Committee of 
the Federal Reserve System in violation of the Appointments 
Clause of the Constitution. In rejecting plaintiff's theory 
of legislator standing, the Court noted that the Congress-
man could simply introduce a bill requiring all FOMC members 
to be presidential appointees, and thus that "no supposed 
impairment of his legislative functions [was] due, in any 
pa,tt, to the actions or omissions of the named defendants." 
584 F.2d at 468. See also Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 
455, 459 (4th Cir.-r9"7'51--1bo1ding that plaintiff Congress-
man lacked standing to challenge military expenditures as 
violative of statutes limiting United States involvement in 
Southeast Asia because of the available legislative solu-
tion of tightening the statutory restrictions). 
-7-
; 
the effect of interfering with or circumventing the legislative 
process~ and thus provide judicial redress for Congressmen 
who had simply failed to take advantage of, or to succeed in 
persuading their colleagues to take advantage of, an expedient 
opportunity for legislative action. The Court is convinced 
that this suit is distinguishable, given the present legislative 
posture and the nature of the derivative injury claimed. 
At the time of the Court's June 6 decision, at least 
three resolutions dealing with the treaty termination power 
and the notice of termination given with respect to the 1954 
Mutual Defense Treaty were then pending before, and apparently 
11/ 
being actively considered by, the United States Senate.~ The 
Court was especially concerned that a premature judicial declara-
tion might circumvent legislative action directed at either 
approving or rejecting the President's notice of termination. 
Believing that the resolution of the ultimate issue of treaty 
termination authority in this case should in the first instance 
be in the legislative forum, the Court stated that its judicial 
powers should be exercised only after the legislative branch 
. 12/ 
had been given the opportunity of acting.~ At that time there 
was no indication whether the Senate or the Congress as a whole 
intended to assert a right to participate in the treaty termina-
tion process, nor whether the action likely to be taken would 
be such that a judicial declaration would interfere with it. 
The legislative branch has now had further opportunity 
to act. On June 6, 1979, within hours after the Court's initial 
11/ Meii7orandum Opinion of June 6, 1979, at 9 n.13. 
there was a commitment by the Senate leadership 
tion 15 would be considered not later than June 
Cong. Rec. S2297-S2305 (March 8, 1979). 






ruling in this case, the United States Senate voted 59 to 35 to 
adopt an amendment proposed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, containing 
13/ 
language identical to original Senate Resolution 15,~ as a 
14/ 
substitute for the substitute amendment~ proposed by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Collmlittee. 125 Cong. Rec. S7038-7039 
(June 6, 1979). The language adopted by the Senate vote reads 
as follows: 
That it is the sense of the Senate that 
approval of the United States Senate is required 
to terminate any mutual defense treaty between the 
United States and another nation. 
125 Cong. Rec. S7015. Subsequent to that vote, additional amend-
ments were proposed by Senator Church, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and by Senator Goldwater, a plaintiff in this 
15/ 




Senate Resolution 15 was introduced by Senator Harry F. 
Byrd on January 18, 1979. 125 Cong. Rec. S220. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Connnittee, on May 1, reported 
Resolution 15 with an amendment to strike all after the 
resolving clause and insert substitute language providing 
several grounds for unilateral Presidential terminations of 
treaties. 125 Cong. Rec. S5018. It was this substitute 
Committee amendment that was displaced by the Byrd amendment 
on June 6. 
The Church amendment would add the following language: 
The provisions of this Resolution shall not apply 
with respect to any treaty the notice of termination 
of which was transmitted prior to the date of adop-
tion of this Resolution. 
125 Cong. Rec. S7061 (June 6, 1979). The Goldwater amendment 
would add the following language: 
(1) The provisions of this resolution shall not be 
construed to approve or disapprove of the proposed 
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the 
Republic of China, such proposed termination not 
having been submitted to the Senate or the Congress 
-- for approval prior to the date of adoption of this 
resolution. 
(2) Nor shall anything in this resolution reduce 
or prejudice any of the Constitutional powers of the 
Senate. 
125 Cong. Rec. S7861-62 (June 18, 1979). 
-9-
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Resolution 15 as amended by Senator Harry F. Byrd's language 
has been returned to the Senate calendar without further action. 
The vote in favor of the Byrd amendment does not constitute final 
16/ 
action by the Senate,~ although it stands as the last expression 
of Senate position on its constitutional role in the treaty termi-
nation process. By that vote, the Senate rejected a Committee 
substitute that would have expressly approved of the action 
17/ 
taken by the President in terminating this treaty.~ No further 
steps have been taken by the Senate with respect to treaty 
termination powers. 
The action taken by the Senate has admittedly not been 
decisive. It does, however, evidence at least some congressional 
determination to participate in the process whereby a mutual 
defense treaty is terminated, and clearly falls short of approving 
18/ 
the President's termination effort.~ At the same time, as was 
lloA 
true in Kennedy v. Sampson, Congress has given no indication that it 
disapproves of the individual suits, and there appears to be no action 
19 / 
presently planned with which a judicial declaration would interfere.~ 
16/ 
17/ 
See Declaration of Murray Zweben, Parliamentarian of the 
Senate, dated June 29, 1979, submitted in support of 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment of June 6, 1979. 
One of the grounds for unilateral Presidential treaty termina-
tion provided in the Committee substitute was "where ... 
provisions of the treaty itself, give rise to a right of 
termination or suspension on the part of the United States 
.... " 125 Cong. Rec. S7014 (June 6, 1979). Article X 
of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty contains a termination 
clause giving either party the right to terminate one year 
after notice. See note 2, supra. 
The Court continues to reject defendants' suggestion that the 
enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 
93 j,tat. 14 (April 10, 1979), can be interpreted as legislative 
ratification of the notice of termination. See Memorandum 
Opinion of June 6, 1979, at 9 n.14. 
See Note, Con ressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 Harv. 
i:-:-Rev. 16 , - . See a so Press er v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 
302, 304 (D.D.C. 1976) (tbree"}udge court), aff'd mem. sub 
nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978). 
-10-
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It must be emphasized, moreover, that when President Carter 
gave notice to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty without sub-
mitting it for congressional approval, effective legislative 
participation was delayed and became more difficult in light of 
20/ 
that action.~ Indeed, it can be argued that the theoretical 
ability of Congress to pursue an alternative political remedy 
through affirmative legislative action in these circumstances 
is not necessarily relevant to an analysis of injury in fact to 
a protected constitutional right, since the Constitution already 
limits the power of a coordinate branch to act in a particular 
21/ 
area. Without adopting the latter position, it certainly 
can be said that, by the President's unilateral action, the 
matter of the treaty termination became less amenable to 
congressional control than the matters involved in other 
22/ 
cases presenting the availability of legislative solutions.~ 
20/ In each of the four instances where Presidents have 
initiated the termination process and then requested 
authority from Congress to terminate treaties, Congress has 
responded promptly to authorize completion of the termination 
process. President Taft received legislative ratification 
and approval to terminate a coun:nercial treaty with Russia 
three days after his request came to the Senate. 37 Stat. 627. 
President Wilson on May 17, 1920 sought the "advice and consent" 
of the Senate to withdraw from the International Sanitary Con-
vention. On May 26, 192.1 two-thirds of the Senate present 
resolved to advise and consent to the denunciation of the 
convention. 61 Cong. Rec. 1793-1794. President Polk 
sought authority to terminate the Convention on Boundaries 
with Great Britain concerning the Oregon Territory. By joint 
resolution such action was authorized by Congress in less than 
five months. 9 Stat. 109-110. President Pierce requested 
authority to give notice to Denmark of the termination of a 
commercial treaty. Within four months the Senate unanimously 
gave the requested authority. S. Res. of March 3, 1855, 33d 
Cong., 2d Sess.; 9 Sen. Executive Journal 431. 
The Court assumes that a request by the President in the 
iustant case would have been met with similar deferential 
S'ttention. See note 3 su~ra. The record discloses that, prior 
to President---cirter's delivery of the notice of termination, 
Senator Goldwater and Senate Minority Leader Baker sought to 
have the President call a special session of Congress to allow 
for legislative participation. See Plaintiffs' Supplementary 
Memorandum on the Privileged Status in Congress of Presidential 
Messages, Exhibits 2-5. 
See Note, Congressional Acces~ to the Federal Courts, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 1632, 1642 (1977). 
See note 10, supra. 
-11-
It is in this vein that plaintiffs' efforts at pur-
suing an alternative political remedy, and the danger of the 
Court's preempting that remedy, must be viewed. Though any 
such assessment is certainly problematic in the context of 
relative congressional inaction, in this instance the Court 
is convinced that there is no apparent risk of circumventing 
or evading the legislative process by a decision on the merits. 
The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have suffered 
and are suffering injury in fact to their legislative right to 
be consulted and to vote on the termination of the 1954 
Mutual Defense Treaty. Defendants do not challenge, and indeed 
there can be no serious dispute, that plaintiffs meet the remain-
ing three requirements of standing relating to zone of interests, 
23/ 
causation, and redressability.~ Thus, plaintiffs satisfy the 
criteria for standing to sue in their capacity as individual 
legislators. Hence, unless plaintiffs have presented a nonjus-
ticiable political question, the Court may decide the case on 
the merits. 
B. Political Question Doctrine. 
Defendants contend that even if plaintiffs have 
standing, they are not entitl~d to a judgment on the merits 
because this case presents a nonjusticiable political question. 
23/ Clearly, the denial of plaintiffs' participatory role in the 
treaty termination process is "within the zone of interests 
to be protected or regulated by the ... constitutional 
guarantee in question." Ass'n of Data Processin~ Serv. 
Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1 70). In 
addition, it is the President's purported termination of 
the Treaty, without submitting the notice of termination for 
congressional approval, from which the denial of plaintiffs' 
role can be fairly traced. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 
Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26, ZiI="42 (1976). Finally, a judi-
ci-ttl decision declaring the constitutional requirements 
for terminating the Treaty can afford plaintiffs the precise 
relief requested, and thus the injury is one "likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 38. The 
critical requirement to be satisfied ~the congressional 
plaintiffs here is that they have suffered injury in fact. 
Any difficulty in demonstrating causation in this case could 
only derive from the same issue of alternative political 
remedies already resolved under the injury in fact inquiry. 




The political question doctrine reflects the view that under 
our governmental system of separation of powers some issues 
are not to be resolved by the j~diciary but by one of the 
political branches of the government~ Consequently, if a 
true political question comes before the courts for adjudica-
tion, it should be dismissed as nonjusticiable. 
Political questions traditionally have been defined 
as those issues that have been committed by the text of the 
Constitution, either explicitly or by reasonable inference, to 
24/ 
the autonomous control of a coordinate branch.-- The textual 
commitment test is indeed an important aspect of the political 
25/ 
question doctrine,--- although other prudential and functional 
concerns also characterize this flexible restraint on judicial 
power. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme 
Court stated that on the surface of any case held to involve 
a political question was at least one of the following formu-
lations: 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable -standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
l~lA 
Id. at 217. Defendants contend that several of these formulations, 
including a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
to the &tecutive, are inextricable from the case at bar. 
Cases involving the foreign relations of the United 
States are commonly cited as examples of judicial abstention 
24/ 
25/ 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1959). 




because the issues presented were political questions.- For 
example, courts have considered themselves bound by the 
Executive's determination regarding which political group 
27/ 
represents the government of a foreign state,- which nation 
28/ 
has sovereignty over disputed territory,- and whether cer-
29/ 
tain aliens should be deported.- But as the Supreme Court 
noted in Baker v. Carr, "it is error to suppose that every 
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies 
30/ 
beyond judicial cognizance."-
Certainly, it is clear that the conduct of the 
foreign relations of the United States is committed by the 
Constitution to the executive and legislative branches of 
the government and "the propriety of what may be done in the 
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial 
31/ 
inquiry or decision."- This is the basis of the Supreme Court 
decisions in the foreign relations cases traditionally viewed 
as raising political questions. In none of these cases did 
the Court refuse to consider whether the President's action 
had exceeded his constitu~ional authority. Instead it con-
cluded that the President's decision was within his authority 
32/ 







See L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 
ID"-16 (1972). 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938); 
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 
(1839). 
Foster & Elam v. Wilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829). 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). 
• 
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
Id. at 211 n.31, quoting Oet en v. Central Leather Co., 
'24o U.S. 297, 302 (1918). ee a so Chicago & S. Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:--!3~S. 103, 111 (1948). 
Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 Yale 
L. J. 597, 612 (1976). 
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relations, as in any other area, a court generally should not 
dismiss a case as a political question if the Constitution does 
not entrust resolution of the issue to a coordinate political 
branch or if the challenged governmental action is ultra vires. 
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519, 548-49 (1969); 
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 567 F.2d 
121, 125-28 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Unless the case raises other 
concerns of a prudential or functional nature, a judicial reso-
lution under those circumstances requires no more than an 
interpretation of the Constitution--a responsibility that beyond 
33/ 
question lies with the courts.~ 
Defendants urge that the executive power over 
34/ 
foreign affairs~ represents such a constitutional counnit-
ment and that the President's action in giving notice of 
termination in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty is within this authority. The Constitution carefully 
delineates the roles played by the executive and legislative 
branches in treaty formation, stating that the President "shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
35/ 
to make Treaties . 11- The Constitution is silent, however, 
on the question of treaty termination. Although defendants 
argue that the President's recognized constitutional responsi-
bility for the conduct of foreign affairs and the implementation 
of treaties includes the power to terminate treaties, they 
acknowledge, as they must, that there is no express constitu-
tional commitment of this power. Their argument that such a 
33/ 
35/ 
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); 
PoweJl v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
The President's powers over the conduct of foreign relations 
derive from a number of Constitutional provisions. U.S. 
Const., art. II, § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy . . . . ") ; id. ("He shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties .... "); id., art. II,§ 3 ("[HJe shall 
receive Ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed .... "). 




commitment can be implied- is unsatisfactory, for it is just 
as possible to imply the requirement of a legislative role in 
the termination process. Thus, the "textual commitment" formu-
lation of the political question doctrine does not bar judicial 
resolution of plaintiffs' claim. 
Defendants also contend that this case presents a 
political question principally because of the "unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made," 
the "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one issue," and the "impossi-
bility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
37/ 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."- The Court finds 
that an interpretation of the Constitution with respect to the 
allocation of power between the political branches in the 
treaty termination process presents none of these prudential 
and functional concerns. Nor are any of the other formulations 
of a political question "inextricable from the case at 
38/ 
bar."- In this case, the Court is not attempting to evaluate 
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
ms2). 
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). -- . 
Id. The Court finds distinguishable those decisions that 
fieid actions challenging the ~egality of military 
operations in Southeast Asia to be nonjusticiable. 
Because of various pieces of congressional legislation 
in support of such operations and the changing nature 
of the hostilities, those cases primarily involved the 
difficulty posed by the "lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards." ld. Thus, the courts were 
not competent to resolve disputes over the specific form of 
legislative action required to constitute congressional 
approval, whether unilateral action by the President 
escalating the activities had exceeded the scope of 
congressional authorizations, or whether, if unauthorized, 
the President was nevertheless acting in good faith to 
terminate involvement in the war. See,~. Mitchell v. 
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-16 (D.C. C!r:" 1973); Holtzman v. 
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 936 (1974); Dacosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d 
Cir. 1973). Simply determining what the constitutionally 
required allocation of power between the two political 
branches is with respect to treaty termination, and 




the wisdom of the underlying political decision or to substitute 
its judgment for that of a political department, but simply 
to determine whether the treaty termination was effectuated 
by constitutionally permissible means. 
Many times in our history, courts have heard and 
resolved disputes concerning the allocation of power between 
the legislative and executive branches without raising the 
39/ 
bar of the political question doctrine.~ Rather than pre-
senting a nonjusticiable political question, the procedure 
required by our Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense 
Treaty must be decided on the merits. The Court is confronted 
with a dispute consisting of a clash of authority between 
the two political branches in a posture suitable for judicial 
resolution. 
III. 
The prime question confronting the Court in this 
case is what governmental action is required by the Constitu-
tion to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 
Because that treaty conta~ns a termination clause stating that 
notice of termination may be given by either party, the narrower 
issue becomes whether the President of the United States is a 
"party" for purposes of this clause and thus able to take uni-
lateral action with respect to the notice of termination. 
Unlike its careful allocation of the power to enter 
into treaties, the Constitution contains no specific reference 
to the manner in which treaties are to be terminated. Nor is 
there any definitive evidence of the intentions of the Framers . . 
No court has ever addressed the precise issue here presented 
See,~. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Youngstown 
Sneet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Cam ai n Activities 
v. N xon, D.C. 
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of the President's authority to effect termination of a validly 
binding treaty, let alone a mutual defense treaty, without legis-
40/ 
lative participation.-- A wide range of legal opinion has been 
presented by scholars and commentators, who are unable to agree 
concerning which branch of the federal government has authority 
41/ 
to represent the United States in treaty terminations.--
Since the first treaty to which the United States 
42/ 
was a party was terminated in 1798 by an act of Congress,-- a 
variety of means have been used to terminate treaties: by 
statute directing the President to deliver notice of termination; 




In Van Der Wyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1935), 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
President's delivery of a notice of termination of treaty 
provisions that were in conflict with the Seamen's Act of 
1915, where such termination was specifically "requested 
and directed" by Congress in the Act. The Court found 
it unnecessary to pass on the question of "the authority 
of the Executive in the absence of Congressional action, 
or of action by the treaty-making power, to denounce a 
treaty of the United States .... " Id. at 117. 
The Court has also recognized the President's power to 
determine compliance and the continuing validity of a 
treaty. See,~. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-14 
(1947); Cnarlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474-76 (1913); 
Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285-88 (1902). That 
power, however, is sharply distinguishable from a power 
to act affirmatively to terminate a validly binding 
treaty--as here, in accordance with a treaty provision 
granting the United State's the option to terminate. 
See note 46 infra and accompanying text. 
See,~. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 
Io7-7l (1972); Scheffer, The Law of Treatt Termination as 
A lied to United States De-Reco nition o the Re ublic of 
China, Harv. Int 1 L.J. ; Ne son, e Termination 
of Treaties and Executive A b the United States: 
eory an ractice, inn .. ev. ; iesen eld, 
The Power of Congress and the President in International 
Relations: Three Recent Su reme Court Decisions, 25 Calif . 
. ev. , 5 - ; M. Reisman & M. McDougal, Who 
Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?, The National Law 
Jout"'nal, May 21, 1979, at 19. See generally Resolution 
Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hearin~s on S. Res. 15 
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 6th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979). 
The first treaties terminated by the United States were the 
treaties of 1778 between the United States and France, termi-
nated by the Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578. The validity 
of that congressional action was upheld in Hooper v. United 
States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 425 (1887). 
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Congress or otherwise acting with the concurrence of both 
houses of Congress; by the President acting with senatorial 
43/ 
consent; and by the President acting alone . ~ The final 
method of termination is of particular relevance here, but the 
44/ 
precedents involving unilateral executive action~ are of only 
marginal utility. None of these examples involves a mutual 
defense treaty, nor any treaty whose national and international 
45/ 
significance approaches that of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.~ 
Virtually all of them, moreover, can be readily distinguished 
46/ 
on the basis of some triggering factor not present here.~ 
44/ 
46/ 
See ~enerall~ Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: 
ffear1n son · . Res. 15 Before the Committee on Forei n Relations, 
t Cong., st ess. History o Treaty Termina-
tions by the United States," an appendix to a memorandum pre-
pared by the Department of State Legal Advisor) [hereinafter 
cited as State Dept. Memorandum]; Emerson, The Le~islative 
Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. Legis. 46, 52-64 1978); 
Scheffer, supra note 41, at 979-85, 993-95 (1978). 
Of the more than fifty treaty terminations in our nation's ~ ~ 
history, defendants point to thirteen instances in which 
the President acted to terminate a treaty and his action was 
unaccompanied by specific senatorial or congressional approval. 
See Supplementary Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Opposi-
tion to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend; State Dept. 
Memorandum, supra note 43. Not all of the cited examples con-
stitute precedent for presidential termination, since in two 
cases the notice of termination was subsequently withdrawn by 
the President. See .1965 notice of termination of the Warsaw 
Convention. 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876; 1933 notice of 
termination of the Extradition Treaty with Greece, 47 Stat. 
2185, T.S. No. 855. For . a critical analysis of these prece-
dents for unilateral presidential termination, see Scheffer, 
supra note 41, at 979-86. 
Most of the terminations by the President alone involved 
commercial situations where the need for the treaty, or the 
efficacy of it, was no longer apparent. 
Unilateral executive action in terminating a treaty would 
presumably be permissible, as both parties recognize, 
when the treaty is superseded by an inconsistent law 
or treaty; when the treaty becomes impossible to perform 
or is otherwise rendered inoperative; when the treaty is 
vicu.ated or denounced by the other party; or when there has 
been a fundamental change in circumstances affecting the 
treaty. In such cases, the President may determine 
that the continuing validity of the treaty has been destroyed, 
either because under principles of international law the 
United States could justifiably withdraw from the treaty or 
because the treaty is in conflict with more recent legislation. 
Scheffer, 03pci note 41, at 987-88; see,~. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 5 947); Van Der Wyde v.-o'cean Transport Co., 297 
U.S. 114 (1935); Charlton v. Kell!, 229 U.S . 447 (1913); 
Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 ( 902). 
(footnote continued on page 20) 
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The great majority of the historical precedents 
involve some form of mutual action, whereby the President's 
notice of termination receives the affirmative approval of the 
. 47/ 
Senate or the entire Congress.~ Taken as a whole, the historical 
precedents support rather than detract from the position that the 
power to terminate treaties is a power shared by the political 
branches of this government. 
A. 
Defendants' argument that the President has authority 
to terminate unilaterally the Mutual Defense Treaty is premised 
on the executive power over foreign affairs. This authority 
derives from the enumerated Article II powers, including those 
that authorize the President to make treaties with the advice 
48/ 
and consent of the Senate~ and to receive representatives of 
49/ 
foreign nations.~ 
Because the President has been termed "the sole organ 
50/ 
of the federal government in the field of international relations,"~ 
defendants argue that construing the Constitution to require 





Many of the instances cited by defendants in which the 
President has acted alone involve one or more of the above 
factors. In others, if ~he treaty was not actually super-
seded by inconsistent legislation, there was at the very 
least a substantial participation by Congress in establish-
ing the policy that led to the termination, the result of 
which amounted to an implied authorization. ~. 1933 
termination of the Multilateral Convention for the Abolition 
of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions of 1927, 
46 Stat. 2461, T.S. No. 811. In those few remaining instances 
in which the presidential termination cannot otherwise be 
justified, the treaty had already become generally ineffec-
tual or the matter involved was relatively insignificant. 
~. 1944 Termination of the Inter-American Convention for 
Traaemark and Commercial Protection of 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 
T.s~·No. 833; 1927 termination of the Convention with Mexico 
on the Prevention of Smuggling, 44 Stat. 2358, T.S. No. 178. 
See notes 66-70 infra and accompanying text. See 
generally authorities cited at note 43 supra. 
U.S. Const. art. II, S 2. 
Id. i 3. 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 320 (1936). 
-20-
in treaty termination would be inconsistent with the President's 
constitutional authority over foreign affairs. They further urge 
that the Senate's . role of advis~ng and consenting in the making 
of treaties is not an independent so~rce of legislative power, 
but only a limitation upon the treaty-making power of the 
President. Such limitations, they conclude, must be strictly 
construed and not extended by implication. See Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926). 
An attempt to justify a unilateral presidential power 
to terminate treaties by analogy to the Supreme Court's treatment 
of the removal power in Myers is unpersuasive. The power to remove 
executive personnel cannot be compared with the power to terminate 
an important international treaty. The removal power is restricted 
in its exercise to "purely executive officers" charged with a duty 
51/ 
unrelated to the legislative or judicial power.~ It concerns the 
President's administrative control over his subordinates and flows 
from the President's obligations to see that the laws are faithfully 
52/ 
executed.~ By contrast, treaty termination impacts upon the 
substantial role of Congr~ss in foreign affairs--especially 
in the context of a mutual defense pact involving the potential 
exercise of congressional wa~·powers--and is a contradiction 
rather than a corollary of the Executive's enforcement 
obligation. The same separation of powers principles that 
dictate presidential independence and control within the 
executive establishment preclude the President from exerting 
an overriding influence in the sphere of constitutional 
powers that is shared with the legislative branch. A power -.. 
to terminate treaties that are made "by and with the advice 
53/ 
and consent of the Senate"- simply does not fall within 
the limited scope of the Myers rationale. 
Hum~hrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 
(19 5); ~ Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 235, 163-64 (1926). 
U.S. Const. art. II, I 2. 
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Nor, for reasons more fully set forth below, can the 
President's status as the nation's spokesman and representative 
in foreign affairs serve as the basis for exclusive executive 
power over the entire process of treaty termination. While 
the President may be the sole organ of communication with 
foreign governments, he is clearly not the sole maker of 
foreign policy. In short, the conduct of foreign relations 
54/ 
is not a plenary executive power. 
Defendants also suggest that the recognition power 
55/ 
of the President~ is directly implicated in the present situa-
tion because termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty was 
generally viewed as a prerequisite to normalization of rela-
tions between the United States and the People's Republic of 
56/ 
China.~ As a result, defendants urge that the President's 
notice of termination is supported by his exclusive "[p]ower 
to remove ... obstacles to recognition," a power that 
has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v . Belmont, 
301 U.S. 324 (1934). 
The Pink and Belmont cases both involved the propriety 
of the Litvinov Assignment, a~ ·international executive agreement 
56/ 
As Justice Jackson, in referring to Article II, § 1 of the 
Constitution, stated in his concurring opinion in Youngstown 
Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 529, 641 (1952): "I 
cannot accept that this clause is a grant in bulk of all 
conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation 
to the r.residential office of the generic powers thereafter 
stated. ' 
The President's power to recognize a government as the 
representative of a foreign state--in this case recognizing 
the People's Republic of China as the sole government of 
Chin.a--is not challenged. See,~. United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229; Guarant Trust Co. v. United States, 
~U.S. 126, 137-38 (193 . The recognition power ows 
from his express authority under U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, 
to "receive Ambassadors and other public ministers." 
See,!.:..&.:.., Declaration of Warren Christopher, Deputy 
Secretary of State, in support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary ~udgment, 
11 4, 7. Steps toward nonnalization were taken with the 
exchange of ambassadors on March l, 1979. 
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providing that Soviet claims to Russian assets in the United 
States would be assigned to the United States government and 
used to settle American claims resulting from Soviet nationali-
zation decrees. Settlement of these claims had become a condition 
precedent to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet government. The Supreme Court held that this agreement 
was valid and superseded New York state laws and policy against 
confiscation of private property. 
Defendants rely on the following statement of 
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Pink: 
Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition 
as settlement of claims of our nationals ... 
certainly is a modest im!lied !ower of the President 
who is the "sole organ o the ederal government in 
the field of international relations." ... Unless 
such a power exists, the power of recognition might 
be thwarted or seriously diluted. 
315 U.S. at 229-30 .(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Defendants' argument lacks merit. The power to termina~e; 
a Mutual Defense Treaty cannot similarly be described as a "modest 
implied power of the President." A holding that the recognition 
power incidentally confers the power to make an executive agree-
ment settling property claims and that such agreement has supremacy 
over conflicting state law does not justify an incidental power 
to terminate treaties without congressional approval. The argu-
ment that any executive action becomes constitutional if it is 
ancillary to an act of recognition is without merit. If limi-
tations imposed by other constitutional provisions exist, the 
recognition power cannot be used as a "bootstrap" to support the 
President's unilateral action in terminating the Mutual Defense 
.. 
Treaty ~ith Taiwan. 
B. 
The termination of a treaty is not a single act entrusted 
by the Constitution to one or the other of our political branches. 





execute those laws; the implications to be derived from the 
constitutionally delineated role of the Senate in treaty 
formation; and the fundamental doctrine of separation of 
powers. It is further bolstered by the historical experience 
represented by constitutional interpretation and practice. 
Article VI of the Constitution provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land .... 
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Defendants argue, however, that 
the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty is not a "law of the land" for 
supremacy clause purposes. They assert that only those treaties 
that are self-executing, and thus become effective as domestic 
law at the time the agreement goes into effect, constitute the 
59/ 
supreme law of the land.~ Careful consideration of the provi-
sions of the Mutual Defense Treaty establishes that a number of 
60/ 
its provisions are self-executing~ and that still others have 
59/ 
60/ 
The distinction between self-executing and non self-executing 
treaties was first expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829): "Our Con-
stitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It 
is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature, wherever it operates 
of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But 
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract--
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular 
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the 
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the 
contract, before it can become a rule for the court." 
Id. at 314. See generallt L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and 
tne Constitution, 156-611972); Restatement (Second) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 141 (1965). 
The.Treaty's key provision--Article V, which declares that 
eacb party would act to meet the common danger of an armed 
attack in the West Pacific area "in accordance with its 
constitutional processes"--is self-executing. Under the 
"constitutional processes" of the United States, the Presi-
dent has authority to take certain action, short of a 
declaration of war by Congress, to alleviate the threat 
of armed attack. Thus the provision does not require the 
(footnote continued on page 26) 
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61/ 
been implemented by subsequent legislation.~ In light of the 
terms and conditions of the Treaty, as well as the acts subse-
quently taken by the Congress arid the President which have 
fixed and defined the nation's responsibilities under it, 
it is now far too late to assert that this Treaty fails to have 
the status of the supreme law of the land under Article VI. 
Moreover, none of the factors that would impair that status 
62/ 
are involved here.~ 
Article II, section three of the Constitution requires 
that the President "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed." This constitutional responsibility clearly extends 
to all laws of the land, including in this instance the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. The President cannot faithfully execute that 
treaty by abrogating it any more than he can faithfully execute 
• by failing to administer. He alone cannot effect the repeal of 
a law of the land which was formed by joint action of the 
executive and legislative branches, whether that law be a 
statute or a treaty. The limits upon his authority are in no 
way altered by the inclusion of a termination provision in 
Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty, allowing either party 
61/ 
aid of implementing legislation in order to be operative. 
The mere fact that a congressional power exists does not 
mean that the power is exclusive so as to preclude the 
making of a self-executing treaty within the area of that 
power. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States§ 141 comment f (1965). 
For instance, Article VII, which provides for the location 
of United States forces in and about Taiwan, is not self-
executing at least to the extent that it requires appropria-
tiQRs by Congress, but such appropriations have been made. 
This non self-executing provision has thus been legislatively 
implemented. 
See note 46 supra and accompanying text. The termination here 
!'s'"based solely upon the invocation of the termination pro-
vision in Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty, rather 




to terminate upon one year notice. The President's powers of 
administering the Treaty do not include the power to terminate 
in accordance with the provisions of Article X. The "party" 
to which the term-ination provision refers is the United States, 
not the President alone, and such termination can only be effec-
tuated in accordance with United States constitutional processes. 
The requirements imposed by the Supremacy Clause 
and the President's responsibility to faithfully execute the 
laws are further supported by the doctrine of separation of 
powers and its corollary concept of checks and balances, which 
lies at the heart of our constitutional system. In the treaty 
formation process, the Constitution expressly limits the 
Executive's role by requiring the advice and consent of two-thirds 
63/ 
of the Senate.~ This constitutional requirement reflects the 
concern of the Founding Fathers that neither political branch 
64/ 
possess unchecked power.~ 
A judicial determination that the President enjoys 
unilateral authority to terminate treaties would raise the 
same fears and present t~e same possibility of abuse. It would 
be incompatible with our system of checks and balances if the 
executive power in the area of. foreign affairs were construed 
to encompass a unilateral power to terminate treaties. It is 
undisputed that the President is without power to amend the 
terms of a treaty. Any such amendment must be submitted to 
65/ 




Article II, § 2 provides: "[The President] shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
co~ur • • • • " 
Alexander Hamilton, in discussing the treaty-making power, 
stated: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that 
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in 
a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous 
a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest 
of the world to the sole disposal of a magistrate, created 
and circumstanced, as would be a president of the United 
States." Federalist No. 75, pp. 505-06 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821); 
leitatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States I 163(2) (1965). 
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to amend treaties is denied the President,~ fortiori, the 
greater power to annul should also be denied. In the present 
situation the President may very well be carrying out the 
wishes of the Ameri_can people but .·because the legislative 
branch has not participated in the treaty termination process, 
there is no way to ascertain this fact. As Justice Frankfurter 
stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 529, 
594 (1952): "The accretion of dangerous power does not come in 
a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force 
of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even 
the most disinterested assertion of authority." 
The predominate United States' practice in terminating 
treaties, including those containing notice provisions, has 
66/ 
involved mutual action by the executive and legislative branches.~ 
In most instances, the President's notice of termination has 
received the affirmative approval of either the Senate or the 
entire Congress. Although no one constitutional interpretation 
has been accepted, nor has a definitive procedure emerged, the 
weight of historical precedent clearly supports the view that 
some form of congressionai. concurrence is required. Support 
can be found for requiring either of two alternatives: 1) the 
. 67/ 
approval of a majority of both houses of Congress,~ or 2) the 
67/ 
At the Court's request counsel supplied information as to 
the number of treaties terminated and whether the termina-
tions were effected by joint action or unilaterally. Dif-
ferent totals were submitted. Further study of these termi-
nations indicates that in most of them there was some con-
gressional action which was consistent with the position of 
the Executive . 
The passage of a joint resolution specifically authorizing 
or.airecting the President to give notice of termination 
has been a relatively common method employed by Congress 
in exercising its role in the treaty termination process. 
Two examples involving express presidential requests for 
such authority are particularly instructive. The 
termination of the 1827 Convention with Great Britain for 
the Joint Occupation of the Oregon Territory--the first 
termination pursuant to a notice provision in a treaty--






consent of two-thirds of the Senate.~ The latter is of course 
69/ 
the most analogous to the treaty-making power, while the former 
68/ 
69/ 
was effected in 1846 following the enactment of a joint 
resolution authorizing Pres"ident Polk to give the notice 
of termination. H.J. Res. of April 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109. 
The 1832 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Russia 
terminated when President Taft's delivery of the notice of 
termination--again pursuant to treaty provision--was 
subsequently approved by joint resolution, H.J. Res. of 
December 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627, following the President's 
message to the Senate of his intent to terminc:tte "with 
a view to its ratification and approval," 48 Cong. Rec. 
454 (1911). In other instances, joint resolutions directing 
or authorizing the termination of treaties pursuant to notice 
provisions have been passed without any prior presidential 
initiative. J. Res. of Feb. 26, 1883, 22 Stat. 641 (Amity 
Treaty of 1871 with Great Britain); J. Res. of June 17, 1874, 
18 Stat. 287 (Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1858 with 
Belgium); J. Res. of Jan. 8, 1865, 13 Stat. 566 (Reciprocity 
Treaty as to Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation of 1854 with 
Great Britain). In addition, Congress has enacted statutes 
which conflict with earlier treaties and which specifically 
request the President to terminate inconsistent treaties. 
Fishery and Conservation Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-265, Title II, § 202(b), 90 Stat. 340; Seamen's Act of 
1915, Pub. L. No. 63-302, § 16, 38 Stat. 1184. See also 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No":- ~O. 
§ 5, 65 Stat. 72. ~ 
At least two treaties have been terminated pursuant to 
Senate approval without any participation by the House of 
Representatives. Pursuant to notice of termination delivered 
by President Buchanan, the 1826 Convention of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation with Denmark was terminated follow-
ing a unanimous Senate resolution. S. Res. of March 3, 1855, 
33d Cong., 2d Sess. · In connection with that termination, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report in 
April, 1856, which concluded that the treaty-making power--
the Senate and the President acting together--could terminate 
a treaty without participation by the House of Representatives. 
S. Rep. No. 97, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (1856). A second instance 
was the termination of the International Sanitary Convention 
of 1903 following a two-thirds vote of approval by the Senate 
as requested by President Wilson. S. Res. of May 26, 1921, 
61 Cong. Rec. 1793. 
Several commentators have argued the constitutional soundness 
of terminating treaties in accordance with the same power that 
concludes those treaties. ~. Scheffer, iupra note 41, at 
1002-03; Riesenfeld, supra note 41 at 660-6 . There is also 
some eminent dictum to support that approach: in Techt v. 
Hufhes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192, cert. denied, 
25 U.S. 43 (1920), Judge Cardozo stated: "[The] President 
and senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its 
life." 
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is based primarily on congressional authority to repeal a law 
70/ 
of the land.~ 
When faced with an apparent gap in the Constitutional 
allocation of powers, the Court must refer to the fundamental 
design of the entire document and determine how its purposes 
would be best served in the gap area. The Court believes that 
either of these two alternative procedures for congressional 
participation is a constitutionally sound means of terminating 
treaties. The important point is that treaty termination 
generally is a shared power, which cannot be exercised by the 
President acting alone. Neither the executive nor legislative 
branch has exclusive power to terminate treaties. At least 
under the circumstances of this case--involving a significant 
mutual defense treaty with a faithful ally, who has not violated 
the terms of the agreement, and the validity of which has not 
otherwise been destroyed--any decision of the United States 
to terminate that treaty must be made with the advice and 
consent of the Senate or the approval of both houses of 
Congress. That decision cannot be made by the President alone. 
In view of the foregoing, it is the declaration of 
this Court that the President's notice of termination must receive 
The Supreme Court's decision in Van Der Wyde v. Ocean 
Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1935), would appear to be the 
strongest judicial authority for participation by the entire 
Congress in the treaty termination process. See note 40 supra. 
Requiring such participation is supported by the fact that a 
treaty, like a statute, constitutes the supreme law of the 
land whose repeal is the proper subject of congressional 
authority. In that regard, it is undisputed that a subse-
quent act of Congress which is clearly inconsistent with a 
tr~~ty supersedes that treaty as domestic law to the extent 
of the conflict. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 
581, 599-601 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
194 (1888); Head Monet Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884); 
Diggs v. Shultz, 470 .2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See 
also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. l, 18 (1957). ~ 
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the approval of two-thirds of the United States Senate or a 
majority of both houses of Congr_e·ss for it to be effective 
\lllder our Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense 
71/ 
Treaty of 1954.~ It is further ordered that the Secretary of 
State and his subordinate officers are hereby enjoined from taking 
any action to implement the President's notice of termination 




-17 &., t'f 7 'I 
As previously indicated, nothing contained in the Taiwan 
Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, can be 
construed as legislative approval of or acquiescence in 
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Jun c 1979 
JAMES F. DAVEY, Cieri< 
Civil Action 
No. 78-2412 
Upon consideration of defendants' motion to dismiss or, 
in the alternative, for summary judgment, and of plaintiffs' cross-
motion for summary judgment, the memoranda in support thereof, the 
oppositions thereto, the arguments of counsel in open Court, the 
entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's 
-q::;--
memor andum of this same date, it is by the Court this {, day 
of June, 1979, 
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss be, and hereby 
is, granted; and it is further 
ORDERED that plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment 
be, and hereby is, denied; and it is further 
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JUN C 1979 
JAMES F. DAVEY,. Clerk 
Civil Action 
No. 78-2412 
This is a suit by eight members of the United States 
Senate, a former senator, and sixteen members of the House of 
Representatives seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the notice given by defendant President Carter to the Republic 
of China ("ROC" or "Taiwan") to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
China. Plaintiffs seek to have this Court declare that the 
termination of the 1954 Treaty cannot be legally accomplished, 
nor. can notice be given of intended termination, without the 
advice and consent of the United States Senate or the approval of 
both houses of Congress. 
Plaintiffs contend that President Carter's unilateral 
notice of termination violated their legislative right to be con-
sulted and to vote on the termination and also impaired the effec-
tiveness of prior votes approving the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. 
They also claim that the President's action violated section 26 
of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, 
for summary judgment contending that this case is nonjusticiable 
because it presents a political question, plaintiffs lack standing 
., 
142A 
to sue, and the President possesses constitutional authority 
to give notice of the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. 
Plaintiffs have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, assert-
ing that the case is justiciable, plaintiffs have standing, and 
the President is without legal authority to terminate treaties 
without congressional participation. 
I. 
On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that 
the United States would, as of January 1, 1979, recognize the 
Government of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") as the sole 
1/ 
government of China.- The United States and the PRC agreed to 
exchange ambassadors and to establish embassies.on March 1, 1979. 
This represented a significant change in the relatjonship between 
the two countries, because for almost thirty years after the estab-
lishment of the PRC on mainland China in 1949, the United States 
had no diplomatic ties or other regular relationship with it due 
to the United States' continued recognition of the Nationalist 
2/ 
Government on Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China.-
On December 2, 1954, a Mutual Defense Treaty Between 
the United States of America and the ROG was signed in Washington, 
D.C. The Senate gave its consent to ratification on February 9, 
1955 and the treaty was ratified by President Eisenhower on 
February 11, 1955. The treaty entered into force on March 3, 
3/ 
1955.- The Mutual Defense Treaty obligates the United States, 
17 See Declaration of Warren Christopher in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment, t 4. 
For background information on the historical relationship 
between the Unitert States and the PRC and events leading up 
to the present diplomatic initiatives, see generally Scheffer, 
The Law of Treat! Termination as Applieat"o United States 
De-Recognition o the Republic of China, 19 Harv. Int'l L. J. 
931 (1978). 
6 U.S.T. 433, T.l.A.S. No. 3178. 
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,. 
upon joint agreement with the ROC and "in accordance with its 
constitutional processes," to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores 
4/ 
from an armed attack.- Article X of the treaty contains a termi-
nation clause, which states that the treaty "shall remain in force 
indefinitely," but continues: "Either party may terminate it one 
year after notice has been given to the other party." The issue 
posed by this lawsuit is thus not whether the United States has the 
right to terminate the defense treaty, a right expressly guaranteed 
by Article X, but the procedure by which that right of termination 
should be accomplished. 
During the past decade, initial steps towards nor-
malizing relations between the United States and the PRC were 
taken. The PRC has always maintained that recog~ition of two 
Chinas was unacceptable and that continuation of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty with Taiwan was incompatible with normalization of relations ~; 
with PRC. On December 15, 1978, the leaders of the United States 
and the PRC announced their agreement to establish diplomatic rela-
tions as of January 1, 1979. On December 23, 1978, United States 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, at the direction of 
the President, gave notice of termination of the Treaty to ROC 
authorities on Taiwan. According to this notice, the Mutual 
Defense Treaty will terminate on January 1, 1980. 
Perhaps anticipating this change in United States policy, 
in the latter part of 1978 both houses of Congress passed the 
International Security Assistance Act of 1978, which was signed 
5/ 
by President Carter on September 26, 1978.- Section 26 of the 
Act, popularly known as the Dole-Stone amendment, provides: 
~/ 
~/ 
Id. Art. V. 
Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 26, 92 Stat. 746 (1978). 
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(a) The Congress finds that--
(1) t continued security and stability 
of East Asia is a matter of major strategic interest 
to the United States; 
(2) the United States and the Republic of 
China have for a Prriod of twenty-four years been 
linked together by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954; 
(3) the Republic of China has during that 
twenty-four-year period faithfully and continually 
carried out its duties and obligations under that 
treaty; and 
(4) it is the responsibility of the Senate 
to give its advice and consent to treaties entered into 
by the United States. 
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there 
should be prior consultation between the Congress and 
the executive branch on any proposed policy changes 
affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1954. 
22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 note (1979). Defendants maintain that consul-
tations with members of both Houses occurred both prior and sub-
sequent to the enactment of this act and that th~se consultations, 
which concerned negotiations with the PRC generally and the necessity 
for terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty, fully complied with the ~' 
6/ 
intent of the Dole-Stone amendment.- For reasons subsequently set 
forth, the Court does not reach the question whether the contacts 
mentioned amount to consultation. 
II. 
The issue with which the Court is confronted is whether 
the President has unilateral authority to terminate a mutual defense 
treaty with a friendly nation which has not violated any of the 
provisions of the treaty. Reference to the historical precedents 
since the beginnings of this nation discloses terminations of 
7/ 
treaties in more than fifty instances.- Some have been terminated by 
~/ 
21 
See Declaration of Richard Holbrooke in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, 
~, 2-3. 
See generally Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: 
Hearin son Sen. Res. 15 Before the Committee on Forei n Relations, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 1979 history of treaty terminations 
by the United States prepared by the Dept. of State); Emerson, 
The Le islative Role in Treat Abro ation, 5 J. Legis. 46, 52-
6 1 78 ; Sche -er, supra note 2, at 979-985, 993, 995. 
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legislative action; some have been terminated by the President 
with the concurrence of both houses of Congress; some have been 
terminated by the President with senatorial consent; and some 
have been terminated by the President acting alone, but these 
Presidential terminations have been in situations in which it 
might be inferred that the Congress had no reason to question 
Presidential action, such as the termination by President Coolidge 
of the ~1exican Smuggling Treaty, which had been found to be com-
pletely ineffectual. Based on the Court's consideration of 
these historical precedents, the Court believes the power to 
terminate treaties is a power shared by the political branches 
of this government, namely, the President and the Congress. In 
this instance, however, ~ince the Congress has, not yet acted on 
the question of treaty termination, a serious question arises con-
cerning the standing of these congressional plaintiffs to seek a 
judicial injunction or declaration respecting the power of the 
executive. 
An increasing number of senators and congressmen have 
invoked the jurisdiction of the courts to challenge executive 
8/ 
actions and policies.- Because of their political overtones, 
these cases present difficult jurisdictional questions. In a 
. , ,. 
numher of cases the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit has considered the interrelationship between 
standing to sue and the political question doctrine and expressed 
9/ 
its view that the standing issue should be resolved first.- Thus, 
8/ 
2_/ 
See, ~~. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, ~436 U.S. 907 (1978); ~1etcalf v. National Petroleum 
Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dole v. Carter, 444 F. 
Supp. 1065 (D. Kan.), motion for injunction pending appeal 
denied, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977). 
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978); American Jewish Congress v. 
Vance, 575 F.2d 939, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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I 
at the outset, the Court must consider whether plaintiffs have 
standing to obtain a judicial declaration that the President lacks 
authority unilaterally to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
Taiwan. 
A. Standing. 
There are no special standards to be employed in 
analyzing congressional standing questions. Harrington v. Bush, 
553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C . Cir. 1977). Like all plaintiffs, a legis-
lator must show that he has suffered an injury in fact; that the 
interests he asserts are within the zone protected by the statute 
or constitutional provision in question; that the injury resulted 
from the challenged illegal action of defendants; and that the 
injury be capable of being redressed by a decision in his favor. 
Id. at 205 n.68. 
Perhaps the most important decision concerning congres-
sional standing is Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). In that case the Court found that Senator Kennedy had stand-
ing to seek a declaratory judgment that a bill for which he had 
voted had become law despite a presidential pocket veto. The Court 
held that to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so too 
is the power of each congressman, because his office confers the 
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the institu-
tion. Id. at 435-36; see Trible v. Brown, No. 79-1229 (4th Cir. 
Apr. 26, 1979) (oral opinion) . 
Plaintiffs Thurmond and Curtis, who voted to ratify the 
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, rely on Kennedy to support their claim 
that the President's action impaired the effectiveness of their 
prior votes approving the treaty. In considering the analogous 
-6-
claim of legislators who alleged that they had an interest in 
ensuring enforcement of laws for which they voted, however, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
llJ7A 
once a bill has become law the legislators' interests are indis-
tinguishable from those of any citizen and legislators "cannot claim 
dilution of their legislative voting power because the legislation 
they favored became law." Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 
459 (4th Cir. 1975). 
All plaintiffs with the exception of former Senator Curtis 
claim that the unilateral notice of termination impaired their legis-
lative right to be consulted and to vote on treaty termination. 
Several courts have suggested that the availability of alternative 
political remedies to redress executive action, .such as impeachment, 
denial of funds, or a vote on pending legislation, is evidence 
that there has been no injury in fact to congressional rights or 
10/ 
powers. For example, in Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 
662 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975); a 
group of congressmen sued to overturn an agency regulation grant-
ing inventors exclusive rights to patents developed under federal 
research contracts. This regulation was promulgated by the General 
Services Administration ("GSA") without congressional approval, 
and the congressmen claimed that it infringed on their right 
to participate in the disposal of government-owned property. 
The Court found no injury in fact and denied standing because 
promulgation of the regulation could not deprive Congress of 
its uncontested right to dispose of government property by 
limiting the contractual powers of the GSA. 379 F. Supp. at 
666-67. 
10/ See, ~. Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th 
Cir. 1975); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 407 F. Supp. 
257, 260 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 176 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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The availability of alternative means to remedy an 
allegedly unconstitutional action was recently considered in 
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. 
Ct. 598 (1978). In that case a congressman sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief from the allegedly unconstitutional com-
position of the Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC") of the 
Federal Reserve System. In rejecting the theory of legislator 
standing advanced by plaintiff, the Court noted that the congress-
man was not without the means of challenging the allegedly uncon-
stitutional composition of the FOMC because he could introduce a 
bill requiring all FOMC members to be presidential appointees. 
Id. at 468. The Court stated: "This circumstance, while cer-
tainly not fatal to [plaintiff's] standing clai.m, does illustrate 
that his actual controversy lies, or may lie, with his fellow 
legislators; no supposed impairment of his legislative functions 
is due, in any part, to the actions or omissions of the named 
defendants." Id. 
This analysis of congressional standing is based on a 
consideration of prudential and functional concerns, similar to 
those described by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962), the leading statement of the political question doc-
tine that reflects the deference to be accorded a coordinate 
11/ 
branch of government under our system of separation of powers.~ 
A suit such as this by a group of individual legislators seek-
ing to vindicate derivative constitutional rights bypasses the 
political arena which shou]d be the primary and usual forum in 
12/ 
which such views are expressed.~ 
11/ 
12/ 
See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale 
L.J. 597 (1976). 
See Note, Congressional Access to Federal Courts, 90 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1632, 1649 (1977). 
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At least three resolutions dealing with the treaty 
termination power and the notice of termination given with 
respect to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty are presently pending 
13/ 
before the United States Senate. If .the Senate as a whole were 
to take action approving the termination of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, the issues raised by this suit would be moot because the 
14/ 
President's action would no longer be unilateral.~ If the Senate 
or the Congress rejected the President's notice of termination 
or asserted a right to participate in the treaty termination 
process, the Court would be confronted by a clash of the political 
branches in a posture suitable for judicial review. 
The situation then would be comparable to that presented 
in Kennedy v. Sampson, in which congressional power had been exer-
cised ~nd was about to be frustrated by a pocket veto. Here, however, 
13/ 
14/ 
Senate Resolution 10, which was introduced by Senator Dole on , 
January 15, 1979, and referred to the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, resolves: "That the Senate disapproves of the action 
of the President of the United States in sending notice of 
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of 
China." 125 Cong. Rec. S209 (Jan. 15, 1979). Senate Resolu-
tion 15, which was introduced by Senator Harry F. Byrd, states: 
"That it is the sense of the Senate that approval of the 
United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense 
treaty between the United States and another nation." Id. S220 
(Jan. 18, 1979). Hearings on this resolution were conducted 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations on April 9-11 and a 
report was issued on May 7, 1979. S. Rep. No. 96-119, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, which 
is subtitled "To uphold the separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches of Government in the termi-
nation of treaties," was introduced by Senator Goldwater and 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 125 Cong. Rec. 
S219 (Jan. 15, 1979). 
On April 10, 1979 the President signed the Taiwan Relations 
Act, which addresses major aspects of United States-Taiwan 
relations and contains a security assurance expressing con-
tinued United States concern in the absence of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b) (Apr. 10, 1979). 
Defendants suggest that this Act can be interpreted as legis-
lative ratification of the notice of termination. During debate 
on the proposed legislation, however, several members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, including the majority and 
minority floor managers of the bill, stated that nothing in 
the bill constituted a determination of the legal and consti-
tutional issue raised by the President's notice of termination. 
See 125 Cong. Rec. S2124, S2126, S2130, S2134, S2151 (March 7, 
1979) (statements of Senators Javits, Glenn, Baker, Hayakawa, 
Helms, and Stone). 
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plaintiffs have not established the necessary injury required for 
standing. Either the Senate or the Congress as a whole still 
can utilize thP. legislative process to assert its right and demon-
strate that it possesses a shared power with the President to act 
in terminating a treaty. Although the Court is inclined to agree 
with plaintiffs' assertion that the power to terminate the 1954 
Mutual Defense Treaty is a shared power to be exercised by the 
action of both political branches, at the present time there is no 
indication that the Congress as a whole intends to assert its pre-
rogative to act. Under these circumstances, the President's notice 
of termination does not constitute injury. In the absence of any 
injury to the institution as a whole, the individual legislators 
here cannot claim a derivative injury. 
B. Cause of Action Under Pub. L. No. 95-384. 
Plaintiffs also have alleged that the statutory rights 
conferred by section 26 of the International Security Assistance 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, have been violated because there 
was no prior consultation between the Congress and the executive 
branch prior to the notice of termination of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty. Defendants dispute this factual allegation and have sub-
mitted an affidavit detailing the consultation that occurred after 
15/ 
enactment. 
The final language of the Dole-Stone amendment is 
16/ 
general and nonmandatory in nature. This was substituted for 
the apparently mandatory language originally proposed by Senators 
17/ 
Dole and Stone.~ Because section 26 apparently does not set forth 
150A 
; 
15/ Declaration of Richard Holbrooke in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; 
see Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 7. 
16/ 
1]__/ 
"It is the sense of the Senate that there should be prior con-
sultation between the Congress and the executive branch on any 
proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of 
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954." 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 note 
(1979). 
The consultation language proposed by Senators Dole and Stone 
stated: "It is the sense of the Senate that any proposed policy 
(footnote continued on page 11) 
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a mandatory or binding duty to consult and because the Court 
could not effectively resolve the question of how much consulta-
18/ 
tion would meet its terms if it were binding,~ plaintiffs, in 
alleging injury under this section, have failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Our Constitution provides for a government of checks 
151A 
and balances. Legislative power is vested in the Congress. Among 
other powers the President is the "sole organ of the federal govern-
19/ 
ment in the field of international relations."~ In Article II, 
section 3 he is charged with the responsibility of faithfully 
executing the laws which under Article VI specifically include 
treaties. 
The Court believes that the extraordinary remedy of 
injunction or the related power of a declaration should be exer-
cised sparingly and only when the legislative branch has been 
given the opportunity of acting. At least three resolutions are 
presently pending in the Senate. For these reasons the Court ~ 
believes that the resolution of the ultimate issue in this case 
should in the first instance be in the legislative forum. If 
the Congress approves the President's action, the issue presently 
before the Court would be moot. If the Senate or the Congress takes 
action, the result of which falls short of approving the President's 
18/ 
1:2_/ 
changes affecting the continuation in force of the United States-
Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty shall be a matter for 
prior consultation with the Senate." See 124 Cong. Rec. Sll727 
(July 25 I 1978), 
See Greater Tamna Chamber of Commerce v. Adams, C.A. No. 78-
0517, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 1978), appeal docketed, 
No. 79-1123 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1978). 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 
(1936). 
-11-
termination effort, then the controversy will be ripe for a 
judicial declaration respecting the President's authority to 
act unilaterally. Until then, the complaint is dismissed without 
prejudice. 
Judge 
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The SG has filed a response which, on the merits, basically 
repeats the arguments used by the majroty opinion below. Like CADC, 
the SG argues that this case involves only a particular treaty and 
will have no effect on other treaty obligations. The power to 
terminate is 1 inked to the Presdent' s power to recognize POC and 
2. 
derecognize ROC. The treaty contains a termination clause and there 
is no reason to believe that the Congress meant to require 
congressional assent to termination. This treaty involves the use of 
the President's power as Commander-In-Chief. 
Further, the grant of powers to the President is not as 
limited as the grant to Congress. In some circumstances, the 
President may need to move quickly to extricate the nation from a 
treaty. The Supremacy Clause governs the ef feet of the treaty on 
domestic law, not the existence or termination of a treaty. As an 
historical matter, the President has sometimes terminated a treaty 
alone, and the Congress has never overridden the President's decision 
to terminate. 
The SG also restates the standing ground relied upon by 
Chief Judge Wright and Judge Tamm. And the SG contends this case 
presents a political question because there are no judicially 
manageable standards by which a court could grant relief. For 
example, there is no way for this Court to decide whether, 
petrs prevail, both Houses need approve termination, or 
Senate approval alone is sufficient. 
if the 
whether 
Also, the SG discusses the mootness point. Unless notice is 
withdrawn, the treaty will terminate on January 1. Under 
international law, that termination will be irrevocable regardless of 
any subsequent judicial holding. 
I continue to believe that cert should be denied but, if 
cert were to be granted, the case is nonjusticiable absent a direct 
congressional challenge to the President. 
~-
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December 7, 1979 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 79-856 
GOLDWATER 
SG's Response and Further 
Discussion of DC's Opinion 
v. 
CARTER 
The SG filed a response at 4:30 p.m. today, December 6. 
DC'S OPINION: Although the earlier memorandum on this subject 
referred to the DC's opinion and legislative history, the following 
; 
add~tional comments are provided. 
The DC (D.C.) (Gash) originally dism~ssed petrs' suit for declara-
tory and injunctive relief. At the time of Judge Gash's opinion, 
June 6, 1979, at least three resolution~ _dealing with the treaty 
termination power were pending in the Senate. If the Senate as a 
whole took action approving the Treaty, the suit would be moot because 




Senate or Congress rejected the President's notice, the DC would 
then be confronted by a clash of the political branches in a posture 
suitable for judicial review. The DC also observed "[i]f the Senate 
or the Congress takes action, the result of which falls short of 
approving the President's termination effort, then the controversy 
will be ripe for a judicial declaration. 
DC dismissed without prejudice. 
II Accordingly, the 
Within hours of the DC's original ruling, the Senate voted 
53 to 35 to adopt Sen. Byrd's amendment containing language identical 
to Sen. Res. 15 which Sen. Byrd had introduced Jan. 18, 1979 as a 
substitute for the substitute amendment proposed by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. The language adopted read: 
That it is the sense of the Senate that 
approval of the United States Senate is 
required to terminate any mutual defense 
treaty between the United States and another 
nation. 
The important thing to note is that Sen. Res. 15 as amended by 
Sen. Byrd's language was returned to the Senate calendar without 
further action. Thus, all the Senate did was adopt the above 
quoted language as the language of the amendment. It did not vote 
on the amendment, and there was thus no final action. 
Petrs went back to DC and on Oct. 17, the DC found that petrs 
had standing. It recognized that Senate action was not decisive. 
But by adopting Byrd's language (quoted above) the Senate rejecteg 
' ·· the amendment language proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee 
which would have approved the President's termination of the Treaty. 
Therefore, the DC was of the view that there was evidence of at 
least some congressional determination to participate in the process, 
and its action "falls short of approving the President's termination 
effort." The DC also observed that Congress gave no indication that 
it disapproves of the individual suits, and there appears to be no 
action presently planned with which a judicial declaration would 
interfere. The DC concluded that with the President's unilateral 
action, the matter became less amendable to congressional control. 
In the context of "relative congressional inaction" the DC found 
standing since there is no apparent risk of circumventing 
or evading the legislative process. The DC held that petrs 
suffered injury in fact to their legislative right to be consulted 
and to vote on the termination. 
SG'S VIEWS: The SG believes petrs lack standing and their com-
plaint. presents a nonjusticiable political question. Further, the 
CA's decision is correct and further review is not warranted. The 
CA rendered a narrow decision dealing only with "this treaty in the 
circumstances before us now." No sweeping constitutional rule is 
involved, and the CA did not finally settle an important constitutional 
question of extensive significance. 
The SG states that the termination remains outstanding, and unless 
withdrawn before January 1, 1980, the treaty will terminate that date. 
Assuming arguendo that injunctive relief is available the Court would 
have to act by January 1. Otherwise, the treaty will terminate on that 
~ 
; 
date, and under international law that termination will be irrevocable, 
regardless of any subsequent judicial holding that the United States' 
internal procedures for arriving at the decision to terminate were 
defi~~ent. The SG agrees that the case wil be moot on January 1. 
1. There are two jurisdictional gounds on which cert should be 
denied. Petrs lack standing and their complant presents a nonjus-
ticiable political question. 
,: 
The SG states that the concurring opinion by Wright and Tamm 
properly concludes that individual members of congress, acting 
without institutional support or authority, lack standing. The 
majority of CA judges found that legislators had standing to litigate 
the question because the President's action impaired their interest 
in voting on the treaty termination question in the moot effective 
fashion. The SG observes that: 
The President has not deprived petitioners of an 
opportunity to vote on the termination question. They 
have always been free to introduce whatever bills and 
resolutions they deem appropriate. Indeed, several 
such resolutions were introduced. The fact that none 
of them ever came to a final vote is attributable to the 
actions of other Senators and not to the conduct of the 
President. 
The cour.ts do not manage the Senate's calendar and so there is 
no personal right to cast a vote regardless of whether the institu-
tion wants to consider the matter. · 
Relying on Baker v. Carr, the SG states that this issue is a 
nonjusticiable political question. There are not judicially managable 
Constitutional standards by which a court could grant the required 
relief. The Constitution does not suggest whether both Houses or just 
what 
the Senate must act. And if just the Senate then by/majority1 Like-
wise there are no standards by which courts can distingish between 
~ 
treaties based on their substance or importance. Courts would 
windpp in the middle of foreign policy disputes between the Executive 
and the Legislative. 
The questions involved call for single-voiced statements of the 
Govern~ea~: views. Continued normal relations with the People's 
Republic depends on termination of this treaty. 
--
Congress has ample means to assert and implement its view on· 
treaty terminatlo~ In view of nearly 200 years of successful accomo-
dation and compromise between the political branches regarding treaty 
termination, the courts should decline to designate a single constitu-
tional method that must be employed in all circumstances. Such 
judicial intervention would eleminate the felxibility intended by 
the framers and detract from the efficient and effective conduct of 
American foreign policy. 
2. In light of the close relationship in this case between the 
treaty termination and the transfer of diplomatic recognition, the 
CA correctly concluded that the President did not exceed his powers by 
giving notice~termination without congressional consent. Recognition 
of the People's Republic was a political executive act and no congres-
sional action can reverse the President~ determination that our former 
treaty partner is no longer a government w. ithwhich the U.S. will main-
tain formal foreign relations. 
There are unquestionably some circumstances in which the President 
has constit±onal responsibility to determine whether treaties remain 
effective. 
-fl.c. 
Thus, CA correctly concluded that court~ · can not make 
distinctions between which treaties fall within that class. 
Article X's termination provision creates a treaty right which is 
an international act to be done by the President. In the absence of 
'"Mt.. ?a~,dt,,,,,f-
some indication to the contrary the normal inference is that· may 
II 
exercise any treaty right of the U.S., including termination, 
\. 
without revertine to the Senate . .£ee, Restatement (2d) of the 




There is no evidence in this case that Congress intended any dif-
ferent. · And Congress had taken no definitive action with~ respect 
to the termination of this Treaty. 
The SG argues that this Treaty implicates the President's power 
as Commander- in-Chief. The President is empowered to terminate the 
Treaty because only he is empowered to implement it through the exercis 
of his discretionary authority. Certainly no court could order the 
President to send troops to defend Taiwan. 
3. The structure of the Constitution and its allocation of 
power to the President in the area of foreign affairs confirms in 
more general terms the correctness of the CA's decision, * 
\ . 
*SG's brief in opposition, pp. 14 - 20 
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1. Motion to Expedite Consider-
ation and for other Relief 
2. Cert to CA DC 
( en bane, p. c. ) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
CA'S OPINION (continued): The en bane opinion noted that Judge 
MacKinnon's position (consent required by both Houses) also requires 
reversal of the DC; hence, the DC's approval of Senate advice ~rrd 
consent as sufficient is reversed without dissent. 
Chief Judge Wright, joined by Tamm, concurred in the result but 
filed an opinion which stated that because petrs lack standing no 
other issue need be reached. Petrs must show that the challenged 
Executive action has nullified a vote already taken by preventing it 
from ever taking its intended legal effect. Where a legislator 
alleges Executive impairment of the effectiveness of his vote, his 
'- 1 
- 2 -
injury can only be derivative. Congress (or a member ) suffers no 
injury unless the Executive has thwarted its will; and there is no 
such will to thwart unless a majority of Congress has spoken 
unequivocally. In this case neither House has ever taken final 
action to voice disapproval of the termination of the Treaty. 
Congress as a body has chosen not to confront the President directly 
(see pp. 38A to 42A of Appendix for legislative history). Denied 
that confrontation by political reality, petrs seek judicial relief. 
Petrs' apparent political inability to "exhaust" their legislative 
remedies rebut their claim of a judicially cognizable injur~ 
Judge Wright went on to state : 
The majority opinion attempts to circumv~nt the 
requirement of final action by asserting that since 
the President never formally submitted the treaty 
termination to Congress, he has already dealt them a 
distinct injury--depriving them of their vote within 
the prescribed constitutional scheme. There may well 
be, as the majority opinion suggests , practical 
political differences betw\,:!en voting on a treaty term-
ination submitted by the President and initiating an 
independent resolution within Congress. The very 
point, however, is that those differences are political, 
not legal. Moreover, the specific mode by which the 
President and Congress interact is a political ques-
tion in which the courts have no say. Se~ Holtzman v. 
Schlesihger, supra note 3, 484 F.2d at 1309; Orlando v. 
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 869 (1971). 
The issue of whether or in what manner Congress anq the President 
share the power to terminate treaties has been dealt with by these 
branches for 200 years without the help or need of courts. Whether 
or not the historical record supports either party's constitutional 
arguments, it does how that Congress can participate directly in 
treaty termination when it wants to. In view of all that Congress 
has done over the years (Appendix, pp. 44A-45A) it can pass a reso-
- 3 -
lution objecting to termination of a treaty if it wishes to do so. 
A president is likely to pay heed to such disapproval, in which 
event no court need intervene.11 
Judge MacKinnon agreed that petrs had standing. However, he 
dissented because he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that 
the Constitution confers absolute power on the President, acting 
alone, to terminate a Mutual Defense Treaty. No prior President 
has ever claimed the absolute power to terminate such a treaty. 
And the majority's advance attempts to minimize its harmful effects 
for the future is accomplished by stating that the opinion is narrow, 
and could not necessarily be relied upon to confer the same absolute 
power to terminate the NATG Treaty which has a similar termination 
provision. 
Under the "necessary and proper clause", "which the majority 
avoids like the plague," power is conferred upon the Congress to 
pass a law to termi nate treaties. Since the Constitution makes 
treaties along with other laws the "Law of the Land," a treaty is 
to be terminated in the same manner as any other ''law"--by formal 
l/In note 25 (p. 45A of Appendix) Judge Wright states: 
As the majority concedes, the heart of its reasoning is that even 
if Congress does take a final vote disapproving treaty termination, the 
President might well ignore it and persist in carrying out the termina~ 
tion~ Thus, the majority asserts, the appellees' injury is already 
manifest. 
Even if the President does now take such a stand, the prospective 
of this 200-year-old, continuing political controversy suggests that we 
view - that stand as a bargaining position which cannot confer standing 
where it would not otherwise exist. Since there has been no definitive 
congressional vote disapproving termination, a large enough number of 
congressmen may well agree with the President's view of the constitu-
tional issue as to prevent any legal controversy. Similarly, no matter 
how resolute the President's position appears, we cannot know if he would 
maintain it in the face of an unequivocal vote of disapproval by Congress. 
Thus we see how the standing issue in this case may be cast as a 
ripeness issue. The President's alleged position may portend a true 
legal controversy, but it remains part of a chain of contingency too 
attenuated to confer standing. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
- 4 -
act of Congress approved by the President . Judge MacKinnon's 
opinion appears in the Appendix on pages 47A to 106A, and contains 
a detailed review of historical precedent . He finds that of the 
54 treaties the U.S. has terminated , 52 were with the concurrence 
of Congress. II [T]here were only two minor treaties in which the 
President could be said to have acted alone since 1788." And all of 
the 13 instances relied upon by the President 'were of such minor 
impact , or so non-controversial and widely approved that no person 
would have suspected that such instances would later be claimed as 
precedents to support. ." an absolute Presidential power. 
PETRS ' REASONS FOR GRANTING CERT: Petrs contend that the CA 
has decided an important question of constitutional law which has 
not , but should be , settled by this Court. A termination clause 
2/ 
similar to the one in this treaty appears in nine major treaties . -
Petrs contend that dicta in two opinions of this Court suggest 
that the power of treaty termination is shared : in Amiable Isabella 
6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 1 (1821), the Court said: 
[T]he obligations of the treaty could not be 
changed or varied but by the same formalities with 
which they were introduced; or at least by some act 
of as high an import, and of as unequivocal an author-
ity. Id. at 75. 
And in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Court quoted 
Judge Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (1920), cert 
den. , 2 5 4 U.S. 6 4 3 ( 19 2 0) : 
'- . 
[T]he President and senate may denounce the treaty, 
and thus terminate its life. Congress may enact an 
inconsistent rule, which will control the action of the 
courts. Id. at 509. 
~/Mutual Defense Treaties: NATO, Japan, Philippines, Korea. 
And national defense: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty. 
(Citations on p. 11 of the cert petn). 
- 5 -
Petrs also contend that the CA's decision expands the President's 
foreign affairs power on an unprecedented scale . Petrs believe the 
CA's 10 reasons are wrong, and it attacks each of them in equivalently 
3/ 
nwnbered paragraphs :-
1. There is no real analogy between the treaty power and the 
. fijCaJJ.CR. £ Au,Jw:r,~ aJ,h?y I; +a£~ hko/le ~~--t,tu 
appointment power . ·rt -J.- rr. / I)" 
, ,.. ne. UL+IJIIM ;eMd'Ve ~ ,-,ncltUJ. 
2. The mere fact that this case does not involve a conflict 
with state law does not prevent the use of the Supremacy Clause in 
the constitutional construction necessary to the resolution of th~ 
,.{1,tuw..11, it. ('~ l,d& 6.e.uc, a.rd tlJ telolt.Je 
question presented in this cas e;. Lcmft;J- £,t'lu,u,u. ~!d.W t- t-e.-tt"-a,, 
3. The founding fathers were just as concerned about entering 
_ ;{so ~ /J1b~t4 /d"J turrD11l''i de.rtf 
entangling alliances as ending the:Z. L,ct.&J/J k, U4li) f;j(,IJ.J /lew. 
4. The CA attempts an unprecedented feat of construction by 
transforming the sparse executive powers of Article II into a power 
to end treaties . The underlying question is whether Article II 
delegates all executive power to the President unless there is a 
specific restriction in the Constitution or whether Article II shall 
be construed as delegating to the President only such powers as are 
, .,. 
consistent with the checks and balances of the Constitution as a 
whole . The CA's rationale is clearly in conflict with Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which rejected a 
similar argwnent (that executive power in Article II is plenary 
unless expressly limited in the Constitution). The CA's theory in 
'-. 
this case of aggregate powers was rejected . 
5. While the President may have primary responsibility for 
treaty making in certain areas Congress has always had competence 
3/The CA's views are not repeated. They appear in the first 
memo on pp . 5-8. 
- 6 -
in repeal of the law of the land. Cf., Reisman & McDougal , "Who Can 
Terminate Mutual 
28, and July 23 , 
Defense Treaties?" , The National Law Journal (May 
J&.t.<1J.t41.. ct ~t..4 is ftp ltMcJ ~~I~, 'tfs feA,.,,,,.tJ.nPi 
1979 )t [mul· ~//&W ~'hH" (J.lt;,u.. 
6. Just because it might be useful for the President to be 
able to take immediate action and terminate a treaty does not make 
it constitutional . "The peculiar circumstances of the moment may 
render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or 
21 , 
less constitutional ." John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. 
Maryland at 190-91 (G. Gunther ed . 1969 ). And in all events congres-
sional involvement need not prevent immediate action . 
7. Petrs think Judge MacKinnon properly evaluated the 
historical evidence about how treaties should be terminated . 
8. The court could easily lay down a rule that some form of 
congressional concurrence 
made on the facts of this 
is required. And a distinction could be A~ 
, ~c~ ftz Mt:_Jo 1, .. lih c(~ 71e.,ily tM. /'tf'lf e;r,J' 
cas).. f_!J' eMUISJrk ~ft,~ &,J,;;;t~ e.uJ'd. 
9. Recognition of the People ' s Republic does nnot give the 
iy,JeeJ;..} 
President the power to terminate the Treaty . The President deemed 
,,; /9? 
the Treaty in continuing effec , espite his recognition of the ~ 
~ 
People's Republic~jnco ne decLaea te tok~i~sto ~~e ~rcaty by i~s 
00011 LeYm~ . 
(10) Just because the Treaty has a termination clause (l ike 
most other U.S. treaties ) the President does not have power t o 
terminate . The President ' s action is contrary to congressional 
intent (in view of the Dole-Stone Amendment calling for prior con-
sultation before termination of this Treaty , the Taiwan Relations 
Act preserving all treaties with Taiwan , and the Senate vote on the 
Byrd substitute amendment ). 
- 7 -
The absence of a provision in the Treaty reserving a role for 
Congress is not significant since it was generally understood from 
past practice that termination of treaties , including those with 
termination clauses , require action by the Senate or Congress . 
The absence of a provision for treaty termination in the 
Constitution does not mean the "power consequently devolves upon 
the President'' as the CA would have it . What Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube teaches is that the President is not presumed to have the power 
to act . His power ". . if any , . .must stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself ." 343 U.S . at 585 . 
DISCUSSION : There is an interesting procedural aspect. The 
CA ' s mandate has not yet issued and apparently will not issue until 
this Court acts on the cert petn. The CA ' s judgment was entered 
Nov. 30. Rule 41 , F.R.A.P., provides that mandate shall issue 21 
days after the entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or 
enlarged by order . At my request , the Clerk ' s office spoke with the 
clerk ' s office at CA DC . They advise that mandate has not issued , 
no special order has been entered , and it is their practice t o 
withhold issuance of mandate pending review on cert by this Court 
where,as here , a party seeks cert in the 21 days. 
what import the Court wil l . assign to this . 
I am not sure 
Should the Court be prepared to deny cert , the case shoul d be 
expedited and cert denied at this Conference . ! / 
'\ 
If the Court believes the case is certworthy , the first question 
is whether or not to grant petrs' motion to expedite and for other 
4/If the SG has filed a response t o the cert petn , the Court 
could-deny petrs ' motion t o expedite and fo r other relief . If the 
SG has not filed a response , t he Court would have t o grant petrs' 
motion to shorten the time fo r response t o Dec. 7, but could deny 
petrs ' motion in all other respects . 
- 8 -
relief, and as requested decide the case by Dec. 31. I doubt it 
would be productive for me to speculate on the answer to this question 
or suggest what result the Court should reach on the merits . 





Marsel CA & DC ops . in 
temporary appendix 
5/If time allows , a second supplemental memo will be circulated 
when the SG files a response . 
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1. Motion to Expedite Consider-
ation and for other Relief. 
2. Cert to CA DC 1/ 
(en bane, per curiam-) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petrs ask the Court to expedite their cert petn which 
was filed Dec. 3, and review the CA DC's en bane per curiam opinion 
~ 
which reversed the DC's (D.C.) (Gash) opinion, and held that the 
Executive possesses the constitutional power to terminate the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (6 U.S.T. 433) without 
Legislative approval. 
CONTENTIONS: According to the U.S. 's notice of termination, the 
Mutual Defense Treaty will be terminated on Jan. 1, 1980. Petrs state 
that if this Court does not dispose of this case by Dec. 31, the 
matter will be moot and the constitutional powers of the Congress will 
be irrevocably usurped. In order for the Court to decide the case 
1/Wright, joined by Tamm, filed an opinion concurring in the 






before Jan. 1, petrs propose that the resp's time to file an opposition 
be shortened to Dec. 6 so the Court can act on the petn by Dec. 7. If 
the petn is granted, petrs propose that the Court dispense with an 
Appendix (Rule 36) and hear the case on the original record. Petrs also 
propose an expedited briefing scheduleI/ and oral argument on Dec. 19. 
On cert, petrs contend that the President does not have the abso-
lute power under the Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty 
with the Republic of China without any form of approval by the Legisla-
tive Branch. (Petrs' claims on cert are discussed below.) 
FACTS: The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by representatives of 
the U.S. and the Republic of China (ROC) on Dec. 2, 1954. It was 
approved by the Senate and signed by the President on Feb. 11, 1955. 
Article V provided that in the event of an attack on Taiwan, the 
Pescadores, or U.S. territories in the Western Pacific, each nation 
"would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes." Article X provides that the Treaty would remain 
in force ''indefinitely" but "either Party may terminate it one year after 
notice has been given to the other Party." On Dec. 15, 1978, Pres . ., 
Carter announced that on Jan. 1, 1979, the U.S. would recognize the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole government of China, would 
withdraw recognition for the ROC, and terminate the Mutual Defense 
Treaty in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. On Dec. 23, 
1978, the State Dept. formally notified the ROC that the Treaty would 
terminate Jan. 1, 1980. 
2/Cross briefs filed Dec. 13, optional reply briefs filed Dec. 17. 
Alternatively, petrs state that they are prepared to have the case 
heard on the briefs and papers filed in the CA. Petrs also ask that 
Rule 39(1) be temporarily suspended to allow filing of 20 copies of a 
temporary appendix which will be replaced with 40 copies that comply 
with Rule 39 as soon as they are printed. 
-------. < -1--------- -- -~.--,------ ~·--- - -
- 3 -
OPINI0N3BELOW: The DC found that petrs had standing in their 
capacity as individual legislators to seek a judicial declaration 
with respect to the President's unilateral termination of the Treaty, 
since they claimed an injury to their legislative right to be con-
sulted and vote on treaty termination. The DC also found that the 
case did not present a non-justiciable political question. The DC 
concluded that the President's notice of termination must receive 
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both Houses 
of Congress for it to be constitutionally effective. The DC therefore 
enjoined the Sec. of State from implementing the President's notice 
of termination until the notice is approved. 
The CA reversed. It agreed that petrs have standing. The CA 
stated that if there is merit in the Senators' theory that they have 
(- a constitutional right to vote on the President's proposed treaty 
termintion (and block it with a one-third plus one vote) then such 
Senators have suffered injury in fact from the President's action 
terminating the Treaty without Senate consent. This Presidential 
action has deprived the Senate of what petrs claim is their constitu-
tionally prescribed right to vote on the treaty termination. Petrs 
; 
allege an objective constitutional right to vote, and allege dis~ 
enfranchisement in the context of a specific matter. The CA was of 
the view that the question was whether the President's action amounts 
to complete disenfranchisement, or whether petrs have left any legis-
lative means to block the termination of the Treaty despite the 
President's action. The CA was of the view that on the record before 
it, there is no conceivable senatorial action that could likely 
prevent termination of the Treaty. A congressional resolution or 
( 
- 4 -
statute might at most have persuasive effect. It could not block 
termination if the President persisted in his present interpretation 
that the Constitution gave him unilateral power. Petrs claim that 
they have a right to block termination with one-third plus one of 
their colleagues. Such a minority cannot obtain a remedy, and even 
a majority would be unable to achieve a remedy. The only way the 
Senate can effectively vote on treaty termination, with the burden 
on termination proponents to secure a two-thirds majority, is for 
the President to submit the proposed termination to the Senate as 
he would a proposed treaty. Since this is the remedy petrs seek, 
the CA was of the view that requiring some other legislative acti~n 
before allowing standing to pursue this claim would be to require 
3/ 
a useless act.-
The CA therefore reached the merits and at the beginning of 
its opinion it observed that the Treaty contained a provision 
for termination by either Party on one year's notice. In the 
course of giving consent, the Senate exhibited no purpose and took 
no action to reserve a role for itself in effectuation of this pro-
vision. Neither has the Senate, since the giving of the notice of 
termination, purported to take any final or dispositive action with 
respect to it either by way of approval or disapproval. The constitu-
tional issue is therefore whether the President, in these precise 
circumstances, is empowered to terminate the Treaty in accordance 
with its terms. The CA concluded that he is, and the limitations. 
which the DC purported to place on his actions have no constitutional 
foundation. The CA listed 10 reasons why it concluded that the 
3/The CA outlined extensive background information in pages 
3 to 9 of its opinion (Appendix pp. 4A to lOA). 
I • 
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President's termination is effective without legislative action. 
The CA stated that its conclusion rested on the totality of the 
10 factors discussed; no hierarchical value is assigned, and no one 
factor or combination of factors is is determinative. 
1. Article II, §2, provides that the President cannot enter 
into a treaty without consent of the Senate. But the CA felt it 
did not follow as a matter of language alone that the inference 
(co.,et /VI 
is inescapable that the President must in all circumstances seek 1..:>'4ttL o... 
the same senatorial consent to terminate a treaty. 
r,t,1S~ 
Cf. Myers V. ~ppotMtd 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); In Re Humphrey's Executor v. w!tt.. t!,. 
---------------r1d>1(e. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Expansion of the language of CDl,($wt' 
·J 'IL 
· the Constitution by sequential linguistic projection is a tricky 1w.di !Mee 
business at best. The CA observed that " [ a] s the Supreme Court has ):ove} 
recognized with respect to the clause in question, it is not abstract ".!J,lt.J 
logic or sterile symmetry that controls, but a sensible and 
f.tu, "JiM) 
realistic ascertainment of the meaning of the Constitution in the 
\ context of the specific action taken." 
2. The DC suggested an alternative theory. To wit, the 
necessary authority to terminate the Treaty in this instance may 
be granted by a majority of each house of Congress, presumably 
under Article VI, which holds that the laws of the U.S., and all 
treaties,shall be the supreme law of the land. The CA was of the 
view that the Constitution is silent on the matter of treaty termina~ 
tion, and the Supremacy Clause speaks to the common characteristic 
of the supremacy of the Constitution, federal law, and treaties over 
state law. It does not provide any basis for concluding that a 
treaty must be unmade either by the same process by which it was 





3. The constitutional requirement of advice and consent of 
the Senate is an extraordinary condition on the exercise of 
Presidential powers, and is not extended absent an unmistakably 
clear implication. The DC's extension of this limitation is not 
sound. Making or amending a treaty involves entangling alliances. 
A constitutional provision dealing with this special occurrence 
does not necessarily apply to its termination in accordance with its 
terms. 
4. Foreign affairs powers proceed directly from the sovereignty 
of the Union and the President is the constitutional representative 
of the U.S. with respect to external affairs. 
The Constitution confers no specific power to terminate treaties 
on either Congress or the Executive, but the powers conferred on 
Congress are detailed; those of the President are generalized,and 
bespeak no such limitation on foreign affairs powers. The President 
is the constitutional representative of the U.S. with respect to 
external affairs and the treaty power appears in Article II, relating · 
to the Executive Branch. 
It would take an unprecedented feat of judicial construction 
to read into the Constitution an absolute condition precedent of 
congressional or Senate approval for termination of all treaties, 
similar to the specific one relating to initial approval. And it 
would unalterably affect the balance of power between the two Branches 
laid down in Articles I and II. 
5. Ultimately, what must be recognized is that a treaty is 
sui generis. The issue is whether the Senate (or Congress) must in 
this case give its prior consent to discontinue a treaty which the 
President thinks it desirable to terminate in the national intere·st 
and pursuant to a provision of the Treaty itself. 7"/i,~ u;4wJ..~ e//.f-/i~cJ-





6. The rule sought by petrs would give a small minority of 
Senators the constitutional power to deny the President the authority 
necessary to conduct foreign policy in a rational and effective 
manner. Many treaties are terminable under international law for 
breach or frustration and the President must be able to act immediately. 
7. A variety of means have been used to terminate - treaties.ii 
The diversity of historical precedents are inconclusive, yet the CA 
thought it significant that in no situation has a treaty been 
continued in force over the opposition of the President. The 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations found there were 14 different 
bases on which a President could terminate a ·treaty in the course 
· of his executive function, and it is well established the President 
can determine that a treaty has been terminated because of breach, 
Charlton v. Kelley, 229 U.S. 447, or is at an end because of changed 
circumstances. Although the CA found no need to define the term, the 
-~ President has "_foreign affairs powers." - · • 
- ' 
8. All the CA decides today is that two-thirds Senate consent 
or majority consent in both Houses is not necessary. to terminate this 
; 
i/As the DC observed, 
Since the first , treaty to which the United ·States - &+~+r= 
was a party was terminated in 1798 by an act of 
Congress, a variety of means have been used to term-
inate treaties: by statute directing the President 
to deliver notice of termination; by the President 
acting pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress 
or otherwise acting with the concurrence of both 
houses of Congress; by the President acting with 
senatorial consent; and by the President acting 
alone. 
Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 18-19 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 
• 1979) (footnotes omitted). 
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treaty in the circumstances before it. The CA found its judicial 
role limited, and it could not find an implied role in the 
Constitution for the Senate in treaty termination for some but not 
all treaties based on their relative importance. 
9. Termination of this treaty has some unique elements, 
revolving around the U.S. 's diplomatic relations with PRC and ROC. 
The President makes a responsible claim that he has authority as 
President to determine that there is no meaningful vitality to 
a mutual defense treaty when there is no recognized state.~ 
10. Finally, of central significance is Article X of the 
Treaty which permits termination on one year's notice. No specific 
restriction or condition on the President's action is found within 
the Constitution or this Treaty itself. The termination clause 
(- is without conditions and without designation as to who shall act 
to terminate it. No specific role for Congress is spelled out in 
the Constitution or Treaty. Therefore, there is no basis for a court 
to imply a restriction on the President's power to terminate. 
DISCUSSION: The papers in this case were received earlier tog~y. 
This partial memorandum is circulated in order to avoid further delay. 
The remainder (discussing the concurring opinions, petrs contentions 
on cert, etc.) will follow. 
The Clerk advises that the Government intends to file a response, 
probably by noon, Thurs., Dec. 6. 
There is no response. 
------- -~~...,... 
~ .. '"· 
Marsel r.A & DC ops in . Eemporary appendix 
js 12-4-79 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
December 7, 1979 Conference 




Cert to CADC (en banc}(per cur1am) 
(Wright & Tamm concurring) 
(McKinnon dissenting) 
Timely 
Attached are two fine memoranda from Bob Marsel outlining 
the facts and the holding below. I have taken the liberty of adding 
a few handwritten annotations. 
I believe that the majority opinion may be properly read as 
an attempt to decide this issue while creati~ i ttle precedent as 
2. 
possible. Thus, the opinion lists ten factors supporting its view , -
that the President may terminate the Treaty with the Republic of 
China (ROC) while suggesting that no one factor, nor group of 
factors, is determinative of the case. Judge McKinnon's dissent 
makes two arguments (1) A treaty is a law under the Supremacy Clause 
and thus, like any other law, can only be repealed by congressional 
acton, and ( 2) The history of treaty termination prov ides 1 it tle 
support for the claim that the President alone may end a treaty 
committment. 
I must say that Judge McKinnon's dissent and the cert 
petition present a forceful argument that the majority gives the 
President unlimited and unconstitutional power. The majority's 
response to Judge McKinnon's two points is simply that (1) The effect 
of a treaty upon domestic law, which is a matter of congressional 
concern, is different than the effect of a treaty upon foreign policy 
discretion, and ( 2) The history of treaty termination provides no 
example of a treaty being terminated which the President did not want 
to terminate. 
On the merits, I think this case presents a compl-e:it and 
difficult issue which I have some doubts could be adequately studied 
and decided by December 31. But, apart from the merits, I do not 
.;:;; ~ IL 
think this Court should consider the case for prudential reasons of 
.... 
--- ....___., ______________________ _ 
the sort outlined in Chie'f" Judge Wright's concurring opinion. 
________ '--____ ....._ ________ _ 
Al though Chief Judge Wright's opinion alternatively refers to its 
guiding principle as standing, exhaustion, or ripeness, the thrust of 
the concurrence is clear--the federal courts should not decide a 
controversy between the President and Congress unless it is 
3. 
absolutely certain that a conflict exists. I agree. 
I do not suggest, as the concurrence may, that this case 
presents an Article III problem. Rather I believe that justiciability 
doctrines allow the courts in appropriate circumstances to refuse to 
hear cases that meet the case or controversy requirement. In this 
case, the petrs argue that Congress must be asked to approve 
termination before the President's order is effective. Yet Congress 
itself has not squarely faced the issue. The two Houses have not 
resolved that the President's power is contrary to their own, nor has 
2/3 of the Senate resolved that the treaty should stay in force. The 
majority says that such action is not necessary because it would be 
fuitile. 
of the 
In an ordinary case, the prospect of fuitility in the face 
President's position would obviate an exhaustion-type 
requirement. 
But this is no ordinary case. Here it is claimed that the 
President of the United States has acted unconstitutionally and in 
derogation of constitutional power given solely to the Congress. I 
do not believe that the judicial branch, and especially this Court, 
, " 
should intrude into the political ebb and flow of power ab.sent a 
clear indication that Congress has asserted the authority that the 
President is claimed to usurp. In this case, the substantial 
possibility exists that a majority of the members of Congress agree, 
or at least acquiese, in the President's assertion of authority. 
Accordingly, I would deny cert. 
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
December 7, 1979 Conference 





Motion of Myres S. McDougal 
and W. Michael Reisman for 
Leave to File Arnicus Brief 
SUMMARY: Profs. McDougal and Reisman ask for leave to file an 
amicus brief under Rule 42(3) in support of petrs. Petrs have con-
sented; the SG's office has apparently refused consent. 
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS: Petrs state their interest in this case 
arises as professors who specialize in international and constitu-
tional law, are experts in the conduct of foreign affairs, and are 





This case is of major interest and concern 
to many lawyers and citizens. If the Court of 
Appeals' decision is allowed to stand, it will 
enormously increase the power of one person to 
terminate international agreements to which the 
United States is party, all but abrogating the 
historic constitutional procedures by which 
Congress was vouchsafed a role in a key part of 
the treaty process and through which political 
power in our system has been checked and balanced. 
Externally, it will weaken rather than strengthen 
the foreign affairs power, for henceforth 
foreign governments will no longer be able to 
rely on the durability of our treaties, since 
they will be terminable at the will of one 
person. 
Amici · suggest that the exclusion of the Congress from the termina-
tion of all agreements imports a radical restructuring of our constitu-
tional system in favor of the Executive, not for peripheral and ephemeral 
matters, but for matters which may be of the greatest national concern. 
Even if such a development should be considered desirable, it should not 
be accomplished through a decision which is candidly expedient. 
The Court of Appeals improperly isolates the conduct of foreign 
affairs from domestic activities and globalizes the foreign affairs 
power, assigning all of it to the Executive. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than strengthening the , 
foreign affairs power in respect to treaties actually weakens it. Prior 
to the decision below, treaty partners could assume that if the United 
States entered into a treaty it was intentionally making an agreement 
that was insulated, through constitutionally mandated procedures, from 
capricious terminations or from unilateral termination as a result of 
threats from a third party. If the decision below is permitted to stand, 
/ than at the very best, prospective treaty partners will not be able to 
I 
....... 
gauge how much to rely on a treaty; at the very worst, they will conclude 
that the United States can no longer make durable agreements. 
- 3 -
One of the most destructive aspects of the Court of Appeals' 
decision is that it creates expectations about future constitutional 
\.._, competence while claiming that it is not deciding the larger issue. 
The President believesthat hisclaim of exclusive constitutional 
competence has been vindicated in the Court of Appeals while a number 
of congressmen aver that they will henceforth insert reservations 
in treaties as to termination procedures. But, if the issue of 
general competence has in fact been decided, such reservations will 
not avail. The prospect is one of more internal conflict. 
Amici conclude "[t] question in this case is not the political 
one of whether the treaty with Taiwan should be terminated, but the 
legal one of by what constitutional procedures out country should 
make such a choice. This case urgently requires review by the highest 
tribunal·.·· The costly-bought sharing and balancing of power in 
(,._ our constitutional process, which~as so long served our freedoms 
so well, should not lightly be abandoned." 
DISCUSSION: Leave to file should presumably be granted. 
12/6/79 Marsel 
CHAMBERS OF 
~uprtnir Qj onrt of t~t 1Jlmtdt ~hdr.s 
'J.lla~lpnghm. W- ~. 2llc?.l!·~ 
THE CHIEF ..JusT1cE December 7, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
John and I have discussed the disposition of 
this case and he drafted an "eight liner" on 
which I have made a few suggestions. This is to 
give you something to think about over the 
weekend, 
"Without intimating any view on whether 
the question presented is a nonjusticiable 
'political question,' we o ta 
petitioners do not have standing to 
prosecute this action. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit is vacated and the case is 
remanded to that court with directions to 






~nµrtmt <qimrt .ltf tfrt ~tb .itatts 
._as4ingfott, 1l3. C!J. 2UffeJ.1-$ 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
December 8, 1979 
No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
The order as now drafted holds that the petitioners 
have no standing. This theory reflects the Wright-Tamm 
concurrence which stated that a congressman is not injured 
unless Congress is injured, and that Congress is not injured 
unless its will has been ignored. Congress has not been 
ignored, because it has taken no action asserting a role in 
treaty termination. 
It seems to me that the problem is absence of 
ripeness rather than lack of standing. The prudential 
considerations are about the same, but I am reluctant to go 
on record holding that individual congressmen (or a group of 
them) lack standing to raise a constitutional issue 
concerning the exercise of their official duties. To be 
sure, we would not be saying that there never could be 
standing. But with no explanation, a flat holding here on 
standing could create trouble for the future. 
I believe the Court would cause less confusion--and 
better preserve our options for the future--if the holding 
were phrased in terms of ripeness. For example, the Court 
could hold that "this case is not ripe for judicial review 
absent explicit legislative action affirming the belief that 
Congress must be consulted prior to termination of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China." 
The ripeness language would focus attention more 
directly on the role of the Court in a dispute between 
Congress and the President. In my view we should not 
intervene in such a situation unless it is clear that the 
Congress and the President are at loggerheads. Phrasing the 
Court's order in terms of "standing" instead of "ripeness" 
may suggest that the Court's attention is directed towards 
the effect of treaty termination upon these congressmen, 
rather than on the role of the Court vis-a-vis the coordinate 
branches of government. 
My notes indicate that you also endorsed the 
"ripeness" ground. Such a holding would be completely 
compatible with the Wright-Tamm reasoning. See n.25 of their 
opinion. I hope others will give further thought to placing 




maximum flexibility for the future. It is also a ground that 
laymen can . understand and probably agree with. 
Of course, any order incorporating this suggestion 
should also note that we do not intimate any v iew on whether 
the question is a nonjusticiable "political question." 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
... 
. 
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we believe it important to reply to the Respondents' in 
terrorem argument, at pp. 8-9of their Brief in Opposition, that 
this Court must rule before January 1, 1980, "Lo/therwise, the 
treaty will terminate on that date and, under international law, 
that termination will be irrevocable, regardless of any subse-
quent judicial holding that the United States' internal pro-
cedures for arriving at the decision to terminate were 
deficient." 
This is simply not so. 
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The issue being litigated is whether the President possessed 
constitutional power to terminate the treaty without any kind of 
congressional concurrence. If he did not, his action was, and 
remains, ineffective as domestic constitutional law, unless and 
until that concurrence is obtained. An invalid act, challenged 
in pending litigation, does not acquire legitimacy by aging, 
during the time that the case is being considered in the courts. 
This Court's judgment reversing the court of appeals would have 
exactly the same effect if rendered in 1980 as it would have if 
rendered in 1979. 
There is nothing in international law to the contrary. If 
the U. s. Constitution requires the concurrence of Congress, that 
is the end of the matter. Even if, contrary to fact, the Republic 
of China were for some reason seeking to rely on the President's 
notice of termination, Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties would put the ROC (and the international community) on 
notice, in view of the pendency of this litigation, that the 
defect in the President's constitutional authority "was manifest 
and concerned a rule of its LI~., u.s~7 internal law of funda-
mental importance," hence cannot be taken to be the act of the 
United States unless and until the deficiency is cured by con-
gressional action. The fact, of course, is that the Republic 
of China promptly protested the termination as being in violation 
of international law (R. 171). See Appendix A to this Reply. 
; 
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The answer to Respondents' resuscitation argument, that the 
judicial power could not order a terminated treaty back into 
effect, is in Article X of the Treaty itself. It says that 
"This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party 
may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the 
other party." If the notice of termination has not been 
validly given in consequence of lack of congressional concurrence, 
the treaty, by its terms, remains operative indefinitely, and 
does not need to be "ordered back into effect." 
The President could not impose "severe time restraints on 
this court" by an ultra vires act. If his notice of termination 
was ineffective, so also was the date that it prescribed. 
The Court has jurisdiction to decide this case effectively 
at a time which suits its own convenience. 
Of Counsel: 
EUGENE V. ROSTOW 
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APPENDIX A TO 
PETITIONERS' REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
,-..._,_ 
Taipei, Dece~ber 31, 1978 
Your Excell ency, 
The Government of the Republic of China has been given notice 
by the Government of the United States of the termination of the 
Mutua l Defense Treaty one year after the date of January 1, 1979. 
The Government of the Republic of China has scrupulous1y 
. 
observed its obl igations under the Mut~al Oef~nse Treaty, and has 
never vioiated any provisions of that treaty. For the U.S. Govern-
men~ to unilaterally give notice of termination for no justifiable 
ground is wholly unthinkable. 
In accordance with principles of international 1aw, ·the 
cause and spirit constitute the basis of the provisions of a treaty. 
To terminate the ~utua1 Defense Treaty unilatera11y without prior 
consultations violates the basic spirit of the provisions of the 
His Exce 11 ency 
Leonard Unger 
A.7.bassador ~xtraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
United States Ewbassy, Taioei 
''""" I , 
' ' \ , 
treaty. 
' There has been no vital change of circumstances since the 
signing of the Mutual Defense .. Treaty and the termination o~ the 
treaty can never=~ justified on the ground of rebus sic stantibus 
(the principle of changed circumstances). 
The Government of the Republic of China deplores the unilateral 
termination of the Mut~al Defense Treaty and lodges its strongest 
protest with the Govern~ent of the United States. 
I avail myse1f of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency 
the assurances of my highest consideration. 
//~ 1-t.~-t 
Tsiang Yie~ (} 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
C HAMBERS O F" 
THE CHIEF .JU S T ICE 
Re: 
~ltpri-mr <qnnrt itf tlyt%ritdt §'ihtft-1' 
~ru.l1ington, :![). <q. ~0?)i;3 
December 10, 1979 
No . 856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Enclosed is a draft undertaking to ex press the 
views articulated in our discussion. 
In my view of the procedure, we should r emand to 
the Court of Appeals with directions that the case be 
sent to the District Court to be dismissed but I will 
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"'• 
Re: No. 856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the 
case is remanded to the District Court with directions 
that the District Court dismiss the complaint. 
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice 
Marshall, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Stevens 
are of the view the case presents a political question 
and is, therefore, non-justiciable. Mr. Justice 
is of the view the case is not ripe for judicial 
Mr. Justice Brennan would 
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would 
grant the petition for cert. 
~ 
~ 




























JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~up-uuu <!fottrl of tlft ~b 
Jr~Jring!on. ~. <!f. 2llffe'!' 
Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
December 10, 1979 
If the proposed disposition is adopted, would you 
please add at the end thereof the following: 
"MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. In my view, 
the time issue is illusory; if the President does 
not have the power to terminate the Treaty, (an 
issue I do not presume to pass upon summarily) 
the riotice of intention to terminate also has no 
legal effect. Without further study, I do not 
wish to pass on the issue of standing. I there-
fore would grant certiorari and give the case 
plenary consideration." 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Co n ference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS Of" 
~u.pttntt QJamt cf t4t ~tilth ~tafts 
jil'agqmg~ ~. QJ. 20.;r>i, 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Goldwater v. Carter 
December 10, 1979 
I agree with the result of the proposed order in this case 
approved by the Chief Justice and John circulated late Friday, but 
am troubled by its failure to cite any controlling authority from 
this Court. As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion in 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), "we are not final because 
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final." If I could be persuaded that the analysis which follows on 
the .issue of "standing" is incorrect, I will cheerfully change my 
mind and vote to join the proposed order. But as I read the case of 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), five out of the nine 
Justices who participated in that case thought that the 20 Kansas 
state senators who voted against ratification of the Child Labor 
Amendment had standing in this Court sufficient for Article III case 
or controversy purposes to question the ratification by Kansas of 
that amendment. Chief Justice Hughes, delivering what is referred 
to as the "opinion of the Court" in the United States Reports, said: 
"Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is 
challenged upon the ground that petitioners have 
no standing to seek to have the judgment of the 
state court reviewed, and hence it is urged that 
the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. We 




Black, J., and Frankfurter, J., in separate opinions, each 
joined by Roberts, J., and Douglas, J., argued that there was no 
standing, but the first sentence of the concurring opinion of 
Justice Black makes it clear that those four recognized that they 
were in dissent on this point, 307 U.S. 433, 456. By means of a 
pure "nose counting" process, Hughes, CJ, Stone, Reed, Butler, and 
McReynolds, JJ, held there was standing; but all save Butler and 
McReynolds, JJ, held that the issue of the time in which Congress 
could accept ratifications of an amendment by a state legislature 
was a "political" one in that case, and therefore one on which the 
Court was not empowered to pass. 
A~ curiam reversal of a lower court by this Court with the 
votes of only six Justices, or with the votes of only five if one of 
the four dissenters states that he would not wish to have the case 
given plenary consideration by granting certiorari, is no stranger 
to us. But I have understood its theory as being that the lower 
court had, at least in the eyes of the six who joined the opinion, 
plainly departed from a precedent of this Court and therefore 
plenary consideration was unnecessary. It seems to me that a~ 
curiam of this sort which not only does not cite the authorities 
upon which it relies for reversal, but seems (at least to me) to run 
counter to an authority of this Court which has never been 
overruled, might be thought to give the appearance of "brute force" 
\ 











The reason that I agree with the . result of the proposed~ 
curiam is that it directs the Court of Appeals to vacate its opinion 
and remand, presumably for dismissal by the District Court. I would 
point o~t here that I am not sure that some of our more recent cases 
on standing, such as Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 426 U.S. 
208 (1974), or Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) do not 
I 
make it crystal clear that dismissal for lack of "standing" is 
because the District Court lacked "jurisdiction" to hear the case or 
because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief 
might be granted. See Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Northwestern 
Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951). 
The reason I agree with the result is that I would simply invert 
the language of the proposed~ curiam, and assume that there is 
standing but hold that the issue decided by the Court of Appeals and 
by the District Court is a "political" question or a 
"non-justiciable" question which requires the same result. I agree 
with the comments expressed at various points in the Conference 
discussion on Friday to the effect that, at least in the field of 
foreign affairs, the authority of the President to act is a 
"political" or "non-justiciable" question, and Art. III courts are 
not empowered to pass judgment on it. A good part of my reason for 
believing this is the opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and the following observation in Coleman 
v. Miller, supra, 307 U.S. at 455: 
"There are many illustrations in the field of our 
conduct of foreign relations, where there are 
'considerations of 
extreme magnitude, 
incompetent to the 
court ·of justice.' 
260." 
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policy, considerations of 
and certainly, entirely 
examination and decision of a 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 
For at least 30 years we have vacated and remanded with 
instructions to dismiss the complaint in cases where there was no 
case or controversy by the time the matter reached this Court even 
though there was one when the case commenced. United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950). I do not believe that any of our 
cases are in either explicit or implicit conflict with treating 
cases which involve "political" questions or "non-justiciable 
issues" in the same manner. I think there is even better reason 
than in the case of mootness by the time the case reaches this Court 
to vacate and wash out prior federal proceedings when it is 
determined that the case involves a "political" question. When we 
vacate under Munsingwear, supra, we are simply saying that this 
Court may not adjudicate a case which no longer involves the Art. 
III type of controversy which is an indispensable prerequisite to 
our jurisdiction. But I think it is even more important that prior 
federal decisions be washed out in a case which has decided a 
political question, at least where the case seeks a decision as to 
the authority of the President in the field of foreign affairs where 
no cognizable injury in fact has occurred in the United States. 
(This would distinguish the Steel Seizure Cases, where although one 
of the grounds upon which President Truman relied was his power over 
foreign affairs, steel mills located in the United States had been 
seized pursuant to that order.) 
\ 
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Thus I could join a~ curiam much like that circulated on 
Friday if its form were inverted, saying that assuming there were 
standing on the part of the Senators, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated with instructions to remand to the District Court 
for dismissal citing Luther v. Bordan, 7 How. 1 (1849), Pacific 
·Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), and United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Co., supra. 
But in view of the wide variety of views expressed at 
Conference, and the fact that I am in close agreement with the Chief 
and John as to the proper disposition of the case, and yet as of now 
cannot join the circulation of Friday, I am under no illusion that 
the views I have just expressed will instantly command the agreement 
of five others. Particularly since Lewis, in his memorandum 
circulated Saturday, seems to feel the issue is one of "ripeness", 
and that the federal courts should have a good deal more discretion 
in dealing with presidential powers in foreign affairs than my 
previous discussion indicates I do, my guess is that it would be 
quite difficult to compose a~ curiam opinion commanding the votes:/ 
of six members of the Court for summary reversal. It is quite 
logical to inquire then, since these are difficult and by no means 
fully settled constitutional questions, why we should not grant 
certiorari and hear them argued in due course. 
It is here that I think the Court is between a rock and hard 
place. One of the parties contends that if the case is not decided 
by December 31, the issue will be moot. I am not prepared to say 
\ 
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flatly, without benefit of full briefing and oral argument, that 
this is not so, although that is my present tentative view. With 
that contention in the case, I don't think we can blithely grant 
certior~ri, and set the case for argument in January or February. I 
think this is especially true in light of the microscopic scrutiny 
which our actions are apt to receive for a while after the "The 
Brethren". If after argument we decided the case was moot, we could 
well be accused of ducking a tough issue. The argument would not be 
necessarily that we were wrong in deciding that it was moot, but 
that we should have set it for expedited briefing, argument, and 
decision in order to assure that it did not become moot. If we try 
to avoid that pitfall by simply agreeing among ourselves now that we 
would, after argument in 1980, decide that the case was not moot in 
order to avoid such criticism, I think we would be transmuting the 
"mootness" doctrine into a principle of judicial convenience to 
which I, for one, could not subscribe. 
A second alternative would be to call for accelerated briefing 
and argument, and decide the case before January 1. I think this is ~ 
the worst possible alternative. I suppose that 95% of the public 
consider that time taken in reaching a judicial decision is fungible 
with time taken to saw wood: if you can cut X cords of wood in 12 
8-hour days, you should be able to cut the same amount in 8 12-hour 
days. All of us who have had any experience with the judicial 
process know that this is not so -- that a sort of brain fag sets in 
after a certain amount of time of pondering the issues in a 
, . . ,
~ 
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particular case, and they have to be put on the mental back burne r 
to simmer for a period before concentrating on them again. We know 
this, but I am quite sure that those who have not been judges may 
not. I mentioned in Conference Friday the tremendously accelerated 
schedule of argument and decision in the Steel Seizure Cases (fou r 
days after the District Court enjoined the President from seizing 
the steel mills, this Court granted certiorari before judgment and 
set the case for argument nine days later. The opinion of the 
Court, and the various concurring and dissenting opinions, were 
filed June 2, 1952 -- 21 days after oral argument, and 30 days af t er 
certiorari had been granted) and my opinion that this Court has bee n 
suffering for nearly 30 years from an opinion which much too 
casually brushed off serious collateral questions in a determined 
effort to reach and decide the merits of a very important 
constitutional question. It was undoubtedly a good faith effort by 
the Court to respond to an event of great public importance, but 
that is not necessarily the formula for a decision which makes good 
law. All of us except John will remember the struggle with Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which we heard argument after full 
briefing on November 10, 1975, and issued t~e opinion January 30, 
1976 -- a period of nearly three months -- but nonetheless involved 
two or three days of conference and the farming out to several 
different members of the Court of different portions of the opinion 
to write. If we tried to decide this case on its merits after 





three weeks what it took us three months to do in Buckley v. Valeo. 
A third alternative is to deny certiorari; as of late last week 
I think I told Byron that would be ~y vote at Conference, but I now 
think the Court of Appeal's "one day excursion ticket'' approach to 
the case is wholly wrong and ought not to be left standing. 
The most positive alternative, from my point of view, is that if 
there are six votes to order dismissal of the case, a simple order 
to that effect be entered, and those of us who felt obliged to 
support our vote with writing, as I now feel I would, could file 
separate opinions supporting the order. There would be no Court 
opinion, even a~ curiarn, so that our action would have very much 
the "one day excursion ticket" effect and would not bind future 
Courts even to the extent that a~ curiam opinion would if and 
when the question arose again. But such an order would have the 
virtue of removing from the books decisions of the Court of Appeals 
and of the District Court which I am convinced are wrong. 
Sincerely, 




December 10, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. 
Without deciding whether the case presents a non-
justiciable "political question" or whether petitioners 
would otherwise have standing to prosecute this action, 
we hold that in any event this case is not ripe for 
judicial review. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit and remand the case to that Court 










December 10, 1979 
.l 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Goldwater v. Carter 
I agree with the result of the proposed order in this case 
approved by the Chief Justice and John circulated late Friday, but 
am troubled by its failure to cite any controlling authority from 
this Court. As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion in 
Brown v. Alle&, 344 U.S. 443, 540 {1953), "we are not final because 
we are infallible, but we are fnfallible only because we are 
final." If I could be persuaded that the analysis which follows on 
. the issue of "standing" is incorrect, I will cheerfully change my 
mind and vote to join the proposed order. But as I read the case of 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 {1939), five out of the nine 
Justices who participated in that case thought that the 20 Kansas 
state senators who voted against ratification of the Child Labor 
Amendment had standing in this Court sufficient for Article III case 
~ ,.. 
or controversy purposes to question the ratification by Kansas of 
that amendment. Chief Justice Hughes delivered what is referred to 
as the "opinion of the Court" in the United States Reports, the 
Court said: 
"Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is 
challenged upon the ground that petitioners have 
no standing to seek to have the judgment of the 
state court reviewed, and hence it is urged that 
the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. We 
are unable to accept that view." 307 U.S. 433, 
437. 
Black, J., and Frankfurter, J., in separate opinions, each 
joined by Roberts, J., and Douglas, J., argued that there was no 







Justice Black makes it clear that those four recognized that they 
were in dissent in this point, 307 U.S. 433, 456. By means of a 
pure "nose counting" process, Hughes, CJ, Stone, Reed, Butler, and 
McReynolds, JJ, held there was standing; but all save Butler and 
McReynolds, JJ, held that the issue of the time in which Congress 
could accept ratifications of an amendment by a state legislature 
was a "political" one in that case, and therefore one on which the 
Court was not empowered to pass. 
A~ curiam reversal of a lower court by this Court with the 
votes of only six Justices, or with the votes of only five if one of 
the four dissenters states that he would not wish to have the case 
given plenary consideration by granting certiorari, is no stranger 
to us. But I have understood its theory as being that the lower 
court had, at least in the eyes of the six who joined the opinion, 
plainly departed from a precedent of this Court and therefore 
plenary consideration was unnecessary. It seems to me that a~ 
curiam of this sort which not only doe s not cite the authorities 
upon which it relies for reversal, but seems (at least to me) to run 
counter to an authority of this Court which has never been 
overruled, might be thought to give the appearance of "brute force" 
and would surely be subject to very valid criticism. 
The reason that I a gr e e with the result of the p r oposed~ 
curiam is that it directs the Court of App e als to vacate its opinion 
a nd r e mand, presumably for dismissal by the District Court. I would 




on standing, such as Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 426 U.S. 
208 (1974), or Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) do not make it 
cyrstal clear that dismissal for lack of "standing" is because the 
Distr·ict Court lacked "jurisdiction" to hear the case or because the 
plaintiffs faiied to state a claim upon which relief might be 
granted. See Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Northwestern Public 
Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (Opinion of Jackson, J.) 
The reason I agree with the result is that I would simply invert 
the language of the proposed~ curiam, and assume that there is 
standing but hold that the issue decided by the Court of Appeals and 
by the District Court is a "political" questJon or a 
"non-justiciable" question which requires the same result. I agree 
with the comments expressed at various points in the Conference 
discussion on Friday to the effect that, at least in the field of 
foreign affairs, the authority of the President to act is a 
"political" or "non-justiciable" question, and Art. III courts are 
not empowered to pass judgment on it. A good part of my reason for 
believing this is the opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and the following observation in Coleman 
v. Miller, supra, 307 U.S. at 455: 
"There are many illustrations in the field of our 
conduct of foreign 
'considerations of 
extreme magnitude, 
incompetent to the 
court of justice.' 
260." 
relations, where there are 
policy, considerations of 
and certainly, entirely 
examination and decision of a 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 
We have vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the 
h . 
~ . 
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complaint in cases where there was no case or controversy by the 
time the matter reached this Court even though there was one when 
the case commenced for at least 30 years. United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950). I do not believe that any of our 
cases are in either explicit or implicit conflict with treating 
cases which involve "political" questions or "non-justiciable 
issues" in the same manner. I think there is even better reason 
than in the case of mootness by the time the case reaches this Court 
to vacate and wash out prior federal proceedings when it is 
determined that the case involves a "political" question. When we 
vacate under Munsingwear, supra, we are simply saying that this 
court may not adjudicate a case which no longer involves the Art. 
III type of controversy which is an indispensable prerequisite to 
our jurisdiction. But I think it is even more important that prior 
federal decisions be washed out in a case which has decided a 
political question, at least where the case seeks a decision as to 
the authority of the President in the field of foreign affairs where 
no cognizable injury in fact has occurred in the United States. 
. I 
(This would distinguish the Steel Seizure Cases, where although one 
of the grounds upon which President Truman relied was his power over 
foreign affairs, steel mills located in the United States had been 
seized pursuant to that order.) 
Thus I could join a~ curiam much like that circulated on 
Friday ·if its form were inverted, saying that assuming there were 









Appeals is vacated with instructions to remand to the District Court 
for dismissal citing Luther v. Berdan, 7 How. 1, Pacific Telephone 
Co. v. Oregon, 233 U.S. 118, and United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Co., supra. 
But in view of the wide variety of views expressed at 
Conference, and the fact that I am in close agreement with the Chief 
I 
and John as to the proper disposition of the case, and yet as of now 
cannot join the circulation of Friday, I am under no ilusion that 
the views I have just expressed will instantly commai:1d, t he agreeme nt 
of five others. Particularly since Lewis, in his memorandum 
circulated Saturday, seems to feel the issue is one of "ripeness", 
and that the federal courts should have a good deal more discretion 
in dealing with presidential powers in foreign affairs than my 
previous discussion indicates I do, my guess is that it would be 
quite difficult to compose a~ curiam opinion commanding the votes 
of six members of the Court for summary reversal. It is quite 
logical to inquire then, since these are difficult and by no means 
fully settled constitutional questions, why we ~hould not grant 
certiorari and hear them argued in due course. 
It is here that I think the Court is between a rock and hard 
place. One of the parties contends that if the case is not decided 
by December 31, the issue will be moot. I am not prepared to say 
flatly, without ben~fit of full briefing and oral argumeqt, that 
thi,s :i:s not so, although that is my present tentative view. With 
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certiorari, and · set the case for argument in January or February. I 
think this is especially true in the light of the microscopic ' 
scrutiny which our actions are apt to receive for a while after the 
"The Brethran". If after argument we decided the case was moot, we 
could well be Sccused of ducking a tough issue. The argument would 
not be necessarily that we were wrong in deciding that it was moot, 
but that we should have set it for expedited briefing, argument, and 
decision in order to assure that it did not become moot. If we try 
to avoid that pitfall by simply agreeing among ourselves now that we 
would, after argument in 1980, decide that the case was not moot in 
order to avoid such criticism, I think we woµld be transmutting the 
"mootness" doctrine into a principle of judicial convenience to 
which I, for one, could not subscribe. 
A second alternative would be to call for accelerated briefing 
and argument, and decide the case before January 1. I think this is 
the worst possible alternative. I suppose that 95% of the public 
consider that time taken in reaching a judicial decision is fungible 
with time taken to saw wood: if you can cut X cords of wood in 12 
8-hour days, you should be able to cut the same amount in 8 12-hour 
days. All of us who have had any experience with the judicial 
process know that this is not so -- that a sort of brain fag sets in 
after a certain amount of time of pondering the issues in a 
particular case, and they have to be put on the mental back burner 
to simmer for a period before concentrating on them again. We know 
this, but I am quite sure that those who have not been judges may 
• 1 1.
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not. I mentioned in Conference Friday the tremendously accelerated 
schedule of argument and decision in the Steel Seizure Cases (four 
days after the District Court enjoined the President from seizing 
the steel mills, this Court granted certiorari before judgment and 
set· the case for argument nine days later. The opinion of the 
Court, and the various concurring and dissenting opinions, were 
filed June 2, 1952 -- 21 days after oral argument, and 30 days after 
certiorari had been granted (and my opinion that this Court has been 
· suffering for nearly 30 years from an opinion which much too 
casually brushed off serious collateral questions in a determined 
effort to reach a~d decide the merits of a ~ery important 
constitutional question. It was undoubtedly a good faith effort by 
the Court to respond to an event of great public importance, but 
that is not necessarily the formula for a decision which makes good 
law. All of · § ' except John will remember the struggle with Buckley 
v. Valeo, in which we heard argument after full briefing on 
November 10, 1975, and issued the opinion January 30, 1976 -- a 
period of nearly three months but nonetheless involved two or 
three days of conference and the farming out to several different 
members of the Court of different portions of the opinion to write. 
If we tried to decide this case on its merits after briefing and 
argument by December 31, we would be trying to do in three weeks 
what it took us three months to do in Buckley v. Valeo. 
A third alternative is to deny certiorari; as of late last week 
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think the Court of Appeal's "one day excursion ticket" approach to 
the case is wholly wrong and ought not to be left standing. 
The most positive alternative, from my point of view, is that 
if there are six votes to order dismissal of the case, a simple 
order to that effect be entered, and those of us to felt obliged to 
support our vote with writing, as I now feel I would; could file 
separate opinions supporting the order. There would be not Court 
opinion, even a~ curiam, so that our action would have very much 
the "one day excursion ticket" effect and would not bind future 
Courts even to the extent that a~ curiam opinion would if and 
when the question arose again. But such an.order would have the 
virtue of removing from the books decisions of the Court of Appeals 
and of the District Court which I am convinced are wrong. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Goldwater v. Carter No. 79-856 ---------------
December 11, 1979 
Potter's admonition against the propriety of a vote t o deny 
cert after five or more of us have voted to grant and vacate is 
sufficiently persuasive to cause me to change my vote to one to affirm 
for the reasons stated in the attached. If the present majority 
vote to grant, vacate and direct dismissal should dissolve in favor 




Goldwater v. Carter No. 79-856 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the 
District Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the 
President's well-established authority to recognize, and 
withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App. 
27A-29A. 
In holding that this case presents a nonjusticiable 
"political question," the Court, in my view, profoundly 
misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to 
matters of foreign relations. Properly understood, the 
political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an 
exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political 
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been 
"constitutional[ly] commit[ted]". Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211-13, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when a 
court is faced with the antecedent question whether a 
particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the 
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-21 (1969). The issue of 
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of 
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it 
falls within the competence of the courts. 
The constitutional question raised here is prudently 
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty with 
\ 
Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the 
,, 
Peking government, because the defense treaty was predicated 
upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan government was the 
only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly 
establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone 
the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign 
regimes. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
410 {1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, at 212; United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230 {1942). That mandate being clear, 
our judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE December 11, 1979 
RE: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Bill: 
I join again. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 







JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~Ul)t"tntt QJcurt cf fftt ~e~ .:%tltl.cg 
~w.dp:n:gtcn. lt). QJ. 20ffeJ~~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Goldwater v. Carter No. 79-856 
Potter's admonition against the propriety of a vote to deny 
cert after five or more of us have voted to grant and vacate is 
/,l "' 
sufficiently persuasive to cause me to change my vote to one to affirm 
for the reasons stated in the attached. If the present majority 
vote to grant, vacate and direct dismissal should dissolve in favor 




Goldwater v. Carter No. 79-856 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the 
District Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the 
President's well-established authority to recognize, and 
withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App. 
27A-29A. 
In holding that this case presents a nonjusticiable 
"political question," the Court, in my view, profoundly 
misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to 
matters of foreign relations. Properly understood, the 
political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an 
exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political 
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been 
"constitutional[ly] commit[ted]". Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211-13, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when a 
court is faced with the antecedent question whether a 
particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the 
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-21 (1969). The issue of 
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of 
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it 
falls within the competence of the courts. 
The constitutional question raised here is prudently 
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty with 
., 
Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the 
Peking government, because the def e nse treaty was predicated 
upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan government was the 
only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly 
establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone 
the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign 
regimes. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
410 (1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, at 212; United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230 (1942). That mandate being clear, 
our judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. 
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THECHIEF.JUSTICE December 11, 1979 
RE: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Bill: 
I join again. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 11, 1979 
Re: No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief, \ 
, I would change th:-~ond sentence of our Order to 
read as follows: The judgm~nt of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court with 
directions to dismiss the complaint. 
In a case from a state court, or from a federal 
court of appeals reviewing the action of an administrative 
agency, our power is appropriately limited to remanding the 
case to the court from which it came. In the federal judi-
cial system, by contrast, this Court may appropriately remand 
any case to the federal trial court, and has done so count-
less times. (See, ~' Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 690, for a random example.) 
Apart from the above suggestion, which is really 
quite minor, I think that the proposed Order is satis-
factory. If Bill Rehnquist or anyone else writes in expla-
nation of why the case is non-justiciable, I shall very 
likely join such writing. If all five of us are inclined to 
do so, such a written explanation might well become a~ 
curiam, and Lewis Powell's statement could still remain as a 
concurrence in the Order. 
In any event, I do not now plan to write anything 
myself, but shall await future developments with interest. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~· . ,,. 
'. 





CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~1tprrmt (!Jcmrt of tqr 'J!lnittlt ,§tatt s 
'JIDa.a qingt.on. ~. <q. 20ffe 'l-2 
December 11, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Potter: 
Re your memo of today, you must have been looking 
at an earlier draft. The second sentence of the 
order attached to my memo of December 10 reads: 
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated and the case is remanded to the 
District Court with directions that the 
District Court dismiss the complaint." 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
December 11, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Bill: 
Please show me joining your concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 























THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.:§u.prmu <.gonrt of tqr 'J!milib .:§tafrg 
~asiru1gton. ~. <q. 202)!.~ 
December 11, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
Please show me joining your concurring opinion. 
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Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Potter: 
Re your memo of today, you must have been looking 
at an earlier draft. The second sentence of the 
order attached to my memo of December 10 reads: 
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated and the case is remanded to the 
District Court with directions that the 
District Court dismiss the complaint." 
Mr, Justice Stewart 
























JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
;§npunu QiltUrl it! flrt ~th ;§taftg 
._asqingLm. ~. QI. 2.0ffe~, 
December 11, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
I propose to make the following stylistic change in 
the presently circulating third draft of my opinion. At 
the end of the text on page 3, the phrase 11 • • • each of 
which has weapons at its command to protect and assert its 
interests, weapons not available to private litigants 
outside the judicial forum ••• 11 should be deleted, and 
substituted with the following: 11 ••• each of which has 
resources available 'to protect and assert its interests, 
resources not available to private litigants outside the 






JS 1 2/ 11/79 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING ~w., ~~~ ~~ 
/)/~/~ ( ~) 
~-;;,~~; with the~ult~in this o<H>e] Boc~e I would . 
O order: the complaint for a different reason, 
I 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckle/~ Valeo, 
424 J Prudential 
) 
1 , (per curiam). 113-14 (1976) U.S. 
considerations persuade me that aAdispute between Congress and 
.,,...~ ,.,..,,~~ ~~~ 
he President is not X ri;?e uAleG9 t:s.e Congress has explici tl/ 
~-~~~-
expressed its view that the President's action is 
unconstitutional. In this case,1 members of both Houses of 
1Congress assert that theJ have been deprived of their 
constitutional role in the termination of a treatJ. For this 
Court to decide the validitJ of such a claim when r 1-
2. 
OlH!lr~lHH::~'!f majori tJ of the Congress maj well agree with the 
J- .. President's view of the case would be to decide a controverst 
that i s now more hjpothetical than real. 
To consider a congressman's claim before Congress has 
taken explicit action would encourage the diversion of intra-
legislative disputes into the courts and impede the practical 
working relationship between Congress and the President. The 
1 
ebb and flow of power between these two branches turns primarilJ 
on political, not legal, considerations. EarlJ resort to the 
' judicial process would allow a few congressmen to call the 
courts into the midst of political battles that maJ well be 
j 
,(:/.'; esolved bj Congress and the President without the need for 
judicial intervention. We should not decide delicate issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the Presidential and 
Congress until the Legislative Branch has indicated its 
disagreement with the Executive. When that occurs, this Court 
maJ be confident that its intervention is necessarJ and that the 
l. dispute is concrete. _ ,_,_ ~~) --
Irr-- this case, Congress 
-- ----...._ 
.~ .. has not disputed the Presidents 
'\ 
assertion of authoritJ. Al though the Senate has considered a 
resolution declaring that Senate approval is necessarJ for the 
termination of anJ mutual defense treatJ, see 125 Cong. Rec. 
S7015, 87038-39 (dailJ ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been 
\ 
3. 
taken on the resolution. See id. at S16683-92 (dailf ed. Nov. _._ 
15, 1979). Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution was 
intended to have restroactive effect. See id. at S7054-64 
(dailJ ed. June 6, 1979) ~ id., at S7862 (dailJ ed. June 18, 
1979). Thus, it cannot be said that either the Senate or the 
House have rejected the President's claim. If the Congress 




The order issued bj this Court holds that the issue 
presented bf this case is a nonjusticiable political question. 
Application of the political question doctrine means that this 
issue can never 
~-,;.-,c~~ 
be reviewed bJ this Court. In mJ view, -ti~e o'f 
'\ 
the political 
'vt., ~ 6'4-4~  ,}+-
question doctrine~ is inconsistent with our ~ 
precedents. As set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the ~olit...i~i q~ecEiOR doctrine 
incorporates three inquiries: Does the issue involve 
resolution of questions committed bj the text of the 
Constitution to a coordinate branch of 
(_.ii) 
governmen td) (/) Would 
resolution of the question demand that a court move be1ond areas 
, .. 
~ 
of judicial expertis~ and (,/) Do prudential considerations 
counsel against judicial intervention? If this case were ripe 
-1,AA,~~-
for review, the answer to each of these inquiries would~require 
4. 
us to dee ide it. 
First, in decidinq whether a political question exists 
because of "a textuallJ demonstrable constitutional commitment 
o f the i s sue to a coo rd in ate po 1 i t i ca 1 branch , " i b id . , this 
Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing the 
exercise of the power at issue. ~11 v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 519 (1969). No constitutional provision explicitlJ confers 
-
upon the President the power to terminate treaties. / And, 
without passing on the merits of the question, I believe that 
's-
Article II, § 2, which give{the President~power to make treaties 
with the advise and consent of the Senate, and Article VI, which 
makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land, further 
indicate that the text of the Constitution does not 
unquestionablj commit the power to terminate treaties to the 
President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 
' 
and Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 (1849). / 
Second, there is no "lack of judiciallJ discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a 
decision impossible "without an initial policJ determination of 
a kind clearlJ for nC?njudicial discretion." Baker~~' 369 
~ l,1.,·~,1, ~  
u.s., at 217. we11 are as~d:;~r~::...:;0~~ 
terminate a treat,r without congressional approval. I\ Reiij2l,!tJ;.ion ~.:.f ._, 
· S t 1 1 o require us _o app i norma 
A 
5. 
principles 0£ interpretation to the constitutional provisions at 
issue. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548-49. The present 
case involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the field 
of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to 
decide, for example, whether a treatj required the President to 
order troops into a foreign countrj. But "it is error to 
suppose that ever1 case or controversJ which touches foreign 
relations lies bejond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr, -
supra, at 211 • This case "touches" foreign relations, but the 
question presented concerns the relationship between 
Congress and the President, not the President's authori tj to 
conduct foreign relations. 
A simple hjpothetical demonstrates the confusion 
H.,d-' ~ 
A inhe&~t in the Court's 
President signed a mutual defense treatj with a foreign countrJ 
and announced that it would go into effect despite its rejection 
bj the Senate. Under todaJ's holding, that situation would 
present a political question even though Article II,~ 2 clearlj 
would resolve the dispute. Although the hjpothetical case might 
be eas~ to resolve because it demands merelj textual rather 
than interstitial anal1sis, the nature of the legal issue 
presented is nofdifferent ~he issue presented 
"\. 
6. 
In both, the Court would interpret the Constitution to decide 
whether congressional approval is necessarJ to qive a 
Presidential decision on the validitJ of a treatf the force of 
law. Such an inquirJ demands no expertise or information beJond 
~«. 
the reaches of judicial competence. Cf. Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).1 -----· -
FinallJ, the political 
~~~P)0 
question doctrine ~- app1} if 
~~'"M4«.R. ~~ 
ra.so.1,.-1,H;.J..ert'\--0-it--.a---e-i~~:w.e-\i.J..G--Q.:~~s.s--,:1~~~-err-\i..~l\respect ~ 
~K<A~ ,r~ branches of governmd J i f the Court must avoid II the 
potential i tf of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
bi various departments on one question," or if there is an 
"unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision alreadJ made." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217.ifAssuming 
that the case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra, 
none of these prudential considerations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not implj lack of repect 
for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548. 
If the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable 
positions, final disposition of the question presented bJ this 
case would eliminate, rather than create, multiple 
constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the federal 
government brought to a halt because of the mutual 
intransigience of the President and the Congress would require 
7. 
this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our dutJ to saJ 
what the law is. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 
(1974); Marburj v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
~ru:: 
In ·m1 view, the Court's holding todaJ is incompatible 
with its willingness on previous occasions to decide whether 
Presidential or congressional powers have been impinged upon. 
See Buckle; v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); ~ed States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto~, 279 U.S. 
655, 676-78 (1929); MJers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).2 
j un~er the criteria enunciated in Baker v. ~. 
the responsiblitJ to decide whether both the 





Branches must plaJ a role in the decision to 
i terminate a treatJ. If this case were ripe for judicial review, 
1 then we would be unable to avoid the question pres::J 
,, 
fl-
lfp/ss 12/11/79 Rider A, p. 4 (Goldwater) 
Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the 
President to make treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that 
treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the 
land. The text of the Constitution does not state 
whether the President alone may terminate a treaty 
or whether, as in the case of incorporating it into 
a,,. 
our fundamental law, the Senate must concur by two-
t\ 
thirds vote. And if it be assumed that a 
termination role on the part of the Senate may be 
inferred, the Constitution is silent as to the 
required vote and also is silent as to whether the 
House of Representatives also has a role. Cf. 
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973), and 
Luther v. Borden, 70 How. 1, 42 (1849). These are 
serious but open questions. 
; 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 ~oldwater · footnote 
:..::_:_:_/ A maiority of the Court today 
decides a maior constitutional question without the 
benefit of full briefinq and arqument. Normally, 
the Court would make such a iudqment only after the 
critical testinq and debate that are the essence of 
the adversary system. It seems especially 
unfortunate that the ultimate constitutional 
decision has been made before an impasse exists 
r. 
between the exectuv1e and leqislative branches. 
~ 
Whether one speaks in terms of the absence of 
"ripeness" or, as the opinions of Judqes Wriqht and 
Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as an 
absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact 
is that neither the Senate nor the Conqress as a 
~A~ 
whole~ taken issue with the President's 
decision. The Court thus has resolved a non-
constitutional crisis by a constitutional iudament. 
; 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 
Thus, the iudicial branch should avoid "the 
potentiality of embarrassment [that would resultl 
from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question". Similarly, the 
doctrine restrain/s iudicial action where there is 
an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made". 
; 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 
-In sum, under the criteria enunciated in 
Baker · v: · earr, this Court has the responsibility to 
decide whether both the executive and leqislative 
branches have constitutional roles in the decision 
).......~~~ 
whether to terminate a treaty. A,J,if the Conqress, bv 
appropriate formal action, had challenqed the 
President's authority to terminate the treaty with 
Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty as to the status 
of the treaty could have serious consequences for 
our country. In such a situation, it would 
duty of this Court to resolve the issue. ; 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This Court has recognized that, in the area of 
foreign policJ, Congress maJ leave the President with wide 
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
)_,._,. J-:t..4--~ I 
304 ( 1936). As ~ stated~ "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He 
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate~ but he 
,,. 
alone negotiates." Id. at 319. Resolution of this case would 
interfere with neither the President's abilit.{ to negotiate 
treaties nor his dutJ to execute their provisions. We are merelJ 
being asked to decide whether a treat/, which cannot be ratified 
'>~tr,r~ 
without Senate approval, continues in effect until thel\Congress }"t. 
takes further action. 
2. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) is not 
relevant here. In that case, the Court was asked to review the 
legitimacJ of a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. Four members of the Court stated that Congress has 
exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-60 
(Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Douglas, JJ., joined). Three members of the Court concluded 
more narrowlJ that the Court could not pass upon the efficacf of 
~-
state ratification or fix a reasonable time within which a 
proposed amendment must be ratified. Id., at 452-54. The 
proposed constitutional amendment at issue in Coleman would have 
overruled previous decisions of this Court. Compare id. at 435 
n.1 with BaileJ v. Drexel Furniture Co~, 259 U.S. 20 (1922): 
Hammer v~ Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review 
of the legitimacJ of a state's ratification would have compelled 
this Court to oversee the verJ constitutional process used to 
overturn Supreme Court decisions. In such circumstances it is 
entirelJ appropriate for the judicial branch of government to 
step aside. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and The Political 
Question: A Functional AnalJsis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966). 
The present case involves no similar principle of judicial non-
intervention. 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 Rider A, p. 1 (Goldwater) 
Prudential considerations persuade me that a 
dispute between Congress and the President is not 
ready for judicial review unless and until the 
dispute has reached the stage where each has taken 
disparate action officially as to its 
constitutional authority. In this case, a limited 
number of members of both houses of Congress assert 
that the President has acted unlawfully in 
terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they 
therefore have been deprived of their 
constitutional role with respect to a treaty that 
; 
has become a part of the supreme law of the land. 
But there has been no official action by Congress. 
In this posture of the case, we do not know whether 
there will ever be an official confrontation 
between the legislative and executive branches. 
Differences between the President and 
the Congress are commonplace under our system. 
These differences should, and almost invariably, 
turn upon political rather than legal 
considerations. The judicial branch should not 
decide issues affecting the allocation of power 
between the President and Congress unless there is 
2. 
in fact an impasse between them of constitutional 
dimensions. A different view could encourage small 
groups or even individual members of Congress to 
seek judicial resolution of issues that are 
political and non-justiciable or at least that have 
not reached the stage where the normal political 
process cannot resolve a conflict as to the power 




1. A majority of the Court today decides a major 
constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and 
argument. Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only 
after the critical testing and debate that are the essence of 
the adversary system. It seems especially unfortunate that a 
constitutional decision , bas been made before an impasse ex'if/s 
between the executive and legislative branches. Whether one 
speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, as the opinion 
,,. 
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as 
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact is that 
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue 
with the President's decision. The Court has thus resolved a 
non-constitutional crisis by a constitutional judgment. 
2. This Court has recognized that, in the area of 
foreign policy, Congress may leave the President with wide 
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He 
makes tr~aties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
( !M k,,ru IJh 'ftv d')l ,,,.J) 
alone negotiates." Id. at 319. Resolution of this case would 
9. 
interfere with neither the President's ability to negotiate 
treaties nor his duty to execute their provisions. We are merely 
being asked to decide whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified 
without Senate approval, continues in effect until the selflte or 
perhaps the Congress takes further action. 
3. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) is not 
relevant here. In that case, the Court was asked to review the 
legitimacy of a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. Four members of the Court stated that Congress has 
exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-60 
(Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Douglas, JJ., joined). Three members of the Court concluded 
more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of 
state ratification or fix a reasonable . time within which a 
proposed amendment must be ratified. Id . , at 4 5 2-5 4 • The 
proposed constitutional amendment at issue in Coleman would have 
overruled previous decisions of this Court. Compare id. at 435 
n.1 with Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 ( 1918). Thus, judicial review 
of the legitimacy of a state's ratification would have compelled 
this Court to oversee the very constitutional process used to 
overturn Supreme Court decisions. In such circumstances it is 
entirely appropriate for the judicial branch of government to 
; 
1 0. 
step aside. See Scharpf, Judicial 'Review and The Political 
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966). 
The present case involves no similar principle of judicial non-
intervention. 
\, 
~ 1--f? c· d"S-- 12/11/79 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING 
Although I concur with the result reached in the ; 
Court's per curiam opinion, I would dismiss the complaint for a 
different reason. 1 
I 
'I!his Court has recognized t hat an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley~ Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 , 113-14 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential 
considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has taken disparate action asserting its 
constitutional authority. In this case, a 1 imi ted number of 
members of Congress claim that the President has acted 
unlawfully in terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they 
therefore have been deprived of their constitutional role with 
2. 
respect to a treaty that has become a part of the supreme law of 
the land. But there has been no official action by Congress. In 
the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there 
will ever be an official confrontation between the legislative 
and executive branches. 
Differences between the President and the Congress are 
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost 
invariably do, turn on political rather than legal 
considerations. The judicial branch should not decide issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional 
impasse. A different view would encourage small groups or even 
individual members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of 
issues before the normal political process He:e the oppot Lt:1ni;e.Y' 
~ 
~ resolve the conflict as to the distribution of 
constitutional powers. 
As noted, Congress has not disputed officially the 
President's assertion of authority. Al though the Senate has 
considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is 
necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, see 
125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1979), no 
final vote has been taken on the resolution. See id. at S16683-
92 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979). Moreover, it is unclear whether 
3. 
the resolution was intended to have restroactive effect. See id. 
at 87054-64 (daily ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed. 
June 18, 1979). Thus, it cannot be said that either the Senate 
or the House have rejected the President's claim. If the 
Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our 
task to do so. 
II 
J. t> /.., 
The ~ ea b.i'i this Court holds that the issue 
"' 
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question. 
Application of the political question doctrine means that this ; 
issue can never be reviewed by this Court. In my view, reliance 
upon the the political question doctrine is inappropriate and 
unnecessary. It also is inconsistent with our precedents. As 
set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, 3 69 U.S. 186, 
217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three inquiries: (i) Does 
the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text 
of the Cons ti tut ion to a coordinate branch of government. (ii) 
Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond 
areas of judicial expertise. and -- (iii) Jo prudential 
considerations counsel against judicial intervention? If this 
case were ripe for review, the answer to each of these inquiries 
would--in my opinion--require us to decide it. 
First, in deciding whether a political question e xists 
4. 
because of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political branch," ibid. , this 
Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing the 
LM-
exercise of the power a,t,....i;.._,~ 
\ 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 519 (1969). No constitutional provision explicitly confers 
upon the President the power to terminate treaties. Further, 
Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the President to 
make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article 
VI provides that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of 
the land. These provisions add support to the view that the 
text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the 
power to terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. 
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973) and Luther v. Borden, 7 
How. 1, 42 (1849). 
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a 
decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S., at 217. We simply are asked to decide whether under the 
Constitution the President may terminate a treaty without 
congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be . 
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretation to the cons ti tut ional prov is ions at issue. See 
5. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case 
involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the field 
of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to 
decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to 
order troops into a foreign country. But "it is error to 
suppose that every case o,r controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr, 
supra, at 211 . Th is case II touches II foreign rel at ions, but the 
question presented to us concerns the relationship between 
; 
Congress and the President, not the President's a.uthori ty to 
conduct foreign relations. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent in the Court's holding in this case. Assume that 
the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign 
country and announced that it would go into ~ffect despite its 
rejection by the Senate. Under today's holding, that situation 
. would present a political question even though Article II, § 2 
clearly would resolve the dispute. Al though the hypothetical 
case might be easy to resolve because it demands merely textual 
rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue 
presented is not different from the issue presented in the case 
before us. In both, the Court would interpret the Constitution 
6. 
to decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a 
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of 
law. Such an inquiry demands no expertise or information beyond 
the reaches of judicial competence. Cf. Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).2 
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part 
on the prudential need for mutual respect among the three 
branches of government. Thus, the judicial branch should avoid 
"the potentiality of embarassment [that would result] from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
; 
question." Simiarly, the doctrine restrains judicial action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217. 
Assuming that the case were ripe for judicial review, 
see Part I supra, none of these prudential considerations would 
be present. Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply 
lack of repect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached 
irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question 
presented by this case would eliminate, rather than create, 
multiple constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the 
federal government brought to a halt because of the mutual 
intransigience of the President and the Congress would require 
• j 1 
7. 
this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say 
what the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 
(1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)). 
III 
In my view, the Court's holding today is incompatible 
with its willingness on previous occasions to decide whether 
-Presidential or congressional powers have been impinged upon. 
See Buckley~ Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976): United States~ 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974): The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
655, 676-78 (1929): Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).3 
; 
In sum, under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, this 
Court has the responsibility to decide whether both the 
executive and legislative branches have constitutional roles to 
play in the decision whether to terminate a treaty. If in this 
case the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged 
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan, 
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for 
our country. In such a situation, it would be the duty of this 
Court to resolve the issue. 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 Rider A, p. 1 (Goldwater) 
Prudential considerations persuade me that a 
dispute between Congress and the President is not 
ready for judicial review unless and until the 
dispute has reached the stage where each has taken 
disparate action officially as to its 
constitutional authority. In this case, a limited 
number of members of both houses of Congress assert 
that the President has acted unlawfully in 
terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they 
therefore have been deprived of their 
constitutional role with respect to a treaty that 
; 
has become a part of the supreme law of the land. 
But there has been no official action by Congress. 
In this posture of the case, we do not know whether 
there will ever be an official confrontation 
between the legislative and executive branches. 
Differences between the President and 
the Congress are commonplace under our system. 
These differences should, and almost invariably, 
turn upon political rather than legal 
considerations. The judicial branch should not 
decide issues affecting the allocation of power 
between the President and Congress unless there is 
2. 
in fact an impasse between them of constitutional 
dimensions. A different view could encourage small 
groups or even individual members of Congress to 
seek judicial resolution of issues that are 
political and non-justiciable or at least that have 
not reached the stage where the normal political 
process cannot resolve a conflict as to the power 
to act under the Constitution. 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 
Thus, the iudicial branch should avoid "the 
potentiality of embarrassment [that would resultl 
from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question". Similarly, the 
doctrine restraints iudicial action where there is 
an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made". 
; 
1 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 Rider · ~;-p:·1·t6oldwater} 
In sum, under the criteria enunciated in 
Baker · v: ~earr, this Court has the responsibility to 
decide whether both the executive and leqislative 
branches have constitutional roles in the decision 
whether to terminate a treaty. If the Conqress, by 
appropriate formal action, had challenqed the 
President's authority to terminate the treaty with 
Taiwan, the resultinq uncertainty as to the status 
of the treaty could have serious consequences for 
our country. In such a situation, it would be the 
duty of this Court to resolve the issue. ; 
lfp/ss 12/11/79 Rider A, p. 4 (Goldwater) 
Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the 
President to make treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that 
treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the 
land. The text of the Constitution does not state 
whether the President alone may terminate a treaty 
or whether, as in the case of incorporating it into 
our fundamental law, the Senate must concur by two-
thirds vote. And if it be assumed that a 
termination role on the part of the Senate may be 
inferred, the Constitution is silent as to the 
; 
required vote and also is silent as to whether the 
House of Representatives also has a role. Cf. 
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973), and 
Luther v. Borden, 70 How. 1, 42 (1849). These are 
serious but open questions. 
lfp/ss 1?./11/79 ~oldwater ~footnote 
:_:_:_:_/ A maiority of the Court today 
decides a maior constitutional question without the 
benefit of full briefinq and arqument. Normally, 
the Court would make such a iudqment only after the 
critical testinq and debate that are the essence of 
the adversary system. It seems especially 
unfortunate that the ultimate constitutional 
decision has been made before an impasse exists 
between the exectuvie and leqislative branches. 
Whether one speaks in terms of the absence of 
"ripeness" or, as the opinions of Judqes Wriqht and 
; 
Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as an 
absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact 
is that neither the Senate nor the Conqress as a 
whole have taken issue with the President's 
decision. The Court thus has resolved a non-
constitutional crisis by a constitutional iudqment. 
LFP 12/11/79 
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MR. J,&i_TICE POWELL, CONCURRING~~~ 
, f I-'~ Al though I ~~ with the result 
r;fl. ';1 "Co~rt' s per curiam opinion, I would dismiss the 
different reason. 1 
I 
reached in the 
complaint for a 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley~ Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 , 113-14 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential 
considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
; 
2. 
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has taken disparate action asserting its 
constitutional authority. In this case, a limited number of 
members of Congress claim that the President has acted 
unlawfully in terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they 
therefore have been deprived of their constitutional role with 
respect to a treaty that has become a part of the supreme law of 
the land. But there has been no official action by Congress. In 
the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there 
will ever be an official confrontation between the legislative 
and executive branches. 
Differences between the President and the Congress are 
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost 
invariably do, turn on political rather than legal 
considerations. The judicial branch should not decide issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional 
impasse. A different view would encourage small groups or even 
individual members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of 
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity 
to resolve the conflict as to the distribution of 
constitutional powers. 
As noted, Congress has not 







considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is 
,. 
( 
necessary for the termination of 
125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-39 (daily ed. 
final vote has been taken on the resolution. See id. 





the resolution was intended to have restroactive effect. See 
at S7054-64 (daily ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed. 
June 18, 1979). Thus, it cannot be said that either the Senate 
or the House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress 
chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do 
so. .J ~ ~ w ~ ~ .,.,,.l, I>-( ~ ~~-c..,(. 
II ~ 




presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question. 
Application of the political question doctrine means that this 
issue can never be reviewed by this Court. In my view, reliance 
upon the the political question doctrine is inappropriate and 
unnecessary. It also is inconsistent with our precedents. As 
set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, 3 69 U.S. 186, 
217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three inquiries: (i) Does 
the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text 
of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government. (ii) 
Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond 
areas of j ud ic ial expertise. (iii) Do prudential considerations 
counsel against judicial intervention? If this case were ripe 
for review, the answer to each of these inquiries would--in my 
; 
4. 
opinion--require us to decide it. 
First, in deciding whether a political question exists 
because of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political branch," ibid., this 
Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing the 
exercise of the power in question. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486, 519 (1969). No constitutional provision explicitly 
confers upon the President the power to terminate treaties. 
Further, Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the 
President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. Article VI provides 
supreme law of the land. 
view that the text of the 
that treaties shall be a part of the 
~ 
These provisions ,:1:1' support ;:f' the 
Constitution does not unquestionably 
commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone. 
Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973) and Luther v. 
Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 ( 1849). 
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a 
decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S., at 217. We simply are asked to dee ide whether u>Aae:i; tlrn ,r 
~~~~~~-k:, 
the President A~ terminate a treaty without 
congressional approval. Re solution of the quest ion may not be 
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See 
5. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case 
involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the field 
of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to 
decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to 
order troops into a foreign country. But "it is error to 
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 




211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but the 
~ ~.,'"C,,<.4.~ '1.~ 
presented to us concerns the A r-elatiTh±p between 
and the President, not the President's authority to 
conduct foreign relations. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent in the Court's holding in this case. Assume that 
the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign 
country and announced that it would go into effect despite its 
rejection by the Senate. Under today's holding, that situation 
would present 
clearly would 
case .rn..ig]it !le 
a political question even though Article II, § 2 
resolve the dispute. 
.-:i..u--~-~ 
e.aS¥ t0--.z:.e:aolJ.T~ because 
"1 
~~~ 
Al though the 4-hypothetical 
it demands merely textual 
rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue 
presented is not different from the issue presented in the case 
before us. In both, the Court would interpret the Constitution 
to decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a 
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of 
6. 
law. Such an inquiry demands no expertise or information beyond 
the reaches of judicial competence. Cf. Chicago i Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).2 
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part 
on the prudential need for mutual respect among the three 
branches of government. Thus, the judicial branch should avoid 
"the potentiality of embarassment [that would result] from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question." Simiarly, the doctrine restrains judicial action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217. 
Assuming that the case were ripe for judicial review, 
see Part I supra, none of these prudential considerations would 
be present. Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply 
lack of repect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached 
irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question 
presented by this case would eliminate, rather than create, 
multiple constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the 
federal government brought to a halt because of the mutual 
~ intransigfence of the President and the Congress would require 
this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say 
what the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 





In my view, the Court's holding today is incompatible 
with its willingness on previous occasions to decide whether 
Presidential or congressional powers have been impinged upon. 
See Buckley~ Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States~ 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
655, 676-78 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).3 
In sum, under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, this 
Court has the responsibility to decide whether both the 
executive and legislative branches have constitutional roles to 
play in the decision whether to terminate a treaty. If in this 
case the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged 
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan, 
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for 
our country. In such a situation, it would be the duty of this 
Court to resolve the issue. 
8. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. A majority of the Court today decides a major 
constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and 
argument. Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only 
after the critical testing and debate that are the essence of 
the adversary system. It seems especially unfortunate that a 
constitutional decision has been made before an impasse exists 
between the executive and legislative branches. Whether one 
speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, as the opinion 
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as 
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact is that 
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue 
with the President's decision. The Court {t_la€j thuskesolved a 
non-constitutional crisis by a constitutional judgment. 
2. Th is Court has recognized that, in the area of 
foreign policy, Congress may leave the President with wide 
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He 
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates." Id. at 319. (emphasis in the original) 
Resolution of this case would interfere with neither the 
President's ability to negotiate treaties nor his duty to 
; 
execute their provisions. 
whether a treaty, which 
9. 
We are merely being asked to decide 
cannot be ratified without Senate 
approval, continues in effect until the Senate or perhaps the 
Congress takes further action. 
3. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) is not 
relevant here. In that case, the Court was asked to review the 
legitimacy of a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. Four members of the Court stated that Congress has 
exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-60 
(Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Douglas, JJ., joined). Three members of the Court concluded 
more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of 
state ratification or fix a reasonable time within which a 
proposed amendment must be ratified. Id., at 452-54. The 
proposed constitutional amendment at issue in Coleman would have 
overruled previous decisions of this Court. Compare id. at 435 
n.1 with Bailey~ Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review 
of the legitimacy of a state's ratification would have compelled 
this Court to oversee the very constitutional process used to 
overturn Supreme Court decisions. In such circumstances it is 
entirely appropriate for the judicial branch of government to 
step aside. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and The Political 
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966). 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING 
Although I concur with the result reached in the 
Court's per curiam opinion, 
different reason.f,") 
~,~ 
I would dismiss the complaint for a 
I 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley~ Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 , 113-14 (1976) ( per curiam). Prudential 



















the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has aken disparate action its 
constitutional author~[!; this case, 
members of Congress claim that the President acted 
unlawfully in terminating the treaty with Taiwan, an~ that they 
therefore have been deprived of their constitutional role with 
respect to a treaty that has become a part of the supreme law of 
the land. But there has been no official action by Congress. 
the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there 
will ever be an official confrontation between the legislative 
and executive branches. 
)' 
Differences between the President and the Congress are 
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost 
invariably do, turn on political rather than legal 
) 
/ considerations. The j ud ic ial branch should not dee ide issues t ~ 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress . until the constitutional 
impasse. groups or even 
judicial of 
political process 
resolve theWi.. COA,fl jct s 
al 
As noted, Congr~ss has not disputed officially tbe 
President's assertion of authority. Al though the Senate has 
considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is 
3. 
necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, see 
125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1979), no 
final vote has been taken on the resolution. See id. at S16683-
92 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979) . . Moreover, it is unclear whether 
the resolution was intended to have restroactive effect. See id. 
at S7054-64 (daily ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed. 
June 1 8, 19 7 9) . Thus, it cannot be said that either the Senate 
or the House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress 
chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do 
so. 
@~~Ji 
The order{ issue.I 
~ I I 
holds that 
__,I 
this case a nonjusticiable political question. 
~ the political question 
tU ~-1rt+""'1 
never llla review-illlilllllll]!p!':.aititil~c::~iiA~ 
j ~t ~~/ 
doctrin~ ~ this 
~1, 
In my 
upon the the political question doctrine is 
I 
unnecessary. As 
set forth in ~h ..s-emi~ai ease~ Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
2 1 7 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , the doc tr in e incorporate s three in q u i r i e s : ( i ) Doe s 
the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text 
f h C · · · f 
7 (1·1·) o t e onst1tut1on to a coordinate branch o government. 
Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond 
areas of judicial expertis / (iii) Do prudential 





/l,.... /l.. ''{.4' IA..-5 -f. <R, ,, /1., ~_; e,. ., I W€r'--€ tf 1uf- f\_ ~-
er'f:rM!!H;:C~~-;r~ i r e 1:3'""""-·,......d e . d . • r 
First, in deciding whether a political question exists 
because of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political branch," ibid., this 
Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing the 
exercise of the. power in question. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486, 519 (1969). No constitutional provision explicitly 
confers upon the President the power to terminate treaties. 
Further, Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the 
President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. Article VI provides that treaties shall b e a part of the 
supreme law of the land. These provisions _. support ~ e 
view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably 
commit the power to terminate treaties to the Pr esident alone. 
Cf. Gilligan ~ Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973) a nd Luther v. " 
r "' (,4. , ""1 /tu ('; , , £~ a.. K.#<"C , 
Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 ( 1849). "" ~, r 
I ..,,.., j,a.>i. o ) ,tJu,ut/ l?ftN-«. 
· second, there is no "lack- of judicial l y discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a 
decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Bake r v. Carr, 369 
U.S., at 217. We simply are asked to decide wh e ther under the 
Constitution the President may terminate a t reaty without 
c o ngressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be 
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See 
5. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case 
involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the field 
,,z 1' I 
of foreign affairs. Such a case wo~id arise if we were asked to 
decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to 
order troops into a foreign country. But "it is error to 
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr, 
supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but the 
question presented to us concerns the relationship between 
Congress and the President, not the President's authority to 
J 
conduct foreign relations. 
~t:. ~ A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
y~ind inherent in the Court's holding in this case. Assume that 
the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign 
country and announced that it would go into effect despite its 
rejection by the Senate. Under today's holding, that situation 
would present a political question even though Article II, § 2 
clearly would resolve the dispute. Al though the hypothetical 
case might be easy to resolve because it d~mands 
rather than interstitial analysis, 
presented is no different from the f 
e legal issue 
f 
presented the case 
before us. In both, the Court would interpret the Constitution 
to decide whether Gafl'g ssional approval i ne ssary gioe a 




la Such an inquiry demands ~ l:2!Ltli'!le or information beyond 
I , -Re/ 
the reach-Qi:S- o ~udicia Cf. Chicago i Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).2 
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part 
on the prudential need for mutual respect among the three 
branches of government. Thus, the judicial branch should avoid 
"the potentiality of embarassment [that would result] from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question." Simiarly, the doctrine restrains judicial action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made. 11 Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217. 
Assuming that the case were ripe for judicial review, 
I 
see Part I supra, prudential consideration would 
be present. Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply 
lack of repect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached 
irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question 
presented by this case would eliminate, rather than create, 
multiple constitutional interpretations. The .,. spectre-O f 
federal government brought to a halt becau~·~ ~ ~ ~~ 
! 
m-utuaL 
intransigience-of th President and the Congress 
bi is Cour1 e a resolution p~""'1:iiii~~ ~ r-::-~5l 
would require 
dut~ "to say 
/ 
what the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 -J-. 
(1974) 
I 
(quoting Marbury~ Madison, Cranch 137, 177 
~ A./1 , . 1 "-' 1,w~"-' ,/..;. l'~·r, ' r '1M 
C,.o.qt, ,...,- '.._rd 1~0 -K -P...-.r Iii ~J -1~ 1 "<,-..._ .. ,;~ ?t ~ 
( 1 8 0 3 ) ) • b, 7 ;VJ/ 




In my view, the Court's holding today 
previous 
,/ 14,,:,, 
. ~ 12 ~. r) ;1,/4 !.d" ;&.-.. fk. E;~k~ 
occasions to"< ec1 ~
a-i;~;.e-rn.n.a}, . powers impinge-d Upofl-. 
See Buckley~ Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 6~3, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
655, 676-78 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).3 
In sum, under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, this 
Court has the responsibility to decide whether both the 
executive and legislative branches have constitutional roles to 
/ play in the decision whether to~ terminate a 
~ase t~ Congress,~ !l'!)~ate fo,IJUf'1""'""'1fcct.i:~r::;: 
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan, 
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for 
our country. In such a situation, it we~ld _u-.....i:~-a~ this 
~ . i~ J. 




""" ~ ~ 
FOOTNOTES 
1. A majority of the Court today decides a major ( 
constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and 
~ 
Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only ~ G~ 
;" h \il after the er it ioal testing and debate that are the essence of ,JV;· 
argument. 
It seems especially unfortunate that a ti' 
\i" 
the adversary system. 
constitutional decision has been made before an impasse exists 
between the executive and legislative br~ Whether one 
speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, as the opinion 
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as 
an absence of standing by ?etitioners, the simple fact is that 
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue 
with the Presi91nt's decision. The Court has thus resolved 
non-constitution; crisis by a constitutional judgment. 
a 
2. This Court has recognized that, in the area of 
foreign policy, Congress may leave the President with wide 
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He 
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate~ but he 
alone negotiates." Id. at 3 1 9. (emphasis in the original) 
Resolution of this case would interfere with neither the 
President's ability to negotiate treaties nor his duty to 
I 
9. 
execute their provisions. We are merely being asked to decide 
whether a treaty, which cannot b t #n :rf ified 
~·>\·r~ 
approval, continues in effect7 until the Senate 
Congress takes further action. 
without Senate 
o.r perhaps the 
3. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939 ~ is not 
r e levant here. In that case, the Court was asked to review the 
legitimacy of a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment Four members of the Court stated that Congress has 
exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-60 
(Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Doug 1 as , J J . , j o in e d ) . Three members of the Court concluded 
more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of 
state ratification or fix a reasonable time within 
proposed amendment must be 
proposed constitutional amendment at i Coleman would have 
o v erruled previous decisions of this Court. Compare id. at 435 
n.1 with Bailey~ Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review 
of the legitimacy of a state's ratification would have compelled 
t h is Court to oversee the very constitutional process used to 
overturn Supreme Court decisions. In such circumstances it is 
entirel y appropriate for the judicial branch of gove rnment to 
s tep asid e . See Scharpf, Judicial Review and The Political 
Qu e stion: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966). 
The present case involves no similar principle of judicial non-
intervention. 
I. I 
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Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
December 12, 1979 
The proposed statement of Byron's and my position is in 
line with my note of this morning. It is acceptable. 
Sincerely, ,,t. 
---
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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79-856 Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
I circulate herewith a second draft of my opinion. 
At this time (as of the Conference this morning) 
there were four votes for Bill Rehnquist's opinion, with 
Thurgood reserving judgment until later. When all of the 
votes are in, I may have to make conforming changes. The 
enclosed draft, however, is what I am sending to the printer. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
Chief: 
I circulate herewith a ~econd oraft of my 
At this time (a~ of the ConferP.nce this morning) 
there were four. votes for Bill Rehnquist's opinion, with 
Thurgood reserving iudgment until later. rifuen all of the 
votes are in, I may have to make conforming chanqes. The 
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DP.c~mb~r 12, 1979 
No. 7G-856 Gol~w~ter v. C~rtPr 
'T'h,.., Pl'.."OPosea ordP.r at~posinq of the e;a~~, 
circulaten with yo11t" memonrndum of Dr-cn.JT\b"'r 12, :is :"IQrP':'0ble 
to me. 
T think it iR n aaod jde~ ~ot to ~tt 0 mpt to 
i~corporat 0 in thP or~Pr th0 substanr~ of th? posi~ion of Any 
Just j C""'P.. 
The Chi~f Justic~ 






~nvr tntt C!Jcnrl cf tfrr 'J!hriuit ~taftg 
~M'fringtlttt. !9. -<!I, 2llffeJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 12, 1979 
Re: No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter 
· Dear Bi 11 , 
Please add my name to your concurring 
opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
(>~ 












JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u.vrttttt QJllllrl 1lf tltt 1lttitth ~bdts 
jihtslfinghm. ~. OJ. 211.;r)!.' 
/ 
\ 
December 12, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
I propose to add at the end of footnote 2 on page 5 
of the present third draft of my concurring opinion the 
following: ", so long as they do not trench upon 
exclusively federal questions of foreign policy. Zschernig 









.JUSTICE w ... . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
$)upttntt QJirurl irf flrr ~rb ~htlrg 
~as~~. QJ. 20ffeJt~ 
December 12, 1979 
RE: No. 78-856 Goldwater v. Carter 
Proposed Disposition 
Dear Chief: 
I suggest that the statement as to me (which 
is satisfactory in form) should go at the end since 
I am the only dissenter. 
The Chief Justice 








CHAM BERS Of" 
,:%,1tprtmt C!Jourt of tfyt ~th j;tatts 
'IDaslyingfon. gl. C!J. 2rtbi'i~ 
.JUST ICE THURGOOD MARS HALL December 12, 1979 / 
Re_: No, 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
Please have the Order show the following: 
''MR. JUSTICE .MARSHALL concurs in 
the result." 
The Chief Justice 









~uµrtuu {!Jitttd itf fltt ~nitth ~hrlts 
~a.t.dyht.gfun. ~. C!J. 2llffe'l-.;l 
C HAM BE RS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 12, 19·79 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
' You have my proxy in working out the final 
details in this case. 
Respectfully, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
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.§ttpTmu <!lourt ltf Ur~ ~h ~mu" 
-uJrin:gt~ ~. <4. 2llffe~, 
CHAMl!IERS 01" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN December 12, 1979 
Re:. No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
/ 
Further consideration of the "proposed disposition" 
which you have circulated prompts me to make the following 
suggestions: 
1. After the sentence setting forth Byron's 
and my position, would it not be advisable to 
add "MR. JUSTICE BLACKMON has filed a statement 
in which MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins"? This would 
parallel the other descriptions in the "disposi-
tion." 
2. Because Byron's and my position is in par-
tial dissent, I wonder whether its place in the 
"disposition" should not follow the places of 
Thurgood, Lewis, and Bill Rehnquist. 
The Chief Justice 




.§1iprtmt <IJonrt of tqt Pnittb i>tatts 
'lUnslrington. ltl. ~. 2og;,i.~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 12, 1979 
Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
Please have the Order show the following: 
''MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in 
the result." 
The Chief Justice 




.§u:pr tutt (!f .imrl cf tlrt 'Jttnittb j;mte g 
~Mqingi01i;' ~. (If. 21lffeJ!.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 12, 1979 
Re: No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Bi 11, 
Please add my name to your concurring 
opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
(>~ 














.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
If the order proposed with the Chief Justice's memo-
randum of December 7 is to be issued, Byron and I would 
prefer that the last paragraph read as follows: 
"MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
join in the grant of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari but would set the case for argument 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§nµrtnt.t QJcurl itf tlrt 'Jllttitth .:§taf.tg 
jiulp:ngum. J. QJ. 20ffeJ!.~ 
December 12, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
I propose to add at the end of footnote 2 on page 5 
of the present third draft of my concurring opinion the 
following: ", so long as they do not trench upon 
exclusively federal questions of foreign policy. Zschernig 
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~tt;rrttttt <!}!llttt cf tltt ~h ~hmn-
'Jjn as fringhm. ~. C!J. 2.{JpJ.1~ 
C HAM6E:RS O F" 
J USTI C E LEWIS F. POW E L L , JR . 
December 12, 1979 
79-856 ·Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
I circulate herewith a second draft of my opinion. 
At this time (as of the Conference this morning) 
there were four votes for Bill Rehnquist's opinion, with 
Thurgood reserving judgment until later. When all of the 
votes are in, I may have to make conforming changes. The 
enclosed draft, however, is what I am sending to the printer. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.§u:pumt C!firurt cf tqt 'J!lnitth .§taus 
'J)lrrurlpngfon. ~. QI. 20ffeJ!.~ 
December 12, 1979 
Re: ~o. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
Your proposed disposition is satisfactory to me. 
Sincerely, ~ 
\0 
The Chief Justice 
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C HAMBERS OF 
.JU S TI C E WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
;§u:µrtntt <!+ll'url of flrt~h ;§hth-9' 
Jtzu~~ ~. QJ. 20ffe't~ 
December 12, 1979 
RE: No. 78-856 Goldwater v. Carter 
Proposed Disposition 
Dear Chief: 
I suggest that the statement as to me (which 
is satisfactory in form) should go at the end since 
I am the only dissenter. 
The Chief Justice 
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December 12, 1979 CHAMl!IERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
If the order proposed with the Chief Justice's memo-
randum of December 7 is to be issued, Byron and I would 
prefer that the last paragraph read as follows: 
"MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
join in the grant of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari but would set the case for argument 
and give it plenary consideration." 
,. 
CHAMl!!ERS 01' 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~mtt Qj:Mtrl oft4t~h~httt-
'1':udfingfon. ~. <!}. 20.;i~.;l 
Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
December 12, 1979 
Further consideration of the "proposed disposition" 
which you have circulated prompts me to make the following 
suggestions: 
1. After the sentence setting forth Byron's 
and my position, would it not be advisable to 
add "MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN has filed a statement 
in which MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins"? This would 
parallel the other descriptions in the "disposi-
tion." 
2. Because Byron's and my position is in par-
tial dissent, I wonder whether its place in the 
"disposition" should not follow the places of 
Thurgood, Lewis, and Bill Rehnquist. 
The Chief Justice 






~upr ttnt QJttmt ttf f:ltt 'J!utitth' .§hdtH 
~a.&'lthtgfon. ~. QJ. 20ffe'l-~ 
CMAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 12, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
Dear Chief: 
. 
You have my proxy in working out the final 
details in this case. 
Respectfully, 
yL 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§1t.p-rttttt <!Jourl of iftt ~lniith .§hdt.a 
~aelyinghtn. ~. <!J. 2!1,SJ~.;l 
December 12, 1979 
Re: 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Enclosed is suggested format following which 
the several statements will appear. 
Each of you should indicate whether you wish 
your position described in this way or otherwise. 
I anticipate that the "Statements" will follow 
in this order: 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
PROPOSED DISPOSITION 
12/12/79 
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case 
is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss 
the complaint. 
1 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would grant the petition for certiorari 
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and has 
filed a statement. (More?) 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join in the grant 
of the petition for a writ of certiorari but would set the 
case for argument and give it plenary consideration. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment (More?) 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurs in the judgment and has filed 
a statement. 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concurs in the judgment and has filed 
a statement in which MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, MR. JUSTICE 
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No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
To: The Chief Justice · 
Mr. Justice Brannan 
Mr. Justice· Sfewart 




Mr. Justice .Ste 
From: Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Circulated:~~~~~~~ 
Recirculated: ____ 1_2~D_E_C_l_S_?S 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN' with whom MR • . JUSTICE WHITE joins' 
\ dissenting in part: 
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory; 
if the President does not have the power to terminate the'.Treaty 
{a substantial issue that we should address only after briefing 
and oral argument), the notice of intention to terminate surely 
ithout further has no legal effect. It is a indefensible, -z._ 
study, . to pass on the issue or on the issues 
of standing or ripeness. While I join in the grant of 
the petition for certiorari, I would set the case for oral 
argument and give it the 'plenary consideration it so obviously 
deserves. 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi 
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. V. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ST A TES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNI'l'ED S'fA'l'ES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR '.l'HE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 79-856 Derided DcrembPr -, 1979 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, I 
would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review. 
I 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicia.l review. Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1, 113- 114 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential con-
siderations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
the President is 11ot ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority. Differences between the President and the Con-
gress are commonplace under our system. The differences 
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than 
legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide 
issues affecting the aUocation of power between the President 
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-
tional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups 
or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial reso-
lution of issues before the normal politicaI process has the 
opportunity to resolve the conflict. 
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the 
President's action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has 
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to 
alteration in the supreme law of the land. Congress has 
taken no official action. In the present posture of this case, 
we do not know whether there ever will be an actual con-
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2 GOLDWATER v. CARTER 
_Although the Senate has considered a resolution dec1ari 11g 
that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any 
mutual defense treaty, sec 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-
S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken 
on the resolution. See id., at S16683-Sl6692 (daily ed. Nov_. 
15, 1979) Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution 
would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily 
ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ('d. June 18, 1979). 
It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has 
rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not 
to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I 
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case. 
11 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQrrrsT suggests, ho\,\,ever, that the issue 
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question 
which can nc>ver be co11sidcred by this Court. I cannot agree. 
In my view , reliance upon the political-question doctrine is 
inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal 
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 ( 1962), the doctrine 
incorporates three inquiries . (i) Does the issue involve reso-
lution of questions committed by the kxt of the Constitutioll 
to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution 
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of 
judicial expertise? ( iii) Do prudential considerations counsel 
against judicial intervention'? Jn my opinion the answer to 
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case 
if it were ripe. 
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitrnent of the issue to a coordinate political 
branch," ibid., turns on an examination of the constitutional 
provisions governing the exorcise of the power in question. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969). No consti~ 
tutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the 
power to termmate treaties. Further, Art. II, § 2 of the 
Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. Article VI provides. 
COLDWATER v. CARTER 
that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. 
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the 
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to 
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 
42 (1849) . 
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a deci-
sion impossible "without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President 
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without con-
gressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be 
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present 
case involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the 
field of foreign affairs. uch a case would arise if we were 
asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the 
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. 
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but 
the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional 
division of power between Congress and the President. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent in MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's concurring opinion. 
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty 
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into 
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. Jus'l'ICE 
REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political 
question even though Art. II, § 2, clearly would resolve the 
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems 
self-evident because it demands textural rather than inter-
stitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no 
different from the issue presented in the case before us. In 
. ' 
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both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to 
dC'ci<le whether congressional approval 1s necessary to give a 
Presidential decision 011 the validity of a trPaty the force of 
law. Such an inquiry d0mands no special competence or 
information beyond the reach of thr judiciary. Cf. Chicago 
& Southern Air Lines v Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 
103, 111 (1948) .1 
<lential concerns calling for mutual respect among the thrcJ 
Finally, the political-quPstion doctrine rests m part on pru:l., 
branches of government. Thus, the Judicial Brauch should 
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment I that would result] 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one riuestion ." Similarly. the doctrrne restrains .1ud1cial action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political deciSIOll already macle.'' Baker v. Carr ., supra, 
at 217 
Lf this case were npe for .1udicia1 review, sec Part I supra, 
noue of these prudential considerations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not unply lack of 
respect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. S., at 548. If the President and the Cougrrss had reached 
irreconcilable positions. final dispositiou of the question pre· 
sc>nted by tlus case would eliminate. rather than create. multi. 
ple constitutional interprelat10ns. The spectre of the Federal 
Government brought to a halt because of thP mutual intran. 
sigence of the PresidC'nt and the Congress would require this 
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say 
1 Tlw Cour( hns rC'cognizrd that, 1n th<· ar<·a of forPig11 polte.v, C'ongrrR1' 
ma~· lea.vr tlw Pre,;1drnt with wide d1HcrPtio11 that otlwrw1:::P might nm 
afoul of tlH' 11ondelrgat1011 doctnnr . Cnited Stall'i; ,. Curtiss-Wright 
Expm-t Corp., W9 l1 , . a04 ( rn:~fi) . A;; ;;(ated in that CHH(', " thr Pre::;i-
drn t. alone haH tlw powrr to :::prak or list en m, a n'11rr,;pn ta ilv!' of th<' 
Nat1011 HP ,nakf,s trra11r,- w1tl1 the adv1<·f' and ron~ent of 11H' Senate, 
but, he :don<' uegotrntrs.'' Id. , a( ;{10 (emphaH1::1 in the ongrnal) . BPso-
lut1011 of tlrn, ca~e would rnterfrre with nr1tlwr th<' Pr!'~1cleut s abilit~· lo 
nrgotia(r treaties nor his duty to C'Xl'rute thrir provi,-1011,; W<' are merely 
being a::;ked lo dernle whrtlwr a t rPaty, wh1rh cannot br rntifiecl wit bout 
Senate approval, continue~ 111 rtfr('( until lhr Sena t P or prrha p,; the 
Cougrr~,; la kl' fmthe1 nrt wn 
' l 
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'what the law is. '1 United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703 
(1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch 137, 177 
( 1803). 
III /J J , j,i_;~ 
In my view, the suggestion that this case present~ ~~ J<--rr =~- ---. 
patible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to 
decide whether one branch of our government has impinged 
·upon the power of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 
1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 707 
(1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676-678 (1929); 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 2 Under the cri-
teria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the responsibility to 
decide whether both the Executive and Legislative Branches 
have constitutional roles to play in. termination of a treaty. 
If the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged 
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan, 
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for 
our country. 1n that situa.tion, 1t would be the duty of this 
Court to resolve the issue, 
2 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 ( 1939), is not, relevant here. In 
tha.t case, th(' Court was asked to review lhe legitimacy of a State's 
ratification of a constitutional amendment. Four Members of the Court 
stated that Congress has exclusive power over the ratification proce~s. 
Id., at 456-460 (Black, J., conrmring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, 
and Douglas, J,J., joined). Threr Members of thr Court concluded more 
narrowly t.hat. the Court could not. pass upon the efficacy of sta.tc ratifica-
tion. They also found no standnrds by which the Court could fix a rea,-
sonable time for the ratification o[ a proposed amendment. T d., at 
452-454. 
The propos('d constitutional amendmenL aL issue• in Coleman would 
have overruled decis10ns of this Court. Compare id., at 435, n. 1 with 
Bailey v. Drexel Ji''urniture Co .. 259 U. S. 20 (1922); Hamrner v. Dagen-
hart, 257 U. S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review of the legitimacy of a 
State's ratification would have compellrd this Court to overser the very 
constitutional process used to over1 urn Supremr Court, drcisions. In. 
such circumstances it iR entirely appropriatr for the J11dicial Branch of 
government to i:;tep asidr. Sre Scharp[, Jud1cia.l Rrvww and Thr Political 
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J . 517, 589 (1066) . The 
present case involves no similar primiple of jmlirial nonintervention. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM, 1979 
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. 
JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, AND CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OF 
STATE 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
PETITIONERS' SUPPLE~ENTAL BRIEF 
Petitioners, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 24(5), 
hereby file this Supplemental Brief in further reply to. 
Respondent's Brief in Opposition at page 16 concerning the 
original design and intent of the Fra~ers. Respondent's 
argument is so contrary to the historical record that Petitioners 
believe it imperative to answer with the words of the Framers 
the:r'1SP.lves ~,rhich, because of time constraints, have not heretofore 
been brought to this Court's attention. 
Respondents argue the Framers were silent on treaty termination 
both at the Constitutional Convention and in the document and would 
have the Court infer that the Framers meant for the President to act 
alone. Actually, the consistent statements and actions of at least 
twelve of the most prominent Framers and Founding Fathers, including 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Jay, James 
Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, George Mason, C. C. 
Pinckney, Rufus King, Hugh Williamson, and James Iredell, prove that 
treaty termination was designed to be a shared power exercised by the 
President with some form of concurrence by the legislature. 
Thus, John Jay declared in The Federalist: 
"They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal 
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make 
treaties may alter or cancel them .... " The Federalist, 
No. 64, at 394 (Rossiter ed. 1861). ~ 
Respondents have claimed below that the words by John Jay are 
''ambiguous." (R. 397). The Nation's leading authority 
on John Jay disagrees. Professor Richard B. Morris, Gouverneur Morris 
Professor of ·History Emeritus at Columbia University and editor of 
The Papers of John Jay, states: 
"It just so happens that I have before me a copy of the 
original draft of 'Federalist' Letter No. 64 in Jay's own 
handwriting, with some variances from the published text. 
Throughout Jay is talking about treaty-making as a shared 
function, and it is a fair inference from his text that he 
would have regarded treaty termination in the same light." 
125 Cong. Rec. Sl5718 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979). 
In part Professor Morris relies on the fact that Jay's personal 
draft includes the following important sentence which was erroneously 
omitted in the newspaper edition: 
"With respect to the responsibility of the President and 
Senate, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased." 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
The inclusion of the missing sentence in the authentic draft 
of The Federalist proves beyond any doubt that Jay was thinking of 
joint action by the executive and legislative branches, and not action 
by the President alone, when he referred to the making and cancellation 
of treaties. 
In explaining how a treaty could be terminated, even in case of 
a breach by the other nation, James Madison, the "Father of the 
Constitution," wrote on January 2, 1791: 
"That the contracting powers can annul the treaty cannot, 
I presume, be questioned, the same authority, precisely 
being exercised in annulling as in making a treaty." 
1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 524-525 
(lo65) (emphasis added)_!_/ 
1/ In Madison's words, there are three grounds for legislative 
participation: l)"the power vested by the Constitution with respect 
to Treaties in the President and Senate makes them the competent 
Judges" of whether to terminate, 2)"as the treaty is a law, the whole 
Legislature are to judge of its annulment," and 3)"in case the President 
and Senate be competent in ordinary Treaties, the Legislative authority 
(may) be requisite to annul a Treaty of Peace, as being equivalent to a 
Declaration of War, to which that authority alone, by our Constitution, 
is competent." 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 524-525 
(1865). Thus Madison sawa:-1-ational basis for~istinguishing between 
treaties according to their subject matter and relationship to other 
powers of the Congress. 
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In 1796, James Iredell, one of the leading figures in explaining 
the Constitution at the North Carolina ratifying convention, wrote 
that it is Congress alone "to whom, I conceive, the authority is 
entrusted" for "vacating" a treaty.-.J:.../ 
In early 1801, when he was still Vice President, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote in the first manual of Senate procedure: 
"Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is the law of 
the land. It differs from other laws only as it must have 
the consent of a foreign nation .... Treaties being de-
clared, equally with the laws of the United States, to be 
the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act 
of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and 
rescinded." T. Jefferson,~ Manual of Parliamentary Prac-
tice for the Use of the Senate of the United States, Sec. 
I:1r-(1801Y--(emphasi~dded.) ~ ~~ 
The statements of other Framers and Founding Fathers are all 
consistent with and supportive of the above stated conclusions by 
Madison, Jay, Iredell and Jefferson. For example, it is well known 
that the Framers were concerned with restoring dependability to our 
treaties and were anxious to gain the respect and confidence of foreign 
nations. Alexander Hamilton identifies the want of respect in our 
treaty relations as one of the most material defects under the 
Articles of Confederation meant to be cured by the Constitution._l/ 
James Wilson, a signer of the Constitution and one of the original 
Justices of this Court, said at the Pennsylvania Convention to ratify 
the Constitution that Article III, respecting the judicial department, 
"will show the world, that we make the faith of treaties a constitu-
tional part of the character of the United States ... _!/ 
2/ See opinion by then Justice Iredell sitting as a 
circuit judge, reprinted in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). 
3/ The Federalist no. 22, at 151 (Rossiter ed. 1961). 
In the preface to his notes on debates in the Constitutional Con-
vention, James Madison identified several instances where treaties 
of the Confederation were violated. These depredations are cata-
logued by Madison among "the defects, the deformities, the diseases 
and the ominous prospects for which the Convention were to provide 
a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked in expounding & 
appreciating the Constitutional Charter the remedy that was pro-
vided." 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 548-549 
(M. Farrand~. 1937) (nereinafter cited as Recoras)-.~-
4/ 2 The Documentart History of the Ratification of the 
Constitutio'i1"518 (~Jensen ed.976). ~ ~- -- -~ 
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It is difficult to believe the Framers, who regarded violation 
of "the sacred faith of treaties" as "wicked" and "dishonorable" and 
contrary to our best interests in gaining respect among other nations, 
would have made treaties repealable at the pleasure of the President 
alone.2_/ 
It is also well known that the Framers were concerned with pro-
tecting valuable commercial interests and securing increased trade 
rights._§/ Specific concern was expressed against making it easy to 
abridge the common rights of navigation of the Lakes and the Mississippi 
River which had been won by the United States in the Peace Treaty with 
Great Britain._2_/ Other Framers mentioned the fear of the New England 
states that our fishery rights by treaty off Newfoundland might be 
easily given away._!/ C. C. Pinckney, a member both of the Federal 
Convention and his state ratification convention, explained that 
South Carolina, "considering the valuable produce it has to export, 
is particularly interested in maintaining the sacredness of treaties."_Q/ 
Gouverneur Morris also pointed to the conclusion that treaties were 
not to be easily cancelled when he said at the Convention that "the 
more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on thell}. :'!Q./ 
5/ So said James Wilson in his Lectures on Law, 1 The Works 
of James Wilson 166-167 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). 
6/ ~·£·, 4 Records 58 (Madison's record of subject debated); 
2 Recoras 449 (C.C. Pinckney), 452 (Madison). For a thorough dis-
cussion of the preoccupation of the Framers with economic and sec-
tional interests when the treaty clause was debated in the Convention, 
see also Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: 
The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. 
Rev. 527, 613-619 (1974). 
_2_/ E.£., 1 Records 308 (Hamilton); 3 Records 306-307 (H. 
Williamson). 
8/ George Mason said in the Virginia Convention that "The 
Newfounc:Iland fisheries will require that kind of security which we 
are now in want of ... " 3 Records 335. Gouverneur Morris referred 
to"the Fisheries or the Mississippi (as) the two great objects of the 
Union." 2 Records 548. Surely the Framers did not intend to permit 
the giving away of these two great objects at the whim of a single 
officer of government. 
9/ J. Elliot, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions of the 
Federar-constitution 279 (1861).~ ~ ~-
_l_Q_/ 2 Records 393 (emphasis added.) 
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Thus, the Framers sought to give each section of the country 
an opportunity to exert an influence in the legislature in deciding 
upon both the making and unmaking of treaties because of the direct 
effect either action would have upon strong economic or political 
interests in particular States or regions. The Framers clearly were 
as interested in protecting these regional interests by making it 
difficult to revoke beneficial treaties as they were in protecting 
those interests by guarding against harmful treaties. 
Moreover, the intent of the Framers can be derived from their 
belief that the termination of any treaty, particularly an alliance, 
might lead to war with the injured nation. George Washington relied 
on exactly such a warning from his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson 1 
in 1793 when he refused to denounce the treaty of alliance with France 
in part because "an injured friend is the bitterest of foes." Jefferson 
added that cancellation of the treaty would giye "just cause for war" 
by our treaty partner._!l/ 
Respondents are correct in observing that the silence of the 
Constitution on treaty termination is "hardly surprising." But 
respondents draw the wrong conclusion from this fact. In the words 
of historian Arthur Bestor: 
"This silence can hardly be considered remarkable in 
view of the fact that the framers neither discussed 
nor provided for other comparable procedures notably 
the repeal of a statute once enacted. The principal 
concern of the members of these conventions was the 
proper allocation of the various positive powers of 
government. Only in exceptional instances did they 
give attention to the negative use of these powers--
in other words, to procedures for undoing or reversing 
what had once been done." A Bestor, "Respective Roles 
of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogating 
of Treaties," 55 Washington Law Review 1, text 
accompanying notes 67-68 (1979) (to be published). 
11/ The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 225, 231 (P. Ford ed. 
1895).----itufus King, one o-r-the Framers, similarly advised Alexander 
Hamilton that the President would not be justified by law in saying 
the treaty was terminated. D. Malone, Thomas Jeffe~soti ·and the 
Ordeal of Liberty 7 4 (.196 2) . Contrary to the implication of--
Respondents' Brief in Opposition at page 16, note 7, Hamilton never 
claimed the French Alliance was "terminated." He agreed as a member 
of Washington's Cabinet the treaty was not void, but later wrote it 
could be temporarily "suspended" becausethe alliance was defensive 
only and France had initiated offensive war against most of the rest 
of Europe. VII Hamilton's Works 83-93 (1850-51). 
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Furthermore, in the absence of specific constitutional instruction 
on revocations, reversal by those branches participating in the adopting 
process is the logical procedure of effecting any repeal. This princi-
ple was so firmly established in English law that it was adopted in 
America without question.~/ Blackstone's famous Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, which was available to the Framers, gave repeated 
emphasis to the maxim ''that it requires the same strength to dissolve, 
as to create an obligation."_!l/ 
In summary, it is clear the Framers intended the same principle -
that the power to unmake is a corollary of the power to make - to apply 
to the termination of a treaty, as to the repeal of other law._]i/ 
~/ Bestor, supra, at text accompanying note 74. 
13/ William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of Enfland 
160-16-r;-185-186 (4th ed. 1770). The fourth edition i~e<3"nerom 
which the first American edition was reprinted at Philadelphia in 
1771-1772. 
14/ Also, the Framers may well have been guided by their 
knowledge that Congress alone could annul a treaty for the United 
States under the Articles of Confederation. In referring to the 
Continental Congress, Hamilton advised Jefferson: "It is an obvious 
truth, and is so stated, that Congress alone has the right to pro-
nounce a breach of the treaty." 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
7 (P. Ford ed. 1895). Absent speciric instruction in the Constitution~ 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Framers meant for the legislatuTe 
to continue to exercise some role in treaty termination, as it had 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. 
ON PE'l'ITION FOR WRJ'l' OJ<' CERTIORARI TO 'rHE UNI'l'ED srl'ATES 
COURT OF APPIDALS FOR 'l'HE DIS'rHICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUI'l' 
No. 79-85G. DPcided Deeembc1· -, 197H 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN ' with whorn MR. JUSTICE WHITE 
joins, dissenting in part. 
In my view, the time factor and 1ts importance are illusory; 
if the President does not have the power to terminate the 
Treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after 
briefing and oral argument) , the notice of intention to ter-
minate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible, with-
out further study, to pass on the issue of j usticiability or on 
the issues of standing or ripeness. vVhile I therefore join in 
the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case 
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. JUBtice Powell 
Circulated:~~~~~~~ 
Al though I 
I would dismiss the 
agree with the result reached by the 
\ u 11£-7~,fi> 1t.d1c1J. ~e.wj 
complaint kx: ii ei ;tRt 'f'ea°'on. 
Court, 
I 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley'!...:_ Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 ' 113-14 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential 
considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
·2. 
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress 
are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and 
almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal 
considerations. The judicial branch should not decide issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional 
impasse. Otherwise4 we would encourage small groups or even ../ 
individual members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of 
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity 
to resolve the conflict. ~ 
In this case, a JH111i",t fttffllbeJ od members of Congress 
claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty with 
Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role with 
respect to alteration in the supreme law of the land. 
i.,ao been- no official action -Is¥, Ceng r es,,; . In the present 
of this case, we do not know whether there ever will be an 
actual confrontation between the legislative and executive 
branches. Although the Senate has considered a resolution 
declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the termination 
of any mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-39 
( daily ed. June 6, 1979) , no final vote has been taken on the 
resolution. See id. at S16683-92 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979). 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution would have 
retroactive effect. See id. at S7 054-64 ( daily ed. June 6, 
3. 
1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed. June 18, 1979). Thus, it cannot 
be said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the 
President's claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront the 
President, it is not our task to do so. I therefore concur in 
the dismissal of this case. 
I) I I 
)/p.. JtJJ"rlC~ f..eHJJ~,;1.(T .S<>'f'[e.c,fsJ 
01-der o-€- this Coat t nz1ds, however, that the issue 
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question 
which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree. In 
my view, reliance upon the the political question doctrine is 
inapprop! ie1!:e e:As 11AAe eessar;;l, I e el~e i~ ---r ncons is tent with 
our precedents. As set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three 
inquiries: ( i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions 
~ 
committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch 
of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that 
a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do 
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention? 
In my opinion the answer to each of these inquiries would 
require us to decide this case if it were ripe. 
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
branch," ibid. , turns on an examination of the constitutional 
provisions governing the exercise of the power in question. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 4 86, 519 (1969). No 
4. 
constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President 
the power to terminate treaties. Further, Article II, § 2 of 
the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that 
treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. These 
provisions add support to the view that the text of the 
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to 
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 , 6 ( 1973) ; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 , 4 2 
(1849). 
Second, there is no 
and manageable standards for 
"lack of judicially discoverable 
resolving" this case; nor is a 
decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker ~ Carr, 369 
~ 
U.S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President may 
terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional 
approval. Re solution of the quest ion may not be easy, but it 
only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to 
the constitutional provisions at issue. See Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case involves neither review of 
the President's activities as Commander-in-Chief nor 
impermissible interference in the field of foreign affairs. Such 
a case would arise if we were asked to decide, for example, 
whether a treaty required the President to order troops into a 
foreign country. But "it is error to suppose that every case or 
,. 
5. 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance. 11 Baker ~ Carr, supra, at 211. Th is case II touches 11 
foreign relations, but the question presented to us concerns 
only the constitutional division of power between Congress and 
the President. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
t. J;,rr,c (!- fe1-1J.J~u,,, ·~ C<Wcurr-1'1:1 tJ,1fl1{)X 
find inherent in ' · · Assume that 
the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign 
country and announced that it would go into effect despite its 
,-4(, .JLJS1'7C~ f."°N.UQIJUT''.f a.Ii "j 
rejection by the Senate. Under~ at situation 
would present a political question even though Article II, § 2 
clearly would resolve the dispute. Although the answer to the 
hypothetical case seems self-evident because it demands textual 
rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue 
presented is no different from the issue presented in the case 
before us. In both cases, the Court would 
Constitution to decide whether congressional 
interpret the 
approval is 
necessary to give a Presidential decision on the validity of a 
treaty the force of law. Such an inquiry demands no special 
competence or information beyond the reach of the judiciary 
-QO~~eteRGe. Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948~ 
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part 
on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the 
three branches of government. Thus, the judicial branch should 
; 
6. 
avoid "the potentiality of embarassment [that would result] from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments _,_ 
question." Sim~rly, the doctrine restrains judicial 
on one 
action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made." Baker .Y_:_ Carr, supra, at 217. 
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I 
supra, none of these prudential considerations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of repect 
for a coordinate branch. Powell .Y_:_ McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548. 
If the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable 
positions, final disposition of the question presented by this 
case would eliminate, rather than create, multiple 
constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the federal 
government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence 
/ 
of the President and the Congress 
~ 
would require this Court to 
provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say what the law 
is." United States .Y_:_ Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). ... 
In my view, 
willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one 
branch of our government has impinged upon the power of another. 
See Buckley .Y_:_ Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 
655, 676-78 (1929); Myers 
(1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 u.s ~ 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). j.-
7. 
Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, ---
the responsibility to decide whether both the executive and 
legislative branches have constitutional roles to play in 
termination of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal 
action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate 
the treaty with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have 
serious consequences for our country. In that situation, it 




1. A majority of the Court today decides a major 
constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and 
argument. Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only 
after the critical testing and debate that are the essence of 
the adversary system. It seems especially unfortunate that a 
constitutional decision has been made before an impasse exists 
between the executive and legislative branches. Whether one 
speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, as the opinion 
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as 
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact is that 
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue 
with the President's decision. There is no reason for the 
to decide whether we are presented with a political question. 
This Court has recognized that, in the area of 
foreign policy, Congress may leave the President with wide 
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. United States~ Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He 
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates." Id. at 319. (emphasis in the original) 
Resolution of this case would interfere with neither the 
President's ability to negotiate treaties nor his duty to 
; 
9. 
execute their provisions. We are merely being asked to decide 
whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified without Senate 
approval, continues in effect until the Senate or perhaps the 
Congress takes further action. 
~ Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) is not 
relevant here. In that case, the Court was asked to review the 
legitimacy of a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. Four members of the Court stated that Congress has 
exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-60 
(Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Douglas, JJ., joined). Three members of the Court concluded 
more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of 
state ratification. They also found no standards by which the 
Court could fix a reasonable time for the ratification of a 
proposed amendment. Id., at 452-54. 
The proposed constitutional amendment at issue in 
Coleman would have overruled previous decisions of this Court. 
Compare id. at 435 n.1 with Bailey':!..:... Drexel Furniture Co., 259 
U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer':!..:... Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Thus, 
judicial review of the legitimacy of a state's ratification 
would have compelled this Court to oversee the very 
constitutional process used to overturn Supreme Court decisions. 
In such circumstances it is entirely appropriate for the 
judicial branch of government to step aside. See Scharpf, 
Judicial Review and The Political Question: A Functional 
The present Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966). 






Styustic Ch11nges Ttir'lughout. 
LFP 12/12/79 
SECOND DRAFT 
79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ;loNCURRING 
To: The Chief Justice 
!.fr. Justice Brennan 
I.fr. Justice Stewart 
~r. Justtce Wbite 
1.fr. Just tee l!1.arshall 
~r . JuFiti.co Bla.:Jrmun 
~'.r. J1.l&tie;e Rr.h::.s.ui st 
Mr. Jus~lce Stevens 
f .rom: Mr . Ju.stice Powell 
Circulated: --------
KP('~ rcula t 8d · Jf~ · fr ! "879 
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, 
I would dismiss the complaint for a different reason. 
I 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
oecided if it is 





for judicial review. Buckley:!...:_ Valeo, 
( 1976) (per curiam). Prud e ntial 
considerations persuade me that · a dispute between Congress and 
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
2. 
~ach branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress 
are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and 
almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal 
considerations. The judicial branch should not decide issues 
1 i 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress until the political branches reach a con st i tut ion al 
impasse. Otherwise we would encourage small groups or even 
individual members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of 
-:,, .. 
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity 
to resolve the conflict. 
In this case, a limited number of ~embers of Congress 
,... .,.. 
claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty with 
Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role with 
' ; 
respect to alteration in the supreme law of the land. But there ~ 
has been no official action by Congress. In the present posture 
of this case, we do not know whether there ever will be an 




Although the Senate 
: 
has considered a resolution 
declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the termination 




(daily ed. June 
r e solution. See 
6, 1979), no final vote has bee n taken on the 
I l (. 
id. ) at S16683fi 92 (daily ed. Nov . 15, 1979). 
Moreover, it is unclear 
retroactive effect. See 
whether 






ed. June 6, 
I 
3. 
1979); id., at S7862 (daily ea. June 18, 1979). Thus, it cannot 
be said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the 
President 1 s claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront the 
President, it is not our task to do so. I therefore concur in 
the dismissal of this case. 
II 
The order of this Court holds, however, that the issue 
presented by this case is a non justiciable political quest ion 
which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree. In 
my view, reliance upon the the political question doctrine is 
inappropriate and unnecessary. 1 It also is inconsistent with 
our precedents. As set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three 
inquiries: (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions 
committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch 
of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that 
a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do 
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention? 
In my opinion the answer to each of these inquiries would 
require us to decide this case if it were ripe. 
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
branch," ibid. , turns on an examination o f the constitutional 
provisions governing the exercise of t h e power in question. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 4 86, 519 (1969). No 
4. 
constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President 
the power to terminate treaties. Fut'ther, Artiole II,§ 2 of 
(!) 
the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with 
the ad v ice and consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that 
tt"eaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. These 
provisions add support to the view that the text of the 
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to 
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 
(1849). 
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a 
decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker ~ Carr, 369 
U • .S., at 217. ~ We are asked to decide whether the President may 
terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional 
approval. Resolution of the question may not be easy, but it 
only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to 
the constitutional provisions at issue. See Powell v. McCormack, 
-5 
395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case involves neither review of 
I) 
the President's activities as Commander-in-Chief nor 
impermissible interference in the fi~ld of foreign affairs. Such 
a case would arise if we were asked to dee ide, for example, 
whether a treaty required the President to orde r troops into a 
foreign country. But "it is error to suppose that every cas e or 
I 
5. 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
· "Bk C r supra, at 211. Th1's case "touches" cognizance. a er ~ ~' 
foreign relations, but the question presented to us concerns 
only the constitutional division of power between Congress and 
the President. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent in the Court's holding in this case. Assume that 
the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign 
country and announced that it would go into effect despite its 
rejection by the Senate. Under today's holding, that situation 
would present a political question even though Art~ II, § 21 C, 
clearly would resolve the dispute. Although the answer to the 
hypothetical case seems self-evident because it demands textual 
rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue 
presented is no different from the issue presented in the case 
before us. In both cases, the Court would interpret the 
Constitution to decide whether congressional approval is 
necessary to give a Presidential decision on the validity of a 
treaty the force of law. Such an inquiry demands no special 
competence or information beyond the reach of the judiciary 
-eompeten"e. Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).2 
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part 
on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the 
three branches of government. Thus, the judicial branch should 
-- -; ,: -
o. 
avoid "the potentiality of embarassment [that would result] from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question." Simiarly, the doctrine restrains judicial action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made." Baker~ Carr, supra, at 217. 
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I 
supra, none of these prudential considerations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of repect 
for a coordinate branch. Powell~ McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548. 
If the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable 
positions, final disposition of the question presented by this 
case would eliminate, rather than create, multiple 
constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the federal 
government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence 
of the President and the Congress would require this Court to 
provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say what th'= law 
is." United States~ Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
III 
In my view, the Court's holding today is incompatible 
with its willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one 
branch of our government has impinged upon the power of another. 
See Buckley~ Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
' 655, 676/178 (1929): Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).~ 
7. 
Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, this Court has - ---
the responsibility to decide whether both the executive and 
legislative branches have constitutional roles to play in 
termination of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal 
action, had challenged the President I s authority to terminate 
the treaty with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have 
serious consequences for our country. In that situation, it 
would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue. 
• 8. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. A majority of the Court today decides a major 
constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and 
argument. Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only 
after the er it ical testing and debate that are the essence of 
the adversary system. It seems especially unfortunate that a 
constitutional decision has been made before an impasse exists 
between the executive and legislative branches. Whether one 
speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, n.S the opinion 
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as 
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact is that 
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue 
with the President's decision. There is no reason for the Court 
to decide whether we are presented with a political question. 
2. This Court has recognized that, in the area of 
foreign policy, Congress may leave the President with wide 
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He 
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates." _!i .
1 
at 319 k> (emphasis in the original)~ 
Resolution of this case would interfere with neither the 
President's ability to negotiate treaties nor his duty to 
I 
9 • 
execute their provisions. We are merely being asked to decide 
whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified without Senate 
approval, continues in effect until the Senate · or perhaps the 
Congress takes further action. 
3. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) is not 
relevant here. In that case, the Court was asked to review the 
legitimacy of a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. Four members of the Court stated that Congress has ,., 
exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-60 
- /I 
(Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Doug 1 as , J J . , j o in e d ) . Three members of the Court concluded 
more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of 
state ratification. 
Court could fix a 
proposed amendment. 
They also found no standards by which the 
reasonable time 
Id., at 452-14. 
- " 
for the ratification of a 
The proposed constitutional amendment at issue in 
Coleman would have overruled previous decisions of this Court. 
Compare id. at 435
1 
n.1 with Bailey~ Drexel Furniture Co., 259 
U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer~ Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Thus, 
judicial review of the legitimacy of a state's ratification 
would have compelled this Court to oversee the very 
constitutional process used to overturn Supreme Court decisions. 
In such circumstances it is entirely appropriate for the 
judicial 
Judicial 
branch of government to step aside. 







Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966). The present case 
involves no similar principle of judicial non-intervention • 
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN J with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE 
joins, dissenting in part. 
In my view, the time factor audits importance are illusory; 
if the President does not have the power to terminate the 
Treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after 
briefing and oral argument), the notice of intentiou to ter-
minate surely has no legal effect. Tt is also i!?cl~f,;:1si]lle, with-
out further study, to pass on the issue of justic1ability or on 
the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in 
the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case 
for oral argument aud give it the plenary consideration it so· 
obviously deserves 
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The Chief Justice 
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From: Ur. Justice 
BARRY GOLD'\VATER E'l' AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PREl',IDENT OF THE UNITED ~TA TES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTJORARI TO 'rHE VNITED S'l'ATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT 0~' COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
·o. 79- 850 Dce1dcd DrcPmlwr - , 1!)7!) 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although I agree with the result reache<l by the Court, 1 
would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review. 
I 
This Court has recogmze<l that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1. 113- 114 (1976) (per curiarn). Prudrntial con-
siderations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
the Presideut is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has taken actio11 asserting its constitutional 
authority. Differences between the President and the Con-
gress are commonplace under our system. The differences 
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than 
legal consideratio11s. The Judicial Branch should not decide 
issues affecting the aliocatiou of power between the President 
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-
tional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups 
or even individual Members of Cougress to seek judicial reso-
lution of issues before the normal political process has the 
opportunity to resolve the conflict. 
In this case, a few Members of Cougress claim that the 
President's action rn terminating the treaty with Taiwan has 
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to 
l\alt811ati(.m in the supreme law of the land. C'oHgress has 
taken no official action. l II the present posture of this case, 
we do not know whether there ever will be an a<'tual con-
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.Although thr Senate> has considered a resolution declaring 
that Senate approval is necessary for thr termination of any 
mutual defense treaty, ser 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-
S7039 ( daily ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken 
on the resolution . See id., at S16683- Sl6092 (daily ed. Nov. 
15, 1979) . Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution 
would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily 
ed. June 6, 1979); 1:d., at S7862 (daily C'd. June 18, 1979) . 
It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has 
rejected the President's claim. If thr Congress chooses not 
to confront the Preside11t, it is not our task to do so. I 
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case. 
11 
Mn. JUSTICE REHNQITIST suggests, hov\C'Ver, that the 1ssue 
presented by this case is a nonjusticiablP political question 
which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree. 
In my view , reliance upon the political-question doctrine is 
inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal 
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 ( 1962), the doctrine 
incorporates three inquiries : (i) Does the issue involve reso-
lution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution 
to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution 
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of 
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considC'rations counsel 
against judicial i11tervention '? In my opinion the answer to 
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case 
if it were~ . 
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
branch ," ibid., turns 011 an examination of the constitutional 
provisions governing the exercise of the power in question. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969) . No co11sti-
t utional provisio11 explicitly confers upon the President the 
power to terminate treaties. Further, Art. II, § 2 of the 
Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with 
the advice and consent of the f.;enate . Article VI provides 
; 
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that treaties shall be a part of the supremo law of the land. 
These provisions adu support to the view that the text of the 
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to 
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 
42 (1849). 
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a deci-
sion impossible "without an initial policy cleterminatio1i of a 
kind clearly for nonjuuicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S., at 217. We are askeu to decide whether the President 
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without con-
gressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be 
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretation to tho co1Jstitutional provisions at issue. See 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present 
case involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the 
field of foreign affairs. j uch a case would arise if we were 
asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the 
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond Judicial cognizance." Baker v. 
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches'' foreign relations, but 
the questio11 presented to us concerns only the constitutional 
division of power between Congress and the President. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent in MR. Ju8TICE REHNQUIST's concurring opinion. 
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty 
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into 
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political 
question even though Art. II, § 2, clearly would resolve the 
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems 
self-evident because it demands textural rather than inter-
stitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no 
different from the issue presented in the case before us. In 
4 GOLDWATEil v. CAHTER 
both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to 
decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a 
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of 
law. Such an inquiry clc>mands no special competence or 
informatiou beyond the reach of the judiciary. Cf. Chicago 
& Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 
103, 111 (1948) .1 
dcntial concerns calling for mutual respect among the three) 
Fiually, the political-question doctrine rests in part on pr~,L 
branches of government. Thus. the Judicial Branch should 
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment I that would result] 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one questi011." Similarly, the doctrrne restrains judicial action 
where there is au "unusual n<'ed for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made.'' Baker v. Carr, supra, 
at 217. 
If this case were ripe for Judicial review, see Part I S'Upra, 
none of these prudential considrrations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of 
resprct for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. R., at 548. If the President and the Co11gress had reached 
irrrcoucilable positions. final disposition of the question pre-
seuted by this case would eliminat<'. rather than create. multi-
ple co11stitutional intC>rpr0tat1011s. The spectre of the Federal 
Govcrnme11t brought to a halt because of the mutual intran-
sigPnce of the President and the Congress would require this 
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say 
l The Court hns recognized thal, in ih<' aren of torrign pohr.v, Congre;.;R 
m:1.,· lP,we 11w Prr~idrnl with widC' diserPt10n that othC'rwi::;e might run 
afoul of the uondelrgation doc·trinr . 'L 'nited 8tate1S Y. Curtiss-Wrioht 
fi};vpurt C'orp., W9 ( l. S. ;30-J (1!l:3ii). As stated 111 that case, " the Pre,;i-
de11t. alone ha,; tlw powrr to ~peak or li~te1i m; a rPpre"'c'ntativP of the 
Nation . He makes trrntw,; with tlw adviC'e and ron"ent of the Senate ; 
b11t, hl' alon<' 1wgotmteH.'' Id., at ;~rn (<'m1iha.~i::; 111 tlw onginal). l~e1:10-
l11tio11 of tlrn: ca8e would 111terfrre with nrithrr tlw Prrs1dent ',; abilit~· 10 
urgotiate treaties nor hi,; duty to Px<·<·ute their prm·i,;1011s. WP are merely 
bPing a:-kecl to deride whether n. trc·at~·, winch cannot be rntifird without 
Sernt1P approval , contmue~ m etfP<·1 until !hr Senate or pPrhnps the 
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what the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703 
(1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch 137, 177 
(1803), ::{ , /J, ./ I /} 
III __ w/~ 
In my view, the suggestion that this case present~ incom- i' ~
patible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to r 
decide whether one branch of our government has impinged 
·upon the power of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 
1, 138 (1976); United States v. Ni:ron, 418 U. S. 683, 707 
(1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 67(i-678 (1929); 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 2 Under the cri-
teria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the responsibility to 
decide whether both the Executive and L<'gislative Branches 
have constitutional roles to play m termination of a treaty. 
If the Congress. by appropriate formal action. had challenged 
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan, 
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for 
our country. In that situation, it would be the duty of this 
Court to resolve the issue. 
2 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (198!l), is nol rrlrvan( lwre. Jn 
that. case, the Court was asked to re\'lew the leg1timacy of a Statr's 
ratification of a ronRtitulional amendnwnt. Fom l\frmbers of the Court 
stated that Congres~ ha:,; exclusive powrr over the raiificat1on prore~::;. 
Id .. a1 4-56-460 (Black, J., concurring, with whom Robrrts, Frankfurter, 
and Douglas, .J.J., Joined). Three Member~ of the Court conrluded more 
narrowly that thr Court could not pm;i; upon the rffiracy of 8tate ratifica-
tion. They also found no 8hmdnrcls by which tlw Court could fix a rrn-
sonable time for 1he ratifirat1ou of n propoRPd amendment . lcl ., at 
452-154. 
The proposrd constitutional amendmen1, al i~~U<' in Coleman would 
hn,vo overruled clec181011s oJ th1~ Com!. Compart' id., ut 435, n . l with 
Baile!! v. Drexel Furniture Co .. 259 ll . S. 20 (Hl22); Harnme1· v. Dagen-
hart, 257 U. S. 251 ( Hl18) . Thut-, juchrial review of the kg1t unary of a 
State'~ ratification would have comprllrd th1~ Cour1 to over~Pe the very 
, · ut10nnl rocess used to Suprrmr Court drr1sion:,,. In. 
,mch circu1n..-;h111res 1t ft'" rnt1rl'1~- appropriatp for th<' .Judicial Branch of 
government to step as1dP. ~ee 8C'h,1rpl, .Jud1c1al RPnew and Thr Polit1cnl 
Question: A Functional Ana]y:,,1:-., 75 YalP L .. J. 517. 589 (1D66) . Tho 
preRent ca;:;e mvolvr~ no ~unilar prinr1plr of ,1udic1al nonint<•rvention. 
; 
To: Mr. Justlcn B,.. ur1<i!. 
Mr. Justloe "t8 I rt 
Mr. Juattco W'1lts 
Mr. Justice M;:-rsha11 
Mr. Justice .Black.nun 
Mr. Just:l.C'o Po ell 
Hr. Justi"e R!'lri'i. •u~ st 
Mr. Justice Stev,ns 
From: The Chief Justice 
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The petition forA writ of certiorari 1s granted. The .1udg-
ment of the Court of Appeals 1s vacatt>d and the case 1s 
remanded to th<' District Court with dirertio11s to dismiss the 
complaint. 
MR. JTTSTICE MAR8HALL concurs lJ1 thf' !'('~Ult 
MR. JUSTICE P1JWELL co11cul's ln tlw ,1udg11wnt and ha filed 
a statement. 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQl.'IST concur::; in the ,1udgment and has 
filed a statement 111 which Mn. CHIEF JusTJCE BunGEH, MR. 
,TUSTICE S'!'FJWAHT, and Mrt. JPRTICE /-,n:n;N::,, .1on,, 
Mn. JvsTJCl!; WHJTE and Mu. ,JUSTICE BLACKMl'N jom i11 
the grant of the 1wt1t10n for~ Tit of certiorari but wo~1kl set 
the case for argument and giw Jt plenary consideratioJJ. MR. 
JUSTICE BLACKWUN haR fil<>d a stat<'tnf>Jlf, in wlnrh MR .TuR-
TICE WHITE .IOlllR 
1\IIR. Jusrr1cE Bm~NNAN would gnwt the pet1t10n or Vint of 
cert10rari and affirm thf' .i udgnwn t of th<' Court of AppealR anrl 
has fil<>d a Rtateme11t 
,, 
to: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
)Cr. Justice Stewart 
Jtr. Justice White 
Ibo. Justice Marshall 
)Cr, Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
~: Jlr, Justice Rehnquist 
Cl""1ated: 
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ON PE'l'ITION FOR WRIT OF CEH'rIORARI 'ro 'l'HE UNI'.PED STA'l'ES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR 'l'HE DIS'l'RIC'r OF COLUMBIA CIHC'UlT 
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MR. Jus'l'ICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF Jus'l'ICE1 
MR. JusTICE S'l'EWAR'l', and Mn. Jus'l' ICJ,J Sn:VENS join., 
concurring. 
I am of the view that the basic questiou presented by the 
petitioners in this case is "political" and therefore nonjus-
ticiable because it involves the authority of the President in 
the conduct of our couutry's foreign relations and the extent 
to which the Sena.te or the Congress is authori,md to uegate 
the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 
433 (1939), a case in which members of the Kansas Legisla-
ture brought an action attacking a vote of the State Senate 
in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment, 
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the 
"Opinion of the Court": 
"We think that ... the question of the efficacy of rati-
fications by state legislatures, i II the light of previous 
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as 
a political q uestiou pertain iug to the political depart-
ments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the 
exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adop-
tion of the Amendmeut. . . . The precise question as 
now raised is whether, when the legislature of the State, 
as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed 
Arnendment, the Court should restrain the State officers 
from -certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State, 
because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the ques-
tion from coming before the political departments. \Ve 
find no basis in either Constitution or statute for such 
.~ 
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judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of ratification, 
contains no provision as to rejection . .. . " J d., at 450. 
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that 
"Congress in controlling the pro.mulgation of the ru-Joption of 
a constitutional amendment has the final determinatiou of 
the question whether by lapse of time its proposal of the 
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifica-
tions." ld., at 450. 
I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the con-
troversy in the instant case ir, a nonj usticiable political dispute 
that should be left for rm,olution by the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches of the Governme11t Here, while the Consti-
tution is express as to the manner in which the Renate shall 
participate 111 the ratification of a Treaty, it is silent as to 
that body's participation in the abrogation of a Treaty. In 
this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra. 
As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F . Supp. 1291, 1302 (ND Ill. 
1975) (three-juuge court) : 
"A q uestiou that might be answered in different ways for 
different amendments must surely be controlled by po-
litical standards rather than stanclards easily character-
ized as .i uclicially rnallageable.'' 
In light of the absence of auy constitutional provision govern-
iug the terminat10n of a Treaty, and the fact that differe11t 
termination proceuures may be appropriate for different 
treaties (sec. e. g., n. 1, fofra), the instant case in my view, 
also "must surely be controlled by political standards." 
I think that the Justifications for concluding that the ques-
tion here is political in nature are even rnon' compelling than 
in Coleman because it involves foreigu relations-specifically 
a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a . 
foreign governmcut if attacked. ln United States v. Curtist-
Wright Corp., 299 U S. 304 (1936), this Court saiJ : 
"Whether, if the Joint Resolution had related solely to 
internal affairs 11t would be open to the challenge that it 
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the ExecuHve, we find it unnecessary to determine. The 
whole aim of the Resolution is to affect a situation en-
tirely external to the l1 uited States. and falling within ~ 
the category of foreign affairs . ... " ~ "G. S., at 315.( - _ 
The present case differs in sC'veral important respects from -C-
Youngstow11 Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 
( 1952), cited by petitioners as authority both for reaching the 
merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals. 
Iu Youngstoum privak litigants brought a suit contesting the 
President's authority under his war powers to seize the Na-
tion's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable 
domestic impact. Here, by (Q,Qn trast, we are asked to settle (J.. , 
a dispute betwee11 coequal branches of our government. each 
of which has resources available to protect and assert its in-
terests, resourcrs not available to private litigants outside 
the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as in Curtiss-Wright, the 
effect of this action . as far as W<' can tell. 1s "C'n ti rely external 
to the Unifrd States. and l fallsJ within the category of for-
eign affairs." Finally, as alreacly noted, the situation pre-
1 AR oh~crvrd hy Judg<' Wright in hi,- <'011r11rring opmrnn hrlow: 
"Congrrt'~ ha:; imtiatl'd tlw fNmmnlion of ireatiP:; by dirl'eling or rrquir-
ing thr PrPHidrnt to giw notirr of tnmmation, withoui any prior pre~i-
drntml rrquP~1 Congn·~,; ha~ annull<•d trcat.ie~ without any prrsidential 
noticr . It ha:, eonfrrn·cl on the Pn·RidPnt the J)O\H'r to tl'rmmat(• a par-
twular treaty, and 1t haH enactrd statutPs practically nulhfymg lhe clo-
mc:;ti(I PffrC'!s of a I n,nty and thus eaused thr PrPs1dPnl to carry out 
1Prmination. . . I~ J \lon•ovrr, Congrr,;s hn,: a varirty of powPrfnl tool. 
for infhwnrmg foreign polir~' c!Pci:;ions that hrar on trPaty matters. 
Under Artirh· I. SeC'!10n 8 of thr Con~t1tut1on, 1( ran rrg11late commerce 
with fon•ig11 na.11011s, nusr and snJ>port armies, and declare war. H has 
powrr over the· appointmrnt of ambas,;adors and 1hr fundmg of rmbassies 
and coni::ulatr~. Congre:<~ thus rP(aim: a, strong 111tluencr over thr Pre~i-
dent!,, roml11eL in lrmty matler~ l~I As our political h1:-:tory drmon-
struk:::, trraty crrat10n and tC'rm111at1011 arr complt•x phrnomena rooted 
in the d~·namic n•lat10111<hip !wt W<'<'n t lw t.wo polii1ral brn11rhe,:: of our 
~overnment. We t h11,; ~houlcl dPriine the mv1tatio11 to R<'t 111 concrete tL 
particular eo11:-:t1tut1onally aeceptabl<' arrangemm1 by which the President 
and Cong rps,; arc> to 8hare trl'at \ trrm11wt10n / ' Pet1tiou, pp. 44A-45A-
(footnotes omittpd ) .. 
,. 
4 COLDWATER v. CAHTER 
sented here is closely akin to that presented in Coleman, 
where the Constitution spoke ouly to the procedure for rati-
fication of an amendrnen t. not to its rejection. 
Having decided that the question presented in this action is 
nonjusticiable, I believe that the appropriate disposition is for 
this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss 
the complaint. This procedure derives support from our 
practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts.2 For 
more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to 
vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has be-
come moot prior to a resolution of the case in this Court. 
United States , . Munsi11gwear, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). The 
Court has required such decisious to be vacated in order to 
"prevent a judgment, ui1reviewable because of rnootness, from 
spawning any legal consequences." / d. , at 41. It is even 
more imperative that this Court invoke this procedure to, 
ensure that resolution of a "political question," which should 
not have be0n decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any 
legal consequences. '' An Art. III court's resolution of a ques-
tion that is "political" in character, can create far more dis-
ruption among the three coequal branches of government 
than the resolution of a question presented in a moot contro-
versy. Since the political nature of the questions presented 
should have precluded the lower courts from considering or 
deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings 
in the federal court~ must be vacated, and the complaint 
dismissed. 
2 Th1;; Court, of l'our~<', ma)· no! proh1b11 :;ta tc C'onrt,, from deciding 
political q11r~tion~. any more' lh:111 1t ma.,· prohibil lhc'm from deC'iding 
que8tion:; 1hat are moot. Doremus v. Board of EdW'ation, ;NZ U. 8 . 429, 
434 (19,52), ~o long a,; the·)· do not trench upon rxC'lu~ivPly fedcml qucH-
tion8 of forPign polic·y. Zscherni11 v. Miller, :lHH U. S. 4'..19, 4ti968) . 
; 
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l3ARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. V. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, !!:T AL. 
ON PE'l'lTION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 'l'HE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPl!:ALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
~o. 79-85G. DeC'ided DPcernl)('r ,-, 1979' 
lVfo. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although 1 agree with the result reached by the Court, I 
would dismiss tht> complaint as not ripe for judicial review, 
] 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S 1, 113-114 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential cou-
siderations µersuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority Differences between the President and the Con-
gress are commonplace under our system. The differences 
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than 
legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide 
issues affecting the aHocation of power between the President 
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-
tioual impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups 
or even rnd1vidual Members of Congress to seek judicial reso-
lutiou of issues before the normal political process has the 
opportunity to resolve the conflict. 
Tn this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the 
President's actioll in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has 
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to 
\ a change iu the supreme law of the land. Congress has 
taken no official action. In the present posture of this case, 
we do not know whether there ever will be an actual cou-
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Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring 
that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any 
mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-
S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken 
on the resolution. See id., at S16683-S16692 (daily ed. Nov. 
15, 1979). Moreover, it is. unclear whether the resolution 
would have retroactive effect.· See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily 
ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed. June 18, 1979) . 
It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has 
rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not 
to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I 
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case. 
Il 
MR. J US'l'ICE REHNQUIST suggests, however, that the issue 
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question 
which can never be considered by this Court. l cannot agree. 
In my view, reliance upon the political-question doctrine is 
inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal 
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine 
incorporates three inquiries : (i) Does the issue involve reso-
lution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution 
to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution 
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of 
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel 
against judicial intervention'? Iu my opinion the answer to 
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case 
f if it were ready for review. 
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordiuate political 
brauch," ibid., turns on an examiuatiou of the constitutional 
provisions govcrniug the exercise of the power in question. 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519 (1969). No consti~ 
tutional prnvision explicitly confers upon the President the 
power to terminate treaties. Further, Art. II, ~ 2 of the 
Constitutiou authorizes the President to make treaties with 
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that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. 
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the 
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to 
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v, 
Morgan, 413 U. S 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 
42 (1849) 
Second. there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a deci-
sion impossible "without au initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for 11onjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President 
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without con-
gressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be 
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present 
case involves neither review of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the 
field of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were 
asked to decide. for example, whether a treaty required the 
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations hes beyond j u<licial cognizance." Baker v. 
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but 
the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional 
division of power between Congress and the President. 
A sunple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent i11 MR. ,J usTiCE REHNQUIS'r's concurring opinion. 
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty 
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into 
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. JusTICE 
REHNQUIST's analysis that situat10n would present a political 
questioH even though Art. II. § 2, clearly would resolve the 
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems 
self-ev1cleut because it clernancls textual rather than inter-
stitial analysis, the 11atur€' of the legal issue presented is no· 
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both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to 
decide whether congressional approval is pecessary to give a 
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of 
law. Such an inquiry demands no special competence or 
information beyond the reach of the judiciary. Cf. Chicago 
& S<YUthern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 
103, 111 (1948).1 
Finally, the political-question doctrine rests in part on pru-
dential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three 
branches of government. Thus, the Judicial Branch should 
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment [that would result] 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question." SimilarlY. the doctrine restrains judicial action 
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra., 
at 217. 
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra, 
none of these prudential considerations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of 
respect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached 
+rreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question pre-
sented by this case would eliminate, rather than create, multi-
ple constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the Federal 
Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intran-
sigence of the President and the Congress would require this 
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say 
1 The Court has recognized that, in the area of foreign policy, Congress 
lffl,Y leave. the President with wide discrt'tion that otherwise might nm 
11.foul of the uondelegation doctrine. United .States v. Curtiss-Wright 
E;rport Corp., 2!)9 U. S. 304 (HJ36). As ~tittetl in that. case, '·the Presi-
dent alont' ha.H the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
Nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
but he alone negotiates.'' Id., at 319 ( empha.Hi::; in the original). Reso-
ltition of thiH caHe would interfere with neitht'r the President's ability to 
riegotiate treaties nor hi::1 duty to execute their provisions. We are merPly 
being a,;ked to decide whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified without 
Senate approval, contmues in effecL until the Senate or perhaps the 
Congress take fnrthe1 action. 
" ·' 
. .. 
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·wbat the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 7p3 
(1074) , quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cnanch 137, 177 
( 1803). 
Ill 
Ju my view, the suggestion that this case presents a political 
question is incompatible with this Court's willingness on pre-
vious occasions to deciae wliether one branch of our govern-
me11t has impinged upon the power of another. See Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U. S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 
676-678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).2 
Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the 
responsibility to decide whether both the Executive and Leg-
islative Branches have constitutional roles to play in termi-
n~tion of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal 
action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate 
the treaty with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have 
serious consequences for our country. In that situatioB, it 
would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue. 
2 C'oletrtan v. Mille1·, 301 U. S. 433 (1939) , is not relevant 11ere. In 
that case, the Court was asked to review the legitimacy of a State's 
ratification of a constitutiona.l amendment. Four Members of the Court 
stated that Congress has exclusive pown over t.he ratification proces,,, 
Jct., at 456-460 (Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter, 
and Douglas, J.J'., joined) . Three Membertl of the Court concluded more 
narrowly that the Court could not pas~ upon the efficacy of sta.te ratifica-
tion. They also found no standarqs by which the Court could fix a rea-
sonable time for the ratification of a proposed amendment. Id., at 
452-45'k, 
The proposed constitutional amendm<:'nL a.t issue in Coleman would 
luwe overruled decisions of this Court. Compare id., at 435, n. 1 with 
Bailey v. Drexel Purniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922): Hammer v. Dagen-
ha1't, 257 U. S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review of the legitimacy of a 
State's ratification would have compelled this Court to oversre the very 
\ 
eoni:-titutional proces:; used to reverse Supreme Court decisions. In sush 
circumstances it may be entirely appropriate for the .Judicial Branch of 
government to step aside. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and The Political 
Question : A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966) . The 
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No 79-856 Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
MR, JusTICE STEWART, and MR, JUSTICE STEVENS join, 
concurring. 
I am of the view that. the basic question presented by the 
petitioners m this case is "political" and therefore nonjus~ 
ticiable because it involves the authority of the President irt 
the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent 
to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate 
the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 
433 ( 1939) , a case in which members of the Kansas Legisla-
ture brought an action attacking a vote of the State Senate 
in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment, 
Mr, Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the 
"Opinion of the Court": 
61We think that, , , . the question of the efficacy of rati-
ficatious by state legislatures, in the light of previous 
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as 
a political question pertaining to the political depart.. 
ments, with the ultimate authority m the Congress in the· 
exercise of its control over the prnmulgation of the adop-
tion of the Amendment. , . , The precise question as 
now raised is whether, when tbe legislature of the State, 
at1 we have found, has actually ratified the proposed 
Amendment, the Court should restrain the State officers: 
from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State, 
because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the ques-
tiou from coming beforp the political departments. We 
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judicial action, Article V, speaking solely of ratification, 
contains no provision as to reJection . .•. " Id., at 450. 
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that 
sccougress m controlling the promulgation of the adoption of 
a constitutional amendment has the final determination of 
the question whether by lapse of ti,me its proposal of the 
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifica-
tions.'' l d , at 456. 
I believe 1t follows a fortiori from Coleman that the con-
troversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable political dispute 
that should be left for re:solution by the Executive and Legis-
lativr Branches of the Government. Here, while the Consti-
t ution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall 
participate m the ratification of a 'I'reaty, it is silent as to 
that body's participation in the abrogation of a Treaty, In 
this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra. 
As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F , Supp 1291, 1302 (ND Ill. 
1975) ( three-juuge court): 
uA question that might be answ~red in different ways for 
different amendments must surely be controlled by po-
hticaJ standards rather than standards easily character-
ized as .I mhc1ally manageable.91 
In light of the absence of any constitutional provision govern-
ing the termmation of a Treaty, and the fact that different 
termination procedures may be appropriate for different 
treaties (see, e. g., n 1, infra) , the instant case in my view, 
also "must surely be controlled by political standards." 
J think that the justifications for concluding that the ques- · 
t ion here is political m nature are even more compelling than 
in Coleman because it involves foreign relations-specifically 
a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a . 
foreign government if attacked. In United States v. Curtiss-
W right Corp. , 299 U. S. 304 ( 1936). this Court said . 
'' Whether, if the Jornt Resolution had related solely to 
illtemal affairs ~t. would be open to the challenge that it 
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the Executive, we find it unnecessary to determine. The' 
whole aim of the Resolution is to affect a situation en-
tirely external to the United States, and falling within 
the category of foreign affairs .. . . " 299 U. S., at 315. 
The present case differs in several important respects from 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579· 
(1952), cited by petitioHers as authority both for reaching the 
merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals. 
In Youngstown private lihgaHts brought a suit contesting the 
Presideut's authority under his war powers to seize the Na-
tion's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable 
domestic impact. Here, by contrast, we are asked to settle 
a dispute between coequal branches of our government, each 
of which has resources available to protect and assert its in- · 
terests, resources not available to private litigants outside 
the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as 111 Curtiss-Wright, the 
effect of this action, as far as we can tell, is "entirely external 
to the United btates, and [ falls] within the category of for-
eign affairs.'' ..Fiually, as already noted, the situation pre-
1 As observed Ly Judgl' Wright in hi~ concurring opinion below: 
"Congre,;s has imtiakd the tcrmina110n of treaties by directing or requir-
ing the President to giw notice of lermmation, without any prior presi-
denlrnl rf'411e~t. Congre~;., has annullf'd treaties without any pre~idential 
notice. It has confrrrcd on the Prrs1drnt the powpr to trrminate a par-
ticular treaty, and 1t has enacted ~tatutes pract,ically nullifying the do-
mestw effects of a t1'eaty and thm: caused the Pm,idenl to carry out 
termma.t1on. . . 1.11 I Moreover, Congre~,; has a variety of powerful tools 
for mfiuencmg foreign policy dPc1~1ons that bear on trpaty matters. 
Under Article I. Section 8 or thr Con:,11t11t1on, it ran regulate commerce · 
with forf'1gn nat1om:, ra1~e and support armies, and declare war. It has 
pown oVPr the appomtment of amba,;,mdors nnd the funding of embassies 
and consulate::;. Congre:-:-; thus retains a Rtrong mfiuence ovrr the Presi-
dent's conduct, m treaty matter" . rirJ A, our political history demon-
strates, treaty creat10n and termination arc romplf'x phf'nomena rooted 
in the dynamic relat1011,-,h1p bPtwc<'n the t.wo political branches of our 
government. We thu~ Rhould dcC'hne the inVJta.tion to set iu concrete a 
particular con:-1titut1onally acceptable arrangement by which the Pre,;iclent 
and Congress are to share treaty termmation." Petil10n, pp. 44A-45A 
(footnote::; omitted). 
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sented here is closely akin to that presented in Coleman, 
where the Constitution spoke ouly to the procedure for rati-
fication of an amendment, not to its rejection. 
Having decided that the question presented in this action is 
nonjusticiable, I believe that the appropriate disposition is for 
this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss 
the complaint. This procedure derives support from our 
practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts.2 For 
more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to 
vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has be-
come moot prior to a res0Iutio11 of the case in this Court. 
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). The 
Court has req uire<l such decisions to be vacated in order to 
"prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from 
spawning any legal consequences." f d. , at 41. It is even 
more 11nperative that this Court invoke this procedure to. 
ensure that resolution of a "political question," which should 
not have been decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any 
legal consequences." An Art. Ill court's resolution of a ques-
tion that is "political" in character can create far more dis-
ruption among the three coequal branches of government 
than the resolution of a question presented in a moot contro-
versy. Siuce the political nature of the questions presented 
should have precluded the lower courts from ·considering or 
deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings 
in the federal courts must be vacated, and the complaint 
dismissed. 
11 'fhb Court, or rour,;e, may nof, prohibit, state courts from deciding 
polit1cal que~t10ns, any more thru1 it may prohibit them from deciding 
que~t1ons that arP moot, Dorem~~ v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 
404. (Hl52), ~o long ar-: they do 1101. trench upon exclusively federal ques-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL, V. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ST ATES, ET AL, 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 79-856. Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. Jus'l'ICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JusTICE WHITE 
joins, dissenting in part. 
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory; 
if the President does not have the power to terminate the 
Treaty ( a substantial issue that we should address only after 
briefing and oral argument), the notice of intention to ter-
minate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible, with-
out further study, to pass on the issue of justiciability or on 
the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in 
the grant of the petition for certiorari, T would set the case 








SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL, 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 79-85l1. Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the District 
Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the President's 
well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recog-
nition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App. 27 A-29A. 
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political 
question," the plurality, in my view, profoundly misappre-
hends the political question principle as it applies to matters 
of foreign relations. Properly understood, the political ques-
tion doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of 
foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to 
which authority to make that judgment has been "constitu-
tioi1al[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 
211-213, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when 
a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a par-
ticular branch has been constitutionally designated as the 
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519-521 (1969). The issue of 
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of 
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls 
within the competence of the courts. 
The constitutional question raised here is prudently 
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty 
with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition 
of the Peking government, because the defense treaty was-
predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan 
g0,vernment was the only legitimate political authority in 
. . 
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China. Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution com-
mits to the President alone the power to recognize, and with-
draw recognition from, foreign regimes. See Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v. 
Carr, supra, at 212; United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 
228-230 (1942) . That mandate being clear, our judicial 
inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. See Baker 








SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
BARRY GOLDWATER E'l' AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRlT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
o. 79-85(i. Decidrd Dcc·rmber 13, 1979 
ORDER 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is 
remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the 
complaint. 
MH. .J u,:;•r1 c~J MARSHALL concurs in the result. 
1Vl1t. Jus'rIC!!; PowELL concurs in the judgment and has filed 
a statemf'nt,, 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l' concurs in the judgment ancl has 
filed a statement in which MR. CHIEJ<' JusTICE BURGER, MR. 
,JUS1'1CID STEW ART, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, 
MR. JUSTICE WHI'l'E and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join in 
the grant of the petition for a writ of certiorari but would set 
the case for argume11t and give it plenary consideration. MR. 
JusncE BLACKMUN has filed a statement in which MR. Jus-
'L'lCE WHJ'Prn ,1oins. 
Mu. Jus'l'JCE BRBNNAN wou]d grant the petition for cer-
tiorari and affirm the judgment of thr Court of Appeals and 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. 
ON PETI'rION FOR WRI'r OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DIS'l'RICT 01!' COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
To. 79-856. Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, I 
would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review. 
I 
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be 
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Bucldey v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1, 113- 114 (1976) (per curiam) . Prudential con-
siderations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and 
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until 
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority. Differences between the President and the Con-
gress are commonplace under our system. The differences 
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than 
legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide 
issues affecting the aUocation of power between the President 
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-
tional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups 
or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial reso-
lution of issues before the normal political process has the 
opportunity to resolve the conflict. 
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the 
President's action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has 
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to 
a change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has 
taken no official action . In the present posture of this case, 
we do not know whether there ever will be an actual con-
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Although the , enate has considered a resolution declaring 
that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any 
mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-
S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). no final vote has been taken 
011 the resolution. See id., at S16683-S1G692 ( daily ed. Nov. 
15, 1979') Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution 
would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily 
ed. June 6, 197D); id., at S7862 (daily ed. Julle 18, H.)79). 
It can11ot be said that either the Senate or the House has 
rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not 
to confront the President, it 1s not our task to do so. I 
therefore conrur rn the dismissal of this case. 
II 
MR. JusTJ C~ REHNQUIS'J' suggests, however. that the issue 
preselltcd by this case is a no11justiciable political question 
which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree. 
In my view, reliance upon the political-question doctrine is 
mconsisteut with our precedents. As set forth i11 the seminal 
case of Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrille 
mcorporates three inquiries. (i) Does the issue mvolve reso-
1ution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution 
to a coordinate branch of government'? (ii) Would resolution 
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas or 
J mlicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel 
against Judicial mtervention '? lu my opinion the answer to 
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case 
if it were ready for review 
First, the existence of ''a textually demonstrable coustitu-
t10nal commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
branch," ibid., turns on a11 examrnatiou of the constitutional 
provisio11s goveruiug the exercise of the power in question . 
Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 48f:i, 5H) (19t:i9). No cousti-
'tutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the 
power to terminate treatirs. Further, Art. II, § 2 of the 
Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with 







GOLDWATER v. CARTER 
that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. 
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the 
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to 
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 
42 (1849) . 
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving'' this case; nor is a deci-
sion impossible "without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Balcer v. Carr, 369 
U. S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President 
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without con-
gressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be 
easy, but, it only requires us to apply normal principles of 
interpretatiou to the constitutional provisions at issue. See 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present 
case involves neither r~view of the President's activities as 
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the 
field of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were 
asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the 
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relatious lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. 
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but 
the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional 
division of power between Congress and the President. 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I 
find inherent in 1\/IR. JusTIGE REHNQUIS'r1s concurring opinion. 
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty 
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into 
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. Jus1.1ICE 
REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political 
question even though Art. II. § 2, clearly would resolve the 
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems 
self-evident because' it demands textual rather than inter-
stitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no 
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both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to 
decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a 
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of 
law. Such an inquiry demands no special competence or 
information beyon<l the reach of the judiciary. Cf. Chicago 
& Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 
103' 111 ( 1948) , 1 
Finally, the political-question doctrine rests in part on pru-
dential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three 
branches of government. Thus, the Judicial Branch should 
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment [ that would result] 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. ' ' Similarly, the doctrine restrains judicial actiou 
where there 1s au "unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra, 
at 217. 
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra, 
none of these prudential considerations would be present. 
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of 
respect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached 
irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question pre-
sented by this case would eluni11ate, rather thau create, multi-
ple constitut10nal interpretations. The spectre of the Federal 
Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intran-
sigence of the President and the Congress would require this 
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say 
1 The Court hns l'ecogniz('(] that, in 1hr arPa of foreign policy, Congm,s 
muy lr,wc the Pm,iclent wlth widt, di~cretion tlmt otlwrwikP might. nm 
afoul of the nondelegation doctrine . United States v. C·urtiss-Wiight 
Export Corp .. 299 U. S. ;304 (19:36) . A,-: ,-:tated in th:it. ca,-:e, "the Prcsi• 
clen1, alonP ha,-: the power to "l>eak or I1s1l'll a~ a, represeu1atwc of the 
Nat10n. FlP nwkes treaties with the adviC'e and con,-:en1 of tbe Senate; 
bui. hr alOJH> negotiates.' ' Id., nf :319 (emphas1,-: 111 the origmal). Re8o· 
lution of t.lrn; ca~o wonld interfrl'e with neither the Prc1nde11t',-: nbilit)' to 
negotia,te treatH'~ nor lu;s duty to exc·rute thr1r provi:,;ions. Wr ,,re merPly 
bcmg askrd lo decide whrther a treat~·, winch caunot be ratifird without 
Senate approval, con1mue:,; m d'fret, until the Seuafe 01 lJerhaps the 
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what the law is." United Stales v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703 
(1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 
(1803). 
nr 
In my view. the suggestion that this case presents a political 
question is incompatible with this Court's willingness on pre-
vious occasions to decide whether one branch of our govern-
ment has impinged upou the power of another. See Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U. S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 
676-678 (1929); Myers V. United States, 272 u. ·s. 52 (1926).2 
Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the 
responsibility to decide whether both the Executive and Leg-
islative Branches have constitutional roles to play in termi-
nation of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal 
action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate 
the treaty with Taiwan, thP resultin€!, uncertainty could have 
serious consequences for our country. In that situation, it 
would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue. 
2 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U S. 433 ( HJ30), is not, relevant hrrc. In 
that case, the Court wa~ a~kcd lo revi<·w the legitimacy of' a. State's 
ratification of a constitutional amendment. Four Members of the Court 
staled that Congre,;1'1 ha::s exclu~ivc power 01 n the ratifica.tion procC~t>. 
Id., at 456-460 (Black, J ., c011rurr111g, with whom Robert~, Frankfurter, 
and Douglm,, .JJ ., .1omecl) . Three i\Im1ber,.: of the Court concluded more 
narrowly that the Cour1, could not, patls upon the efficacy of Htate rntifict~-
tion. They abo found no H1 auda rd~ hy which the Court. could fix a rea-
sonable l1tne lor the rntificaiion of a, propo,;ed am.endment id., at 
452-454, 
Tbe prnpospd constltutioual :imeudrnent. ai. isHIK• in Coleman would 
have overruled dec1~ion,..: of tlu,..: Court. Compare id .. at 4:35, n. 1 wiLh 
Baileu v. Dreul Furniture Co .. 251:l U. S. 20 (H)22) ; Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 257 U. S. 251 (Hll8). Thu,-:, j11d1eial rc'v1ew of 1.he [pg1i.urn1c:v of a. 
Slate'H ratificat1011 would havr compc•llrd tl111o Court to owr~ce the very 
constitutional procrss used to rrwr:-;e Suprrm(• Court deri,;ion,;. In such 
circnm,;tanee,..: 11 may be entirrly appropriate for the Jud1cial Branch of 
govermncni, to :atep a::nde. Sec Schnrpf, .Jurl1crn.l Review and The Political 
Question: A F1mct10nal A11aly/'<1~, 75 Yale L. ,J. 517, 589 (1066). Tho 
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BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. V. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
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ON PE'l'ITION FOR WRIT OF Cl!JRTIORARI TO 'l'HE UNI'l'ED S'l'ATES 
COURT OF APP~JALS FOR THE DISTRIC'l' OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 79-856 Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, w1th whom THE CHrnF JUSTICE, 
MR. JusrrrcE S'rEWAR'r, aud MR. JusTICE STEVENS join, 
concurring. 
T am of the view that. the basic question presented by the 
petitioners iu this case is "political" and therefore nonjus~ 
ticiable because 1t mvoives the authority of the President in 
the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent 
to which the Sellate or the Congress is authorized to negate 
the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S, 
433 ( 1939) , a case in which members of the Kansas Legisla-
ture brought au action attacking a vote of the State Senate 
in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment, 
Mro Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the 
«iOpimon of the Court": 
ciw e think that . . . the question of the efficacy of rati-
fications by state legislatures, in the light of previous 
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as 
a political question pertaining to the political depart .. 
ments, wiith the ultimate authority in the Congress in th~ 
exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adop-
tion of the Amendment. . . . The precise question as 
now raised is whether. when the legislature of the State, 
as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed 
Amendment, the Court shoulu restrain the State officers 
from ·certifymg the ratification to the Secretary of State, 
because of an earlier re.1ection, a11J thus prevent the ques-
tion from coming before the political departments. We' 
fiud no basis m either Coustitutwn or statute for such 
; 
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judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of ratification, 
contains no provision as t,o rejection . . , .1' Id., at 450. 
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that 
"Congress in controlling the promulgation of the adoption of 
a constitutional amendment has the final determination of 
the question whether by lapse of t~me its proposal of the 
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifica~ 
tions-1' l d., at 456. 
I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the con-
troversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable politi,cal dispute 
that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches of the Government. · Here, while the Consti-
tut;ion is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall 
participate in the ratification of a 'rreaty, it is silent as to 
that body's participation in the abrogation of a Treaty. In 
this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra. 
As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (ND Ill. 
1975) (three-judge court): 
ssA question that might be answered in different ways for 
different amendments must surely be controlled by po-
litical standards rather than standards easily charncter-
ized as judicially manageablr/ 1 
In light of the absence of any constitutional provision govern-
ing the termination of a Treaty, and the fact that different 
termination procedures may be appropriate for different 
treaties (see, e. g., n. 1, infra), the instant case in my view, 
also "must surely be controlled by political standards." 
I think that the justifications for concluding that the ques-
tion here is political in nature are even more compelling than 
in Coleman because it involves foreign relations-specifically 
a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a, 
foreign government if attacked. In United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936), this Court said : 
!
1Whether, .if the Jornt Resolution had related solely to 
ill ternal affairs it would be open to the challenge that it 
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the Executive, we find it unnecessary to determine. The· 
whole aim of the Resolution is to affect a situation en-
tirely extemal to the United States, and falling within 
the category of foreign affairs .... " 299 U. S., at 315. 
The present case differs in several important respects from 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579· 
( 1952), cited by petitioners as authority both for reaching the 
merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals. 
In Youngstown private litigants brought a suit contesting the 
President's authority under his war powers to seize the Na-
tion's steel industry, an action of profound and demoustrable 
domestic impact. Here, by contrast, we are asked to settle 
a dispute between coequal branches of our government, each 
of which has resources available to protect and assert its in- · 
terests, resources not available to private litigants outside 
the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as rn Curtiss-Wright, the 
effect of this action. as far as we can teU, is "entirely external 
to thf' United States, and [falls] within the category of for-
eign affairs." ·Fiually, as alrrady uoted, the situation pre-
1 As observed Ly JudgP WrighL iu his eoncurring opinion below: 
"Congre::-:; has 1111t1at<·d the termi111it 10n of treat1rs by dirrrting or requir-
ing the Pre:;idrnt to g1w not1ep of termmat10n, without an~, prior presi-
dentml rPqtw~t. CongrM, ha~ annullrd treaties without an~' presidential 
notice. It, has confrnrcl on thr Prrs1dent the powrr to tenrnnate a par-
ticular treaty, and it has rnacted ~tatutes practically nullifying the do-
mestic effrcts o[ a tr,caty and thus cauHrd the Pm,iclent to carry out 
term1mtho11. . . I~,] Moreover, Con~r('ss ha~ a variety of powerful tools 
for influencmg l'ore1µ;n pohry Jec1s1ons that bear on treaty matters. 
Under Article I. Sect10n 8 of thr Co11stitut1on, 1l can rrgula.te commerce 
with foreign na!Jom;, raise and ,;upport arrrue:,;, and cleelare war. It. has 
power over the appomtment of amba"sadortl nnd thr funding of Pmbai;;sies 
and consulates. Congre~,; thus rctnms a strong mfluence ovrr the Presi-
dent.'s conduct, m treaty matter,-. Iii] A,; our polit1eal hi:.;tory dcmon-
stralc::;, trraiy ereation and termination arc complpx phenomena rooted 
in Lhe dynamic rrlat 10nsh1p bt>twr('ll tlw two political branches of our 
govemment. We thu;,, ~hould deehne the mv1tahon to 1:,ei iu concrete a 
particular corn;t1tut10nally ac<'Pptahle arrangement by which the Pre,..iclent 
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sentecl here is closely akin to that presented in Coleman, 
where the Constitution spoke only to the procedure for rati-
fication of an amendment, not to its rejection. 
Having decided that the question presented in this action is 
nonjusticiable, [ believe that the appropriate disposition is for 
this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss 
the complaint. This procedure derives support from our 
practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts.2 For 
more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to 
vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has be-
come moot prior to a resolution of the case in this Court. 
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36 ( 1950). The 
Court has required such decisions to be vacated in order to 
"prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from 
spawning any legal consequences." f d., at 41. It is even 
more imperative that this Court invoke this procedure to. 
ensure that resolution of a "political question," which should 
not have been decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any 
legal consequeuces." An Art. III court's resolution of a ques-
tion that is "political" in character can create far more dis-
ruption among the three coequal branches of government 
than the resolution of a question presented in a moot contro-
versy Since the political nature of the questions presented 
should have precluded the lower courts from considering or 
deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings 
in the federal courts must be va.cated, and the complaint 
dismissed. 
2 This Court., of r.onrse, may not prohibit state courts from deciding 
political qurr;t10ns, any more than it may prohibit them from decidjng 
qne;;t10ns that, arc moot, Doremus v. Boa.rd of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 
434 (1952), so long m; they do not trench upon exclusively federal ques-
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ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 79'--856. Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. Jus'l'ICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE 
joins, dissenting in part. 
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory; 
if the President does not have the power to terminate the 
Treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after 
briefing and oral argument) , the notice of intention to ter-
minate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible, with-
out further study, to pass on the issue of justiciability or on 
the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in 
the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case 
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BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. V. JAMES EARL CARTER, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 79-856. Decided December 13, 1979 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the District 
Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals insofar as it·Tests upon the President's 
well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recog-
nition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App. 27 A-29A. 
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political 
question,'' the plurality, in my view, profoundly misappre-
hends the political question principle as it applies to matters 
of foreign relations. Properly understood, the political ques-
tion doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of 
foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to 
which authority to make that judgment has been "constitu-
tional[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 
211-213, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when 
a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a par-
ticular branch has been constitut10nally designated as the 
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519-521 (1969). The issue of 
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of 
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls 
within the competence of the courts. 
The constitutional question raised here is prudently 
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty 
with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition 
of the Peking government, because the defense treaty was 
predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan 
government was the only legitimate political authority fo 
, .. 
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China. Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution com-
mits to the President alone the power to recognize, and with-
draw recognition from, foreign regimes. See Banco N acional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v. 
Carr, supra; at 212; United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 
228-230 (1942). That mandate being clear, our judicial 
inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. See Baker 
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